DISSENT

LEFT SLANTS ON THE SEVENTIES

Martin Kilson

Blacks in Politics
A New Power

Richard Robbins

Perishable Good:
Left Turn in American Religion

Dennis Wrong

The Population Problem
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Brendan and Patricia Sexton

Labor's Decade—Maybe

Emanuel Geltman & Stanley Plastrik

Coalition Politics Revisited

Arnold Kaufman

Political Strategy for Radical Liberals

plus: Cuba—The Dictator and the Poet... Problem of War Crimes ... Mysteries of Greek Politics ... Culture, Life Style, & Politics

AUGUST 1971

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Behind the Revolt In East Pakistan

APART FROM BASIC DIFFERENCES in language, tradition, culture, and even the manner in which their common Islamic religion is practiced, the Urdu-speaking West Pakistanis and the Bengali-speaking East ex-Pakistanis have stood in an unhealthy political, social, and economic relationship to one another ever since Pakistan was founded in 1947. It was only at the insistence of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, head of the original Muslim League and creator of the Pakistan state, that Bengal was split into East and West Bengal with the predominantly Muslim East Bengal forming East Pakistan while the predominantly Hindu West Bengal became part of India. Where partition in the West led to the tragic slaughter familiar to the world, the Bengal Partition, even though it involved the exchange of millions of people, was relatively nonviolent and peaceful, thanks partly to Gandhi's efforts but mainly to a sense of common brotherhood (of fellow Bengalis) despite religious differences. Nor was the splitting of Bengal put to a vote of the people; it was accepted reluctantly and unhappily as part of the overall division of the subcontinent.

From the start, the East Pakistanis were treated as second-class citizens by the West. The political development of Pakistan was turbulent from the very beginning. Whichever regime held power, it was bound to be dominated by West Pakistanis and to further the principle of keeping the East Pakistanis in their proper place. But an active, politicized, resentful Bengali middle class continued to emerge in the East. Demands for varying degrees of autonomy extending to separation were raised as early as the 1950s.

Meanwhile, the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan kept growing. During the period of the Third Plan (1965–70), in per-capita terms the disparity between the two rose from 46 percent to 60 percent. After the coup of 1958, which installed the "guided democracy" (i.e., military dictatorship) of Ayub Khan, the political dispossession of the Bengali middle class was complete. In 1968, the East Pakistani representation in the Civil Service of Pakistan (the elite cadre of civil servants) was only 36 percent; in lower-rank services, such as taxation, audit and accounts, police, customs, etc., the percentage was the same. Half a dozen Bengali civil servants reached the prestigious position of secretary in the central government, but no East Pakistani held the post of secretary in the key ministries of Finance, Home, or Defense. With one exception—he held the Finance portfolio for four days—no East Pakistani was appointed minister over the past 15 years.

Representation in the armed forces followed a similar pattern. Sixty percent of the army consists of Punjabis and 35 percent of Pathans from the West. The remaining 5 percent come from the rest of the country, including the East. Of 50 senior army officers who had attained the rank of major-general and above since 1947, 17 came from the Punjab, 19 from the Northwest Frontier, 11 from among Indian refugees in 1947, and 1 from Bengal.

The economic contrast is even sharper. The poor in rural East Pakistan are particularly wretched. The production of rice (the major staple) has been stagnant. A decline in the world price of jute caused by the growing use of synthetics and a phenomenal increase in the ranks of landless agricultural laborers have contributed to a drop in the income of the Bengali agrarian population. Rural per-capita income dropped from 228 rupees for the period between 1949–50 and 1953–54 to 198 rupees for the period between 1964–65 and 1967–68. A growth of radical movements in the countryside followed.

East Pakistan was subject to a colonial pattern of economy for two decades. Primary commodities, primarily jute (East Pakistan is the world's leading producer of raw jute), were exported throughout the world in order to earn foreign exchange which was, in turn, channeled for the industrial development of West Pakistan. There, in the words of Gustav

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Papanek (*Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives,* Cambridge, Mass., 1967) a philosophy of industrial development based upon "the social utility of greed" prevails. To complete the cycle, manufactured products from West Pakistan were sold at artificially inflated prices in the protected East Pakistani market. The bulk of central funds for developmental and nondevelopmental purposes were also diverted to West Pakistan, while in the East only about half the alloted funds would actually be spent. As for nondevelopmental expenditures, the bulk of this went for the Indus Basin program in the West. And with the bulk of defense expenditures and costs for civil administration concentrated in West Pakistan, there naturally developed a lopsided distribution of resources.

These are the major factors behind the movement for fiscal and political autonomy in East Pakistan, centering in the Awami League headed by the imprisoned Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Actually, within this broad surge toward autonomy one must note two basic currents: a Bengali middle-class movement for regional autonomy (now transformed into a movement for complete independence, Bangla Desh), and a more radical peasant and workers' movement for a restructuring of the socio-economic order. Through their violent repression, the West Pakistanis have succeeded in welding these two currents into one.

—S. P. □

Algeria: The Revolution Devours Its Children

THE ASSASSINATION OF BELKACEM KRIM, one of the nine original leaders of the Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front) in Frankfurt, West Germany, on October 21, 1970, leads one to ask, what has become of the original FLN leadership since its launching of an insurrection on November 1, 1954? The answer is a tragedy of historic proportions, though widely unknown.

Krim had previously been sentenced to death *in absentia* by a revolutionary tribunal in Algeria meeting on April 6, 1969. He was living on borrowed time, since in its decision the court had said that "anyone" had the right to carry out its sentence! Like "K" in *The Trial,* he met his executioners in a cheap hotel room—and was strangled. Who they were we do not know . . . perhaps "volunteers of the court"?

Born in the mountainous Grand Kabylia region of Algeria in 1922, Krim was a talented guerrilla leader who, like many others, had been trained in the French army. He was one of the original nine Young Turks who had taken leadership of Algeria's nationalist movement out of the hands of its founding father, Messali Hadj, now a lonely and aged man living in permanent exile in France. Later, after the call for insurrection, Belkacem Krim became a member of the 17-member CNRA (National Council of the Algerian Revolution); with Ben Tobbal and Boussouf, Krim may be described as one of three who led a revolution. He became Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister of the Provisional Algerian Republic, then the Republic's first Vice President in 1958 until 1962. When he broke politically with Ben Bella, then head of the Algerian Republic, Krim left the country in 1963 to form a political opposition in exile. He returned briefly to Algeria when Ben Bella was ousted in a coup by the present head of state, Colonel Boumedienne. But Krim shortly found himself opposed to Boumedienne as well and left Algeria for the last time in June 1965. Four years later, he was condemned to death by Boumedienne. Krim's original comrades-in-arms have fared equally poorly. Their fate has been death, imprisonment, or a fall from power.

Of the original membership of the CNRA and the nine signees of the original revolutionary call, not a single one remains in a leading position in Algeria. The fate of Ben Bella and Belkacem Krim we have already described. Ben Tobbal is out of political life and manages a small steel plant in Algeria. Boussouf is a businessman in Algiers. Mohammed Khider, after going into political opposition, was assassinated in Spain in 1967. Ahmed Mezerna lives the difficult life of a political exile in Paris. Chaddly Mekki has a minor post as a functionary in the Algerian Ministry of National Education. Lahouel Hussein is director of the pari-mutual track-betting system in Algeria. Ouamrane has a minor post in the

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ARNOLD KAUFMAN

We learn, as we go to press, that Arnold Kaufman, a member of the DISSENT editorial board, has been killed in an airplane accident over Los Angeles. Arnold was a leading activist in the peace movement, especially SANE, and in the New Democratic Coalition; he had emerged as a distinguished spokesman for left-liberalism in the United States; and in recent years he had become a devoted collaborator of DISSENT. A kind and gentle man, patient with colleagues, friends, and opponents, he embodied in his life the best of liberal values. The collaboration we had established with Arnold seemed to us a hopeful sign of a collaboration that might—indeed, must—be established in this country on a far greater scale. That he has been struck down by an accident while still a young man, is a terrible blow—to his family, his friends, his students, his colleagues. We join in the mourning for Arnold Kaufman.

THE EDITORS □

present administration. Dr. Francis died a natural death in a Swiss clinic two years ago. Debaghine lives obscurely in Algeria. Ben Khedda returned to practicing his profession of a pharmacist.

Every revolution has its professional opportunist who turns up on all the lists of the victors. In this instance, it is Mohammed Yazid, once minister of information in the government, and presently its ambassador to the United Nations. If he thinks about the long list of his former associates, all now gone, he remains silent.

The original secular leadership of the Algerian Revolution has been replaced by narrow militarists and technicians who flavor their authoritarian regime with "Arabization" and the teachings of Mohammed.

Again, the revolution devours its children, and too often the best of them. A little bit of that democracy which certain "leftist" intellectuals in America sneer at when they discuss the Third World might have stood Algeria in good stead—to say nothing of those who led its liberation.

—H. J. □

Progress Report On the YPSL

BUILDING A RADICAL YOUTH MOVEMENT is never easy. Building one that is committed to the discipline of reason and to the ideal of democracy is considered all but impossible.

Nevertheless, it is being done, with modest but impressive success.

The Young People's Socialist League was reestablished five years ago by about two dozen democratic socialists concentrated in New York City and the West Coast. A number of them had dropped out of Students for a Democratic Society, having seen (with some prescience) the direction in which that movement was heading.

The YPSL now is a substantial force on campus and has close to 1,000 members. There are 25 chapters, half of which are located in New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, while 7 others are in California. Over the last two years, a number of chapters have been started in Illinois and Michigan. In addition, there are about 15 organizing committees, many of which should soon achieve chapter status.

(continued on page 408)

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REGIONAL INTEGRATION

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AUGUST 1971

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Dennis H. Wrong

War Crimes and Politics

The knotty problem of war crimes—what they are, how to respond to them, whether the Left should try to make them into a major political issue—is likely to figure largely in the next year or two. Below appears a comment by an editor of DISSENT *giving his opinion on this matter; very probably, others among us have different opinions. We expect to open our pages on this topic during the coming months to a range of views from among our contributors and readers* —ED.

THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBLE DOUBT that the United States has violated in Indochina the laws of war laid down by the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the principles on which the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials were based, and several specific regulations in the U.S. Army Field Manual. Air and artillery bombardments of civilian populations and search-and-destroy ground missions were general policies established by the top military command with the support of Washington—where political leaders opted for such policies in preference to an occupation of Vietnam by ground troops, which would have required higher draft calls and more American casualties.

To claim that civilian and military leaders in Washington were unaware that the execution of these policies resulted in the killing and wounding of hundreds of thousands of noncombatant peasants defies all credibility. Thus the Yameshita precedent is clearly applicable—more justly so indeed than it was to General Yameshita—to Presidents Johnson and Nixon, their secretaries of defense, joint chiefs of staff, and commanding generals in the field.

As one descends the chain of command, general policies become translated into ever-more specific orders, as is always the case in large bureaucracies, until one reaches a Lieutenant William Calley at My Lai who led his men in actually carrying out orders he had received from Captain Medina. Calley was found guilty of war crimes (and Medina may well be too), but men above them were also guilty under the U.S. Army's code up to at the very least Major-General Koster, against whom the army dropped charges although he was in a helicopter above My Lai at the time of the massacre. And, of course, there were other My Lais.

What about the international crime of genocide? I am one of the middle-aged described by Peter Gay in his Introduction to Karl Bracher's *The German Dictatorship* who "rage at the facile abuse of the terrible words of the 1940's that disfigure so much of our discourse today." I am impressed, moreover, by Neil Sheehan's argument in his recent brilliant *New York Times Book Review* piece, "Should We Have War Crime Trials?" that genocide is an inaccurate charge in view of the fact that the population of South Vietnam has, despite all war-related deaths, grown by 2 million since the early 60s. Someone is bound to reply that Hitler didn't kill all the Jews of Europe, or even of Poland, either—that the attempt is

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what should count. Sheehan himself quotes American generals in Saigon who were well aware that the destruction of the rural population deprived the enemy of new recruits, thus "revers[ing] Mao-Tse-tung's maxim by drying up the sea (the peasantry) in which the guerrillas swam." This, it could be argued, comes close to genocide: the total destruction of a population.

Yet the population in question was hardly the South Vietnamese people as a whole. It was rather the peasantry in areas where the Vietcong were most active. Also, much of the killing has been a by-product of the massive and indiscriminate use of modern technological warfare, a use favored for reasons other than that it guaranteed the killing of large numbers of civilians whatever military advantages cynical generals, such as one quoted by Sheehan, may have discerned in this result. Bad as this is, and I think it suggests the necessity for new international laws restricting the use of aerial and perhaps artillery bombardments in war, it is not really genocide. The invocation of that deadly term by critics of the war is a form of rhetorical overkill more likely to prevent than to encourage a real facing up to what the United States has done in Vietnam.

Should we, then, demand that Lyndon Johnson be put in the dock and tried for war crimes? Violations of international law committed by the United States in Southeast Asia, and even destruction that was not in express violation of existing international agreements, should receive maximum publicity; but I doubt that national revulsion against the Vietnam disaster and a determination to avoid any repetition of it will be strengthened by an attempt to personalize guilt. Where would we stop? Presidents, secretaries of defense, the joint chiefs, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams—okay, but what about influential advisers on the White House staff like Rostow, Bundy, or Kissinger, who are invariably mentioned as candidates for trial and yet possessed no formal "line" authority in the chain of command? A piddling legal question, to be sure, when everyone knows that their advice was crucial to involving us and keeping us involved in Southeast Asia. But if we adopt formal legalistic procedure to assign individual guilt, it is just such piddling legal questions that are unavoidable.

A liberal columnist the other day, advising the Democrats not to renominate Hubert Humphrey in 1972, said he belonged in the dock on trial for war crimes in Vietnam. But the Vice-Presidency is, as we all know, largely a ceremonial and public-relations office without any real authority. What about senators, including Senator Fulbright and leading doves now running for President as antiwar spokesmen, who voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution in 1965? There was considerable ambiguity and arbitrariness in the selection of those who were tried at Nuremberg, not to speak of the legal confusion resulting from the combination of the charges of "conspiring to wage aggressive war" and "crimes against humanity." I thought then, and still think, that the first charge was a mistake, a flagrant imposition of victor's justice even when invoked against the Nazis. And this was even more clearly the case in the Tokyo trials. Why compound these errors by adopting them as precedents?

I think it preferable to appoint a commission, like the Kerner or Warren commissions, to investigate and report on our actions in Southeast Asia since 1965, but not to assign legal or quasi-legal degrees of guilt to individuals. This has been suggested in a recent issue of the *New Republic,* which even lists possible members of the commission. (I disagree, however, with the *New Republic's* suggestion that U.S. responsibility for waging "aggressive war," the old Nuremberg charge, should be explored by the commission.)

Let individual policy-makers be named and criticized, let the orders of staff and field officers that resulted in violations of international law be enumerated and their authors named, let new laws restricting the technological devastation of people and land be suggested. But avoid the guilt-mongering and adversary pro-

Vietnam Papers

The sensational Vietnam Papers are being published just as we go to press. It makes no sense to try to comment on them in this issue. We will do so in our next one.

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ceedings of a criminal trial assigning degrees of individual guilt and imposing penalties. Not because everyone, and therefore no one in particular, is guilty—a proposition on which both the outraged patriots who have tried to make a martyr out of Calley and those radicals who call the war "genocidal" and equate the United States with Hitler's Germany are in essential agreement. No; because a trial procedure would ensure endless diversionary litigious wrangling on a far greater scale than that of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.

The proposal often heard on the Left for a UN tribunal makes even less sense. Would it not also have to investigate the war crimes committed by North Vietnam, at Hué for instance during the Tet offensive, even if not those of the Vietcong and the ARVN forces because they are participants in a civil war? Pakistan belongs to the UN and the Pakistani army killed an estimated three or four times as many people within a few weeks last April than have been killed by U.S. forces in Southeast Asia in six years, yet that is a civil war presumably outside UN jurisdiction. What about South Africa and Sharpeville where the UN has been urged to take stands under statutes derived from the Nuremberg tribunals governing "human rights"? Will we really come to terms with Vietnam by opening this Pandora's box? Finally, will judgment by foreigners be more or less likely to bring Americans to a full realization of the evil their government has wrought in Indochina?

When it comes to the actual commission of crimes like Calley's, let the perpetrators be judged as he was by military courts. True, the Army will cover for its own and seek to avoid, as it already has, indicting any but a few scapegoats. But the report—impending and actual—of a prestigious commission documenting war crimes as fully as possible should make it harder for the Army to pursue this policy. Continuing public debate and the appointment of a commission to prepare a report will increase the likelihood that other My Lais will come to light and be exposed to the glare of publicity, especially if we elect in 1972 a President who is an unambiguous opponent of the war.

David Bromwich

A Word on the Calley Case

EVERY AGE has its public drama, a scene jarred loose of context which illuminates that longer, impassive flow of events that leaves most people happily unconcerned. From the first it should have been apparent that the My Lai massacre would become just such a drama for all of us. And yet the public reaction to Hersh's story was deceptively placid. Straight off, the moral problem was complicated by the fixing of blame, arbitrarily, half-way down the chain of command. But at the time nobody much bothered about it. So the change of mood could not be gradual; it was sudden and absolute. Now that the verdict has been delivered and shock waves have been sent reverberating through the nation, we can begin to see the significance of the case. The outrage was sounding peculiarly without object, and it must therefore have been all the more painful. In all this, it should be plain that the court-martial of Lieutenant Calley has brought the war home more forcibly than radicals ever could have hoped to do.

I think that a good part of the sentiment

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lined up with Calley has to be understood as a perversion of rooting for the underdog. Calley is the little guy being handed a bum rap by the Army brass, who naturally want to cover up their own side of the show. Of course, this kind of feeling isn't unhealthy—it is "typically American"—but it is not in any sense pre- or proto-radical. It is rather on a level with that sentiment that announces its distrust for all politicians and then produces votes for George Wallace, as one who speaks his mind. Calley spoke his mind—he followed orders. And for that reason he is not so much respected as trusted; he is comprehensible.

There are leftists who defend Calley as the circumstantial victim of some much wider ambit of guilt, and no doubt their instinct is right. But they do not see the situation as it is. For there can be little hope of appropriating the pro-Calley sentiment for left-wing purposes, looking toward the eventual trial and conviction of Westmoreland *et al.* So much is obvious, and leads to a well-worn and quite sensible observation. Granted that the war in Vietnam ranks among the more formidable atrocities of a century rich in barbarous acts, still, when has the punishment for such crimes been exacted from those who enforced the will of a nation not at last fully defeated and humiliated? Yet perhaps there is a danger of being too easily satisfied. It might be objected, for example, that this is arguing moral from fact—turning the existing state of affairs into a judgment on every possibility, confusing "is" with "ought"—and that so long as we go on clamoring for heads there is the chance of setting a precedent. About any such retort I must say that I remain skeptical in a "practical" way, but not on principle. The war has done incalculable harm to this nation, and the further prosecution of war criminals may be one way, though hardly the most direct or efficient, of assuaging the wound.

At any rate, those who say that Calley has been made the scapegoat certainly have a point. Something had to come between the man who couldn't bear to kill a reindeer and the man who slaughtered untold numbers of Vietnamese, and what came between was the Army. That he did have an important share in the slaughter, however, makes all the difference. For in order to defend him on *moral* grounds it would be necessary to feel a certain sympathy for the man, and that it is not possible to do. Here, I am afraid, the radical defense of Calley runs aground, for if the moral basis of the prosecution is once forgotten then the chain-of-command notion is left in charge, and only a very few can be guilty. The gradations of guilt and innocence must surely be finer than that: one should bear this in mind with respect to future war crimes tribunals as well.

One further point may be worth mentioning. It is often feared that as we wind down the war a "stab-in-the-back" myth will gain currency, as the logical focus of a national sense of frustration. This may yet happen, but one odd feature of the public reaction to Calley is that it has nothing to do with the antiwar movement. There is no talk about a stab in the back or anything of the sort. Where reaction of another kind has its first real chance, it is not even putting in an appearance. Where jingoism ought to come into play, there is only a feeling of unbearable sadness. A resolution of the Kansas state legislature says that we all "share this guilt to the degree that we have permitted our leaders to lead us into this war. . . . The trial is the culmination of a war that has rotted and decayed our nation severely." They are saying this in Kansas. One is almost tempted to cry out "only in a democracy," but such a happy rebound, in the face of all the bloodshed, might smack of something worse than complacency.

Inevitable?

"Why is it necessary for Fidel Castro to continue to change so blindly the image of a revolution that was so dear to us? He has gotten one of his highest functionaries, after two years of imprisonment, to confess to having been an agent of the CIA and to having passed along information to another 'agent' none other than our friend Professor René Dumont. . . ."
JEAN DANIEL, *Editor of* Le Nouvel Observateur, *in the issue dated March 8, 1971*

P.S. DISSENT *readers will recall the study on Cuba and its failures which appeared in our September–October 1970 issue and was written by René Dumont, renowned agricultural expert and original sympathizer of the Castroite revolution.*

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Irving Howe

Cuba: The Dictator and the Poet

The case of Herberto Padilla is of great importance, first as a reflection of the increasing Stalinization of the Castro regime, and second as a test of the responses that are elicited among what, I suppose, must be called the "Left" intellectuals. For readers unfamiliar with this case, let me present a brief factual summary:

On March 20, 1971, Herberto Padilla, a prominent Cuban poet and supporter of the Castro regime, was arrested on unspecified charges and imprisoned in Havana. A group of European and Latin-American intellectuals, who had been supporters of the Cuban revolution, issued a letter expressing their dismay at this act; their letter was reprinted in the May 6 issue of the *New York Review of Books*. It turned out, meanwhile, that on April 25 Padilla had been released, after having written or at least signed a statement of "self-criticism" while in jail. On April 27, in a ceremony of public humiliation, he read this statement before a meeting of the Cuban Writers' Union.

We take these details from an article in the June 3 issue of the *New York Review* written by José Yglesias, a writer who has composed a good many celebrations of the Castro regime. It therefore comes with special force that Yglesias should now write:

> In his statement of self-criticism last month, Padilla adopted—with what anguish one can well imagine—the image that his adversaries offered: he described himself as an Iago, counter-revolutionary, subtle, insidious, malignant, the source for all the criticism of Cuba that foreign writers like K. S. Karol and René Dumont have published.

How far-fetched—yet, to those who have lived through the last few decades, how sickeningly familiar—all this is! Karol is a writer who has defended Castroism and Maoism; Dumont is a French agronomist who for some time worked as an adviser to the Cuban government and who later published a book, *Cuba: Est-Il Socialiste?*, in which he criticized the bureaucratic deformations of the regime. (Portions of this book were translated in DISSENT, September-October 1970; it is a significant comment on the American intellectual climate that this important book has not been published here.) According to Yglesias, it is probable that Padilla never even met Dumont: in any case, the bulk of Dumont's criticism had to do with Cuban agricultural policy, a matter on which he needed no one's advice, let alone that of a poet.

Yglesias continues by quoting from *Le Monde* a report that Castro boasted that he "had personally ordered the arrest of Padilla" and had added—I now quote Yglesias—"that other Cuban intellectuals could suffer the same fate. At a gathering of university students Fidel indirectly replied to the intellectuals' letter with the statement that Cubans would see now who are really the friends of Cuba, accusing those who have interested themselves in Padilla's case of imposing conditions on their friendship."

Yglesias then provides a detailed account of the circumstances that led to Padilla's disgrace. Reading this account, anyone endowed with historical memory will be forced to make a comparison with the circumstances under which an endless array of Russian writers, ready enough to bow to the Stalin dictatorship but still hoping to salvage a fraction of their integrity, were brought to submission.

The entire text of Padilla's "confession"—which his old friend, the Cuban novelist Joan Arcocha, declares in *Le Monde* "could only have been extracted under torture"—is not yet available. But Yglesias gives us a good enough taste of it:

> In his statement, Padilla began by reproaching himself for his literary vanity and political and intellectual fatuity and went on to confess that he had defamed every project of the revolution. . . . [At the Writers' Union meeting] he called

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on others writers—among them his wife Belkis Cuza Male, Pablo Armando Fernandez, Cesar Lopez, Manuel Dias Martinez—to overcome their weaknesses which "could lead them to political and moral degradation," and *Le Monde* reports that at the meeting each of these writers arose and confessed his faults.

In response to this ghastliness, there appeared on May 21 a statement signed by 60 intellectuals, among them Jean Paul Sartre, Susan Sontag, and Alberto Moravia, expressing their "shame and anger" over the treatment of Padilla. The statement, as printed in the *New York Times*, continues:

> The contents of this confession, with its absurd accusations and delirious assertions . . . recall the most sordid moments of the era of Stalinism, with its prefabricated verdicts and its witch-hunts. . . .
>
> We would want the Cuban revolution to return to what made us consider it as a model in the realm of socialism.

II

LET US STOP for a moment's reflection.

No one with even a minimal attachment to the values of liberty will fail to be pleased by the vigor of the statement issued by the 60 intellectuals, especially in their entirely justified comparison between the methods used by the Castro regime to break Padilla and the methods used earlier by Stalinism. Yet it would be too easy and far from honest to let the matter go at that. For the 60 intellectuals tell us proudly that from the first they were defenders of the Castro regime and "considered it exemplary in its respect for the human being."

Exemplary, no less! Where have these people been the last few years? Have they managed not to hear about Huber Matos, the former close friend of Castro and fellow-guerrilla in the revolution, who now languishes in jail because he dared to criticize the policies of the Maximum Leader? Is the skin of Matos any the less precious than that of Padilla? And have the 60 intellectuals managed not to read the profoundly moving appeal that was released last year from the inmates of Castro's prisons (reprinted in DISSENT, May–June 1970)?

In a word, might they not add to their indignation some reflection on their failures to be publicly indignant during all these years that the Cuban regime has suppressed dissident voices? Years, they now tell us, that they still consider as a "model in the realm of socialism"?

We need to go a step further. How, one must ask oneself, after the experiences of the last decades is it possible for people who have gained distinction through the use of their minds to speak of *any* one-party dictatorship as "a model in the realm of socialism"? The central lesson of politics in our century has been that *any* regime that suppresses democratic liberties has no right, political or moral, to the designation of "socialism"—and still more, that such a regime, through its arbitrariness, its manipulation of workers and intellectuals, its inherent brutality, can only end as the very opposite of socialism. During the past decade we were told that, true as this might be in respect to Stalinism in Russia, it was "mechanical" and "unimaginative" to say the same thing about Cuba. For our part, however, we have stubbornly persisted in the conviction that without democracy, socialism is inconceivable. Does the Cuban experience prove us to be wrong?

And that is where sharp criticism must be directed against the signers of the letter criticizing the Castro regime. They are right, of course, in protesting the Stalinist brutality with which Herberto Padilla was treated, but having done so, they also have an obligation to reconsider their belief that the one-party dictatorship which made this brutality possible merits its description as "a model in the realm of socialism."

Nor is this merely one of those "ideological nuances" or hair-splitting quarrels that keeps recurring in intellectual life. It is the central question, the overwhelming question, of modern politics. The signers of the Sartre-Sontag-Moravia statement, like Yglesias in the *New York Review*, and by implication, the *New York Review itself*—all confine themselves to a criticism of Castroism *from within its own premises*. They fail to raise the question of the authoritarian nature of the regime itself. Perhaps they felt that this was not an appropriate occasion. Very well; but how many times must we repeat the experiences of a Communist one-party dictatorship, how many times must we relive Stalin and Zhdanov and all their imitators on all the continents before people like Sartre, Sontag, and Moravia will come to grips with this crucial reality?

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Martin Kilson

Black Politics: A New Power

Political Sociology of Racism

FOR THE FIRST half-century after slavery was abolished in the United States, the Negro lived mainly in the rural South and, save for a brief 10–15 years of Reconstruction, he had no rights of political participation. During this same period, the major white non-Protestant ethnic groups were crowding into the cities of the East, North, and Midwest, and by the end of the 19th century they had laid the basis for mastering the politics of the emerging urban society.[1] But the Negro did not enter urban society in significant numbers until World War I, and so for nearly 40 years, roughly from the early 1880s to 1915, the typical black had neither political rights (stripped from him by the white racist rule in the post-Reconstruction South) nor access to the social system of urban America.

The cities were becoming the center of sociopolitical influence, and the Negro's belated migration from the South to the cities of the East, North, and Midwest meant that his institutional capability for handling modern urban life was much weaker than that of the white ethnic urban groups which had preceded him by 40 years. In fact, their lead in settling in the cities amounted to more than 40 years; for although black migration from the South began in earnest around 1910–15, in the succeeding 50 years more than half of the Negro population remained in the South. (See Table I.)

[1] See Charles Merriam, *The American Party System* (New York, 1924).

In the first 60 years of this century, only a minority of the black population, though an increasing minority (e.g., 10 percent in 1910, 23 percent in 1930, 32 percent in 1950, 40 percent in 1960), had any opportunity at all to experience modern political life.[2] However, the political experience of this urbanized black minority obviously was part of the kind of political life that was to dominate 20th-century America. Therefore this black urban sector has been and remains crucial in shaping both current and future Negro politics. What, then, was the experience of this critical urban minority of the Negro population that resided outside the South from 1910 to the post-World War II era?

Of primary importance was that the migration from the South brought hundreds of thousands of Negroes at least some of the

[2] Negroes did not acquire effective voting rights in the South until the Federal Voting Act of 1965.

TABLE I

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION REGION—1950, 1960, and 1966

	Negro Population		
Region	1950	1960	1966
United States	100	100	100
South	68	60	55
North	28	34	37
Northeast	13	16	17
North-central	15	18	20
West	4	6	8

Source: *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C., 1968).

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political rights they had so long been denied. Without this migration, they doubtless would not have obtained these primary political rights far beyond the 1960s, when they were secured, at least in the written law. Ruling elites in the South certainly were both willing and able to sustain Negro political subservience to the end of this century, and the connivance of the North, Midwest, and West cannot be discounted.[3] Fortunately, the measure of political freedom available to blacks in other parts of the country was sufficient to allow an attack on white authoritarianism in the South.

Urbanization provided blacks with the social organization and institutional differentiation that is necessary for effective political power.[4] Essentially, political modernization is a matter of highly differentiated strata and institutions that will sustain political articulation beyond parochial settings (ethnic, religious, regional, economic, etc.) in order to provide public and civil services.

BUT BLACK URBANIZATION was a *particular* form of city-dwelling.

Negro city-dwelling in this century was stifled by that cluster of norms or customs characterized by the term white racism. W. Lloyd Warner, the sociologist of mainstream America, discovered this in Yankee City: "The caste barrier or color line, rigid and unrelenting, has cut off this small group [of blacks—0.48 percent of the population] from the general life of the community." [5] As Warner knew well, whatever the general life of a modern community is, surely politics is a salient feature: for politics is, after all, the process through which services and benefits are allocated among competing sectors of society. The restrictions imposed by whites upon blacks necessarily jeopardize the latter's capacity for political adaptation to life in the cities: blacks were victims of the whims and caprices of white politicians, bureaucrats, and party machines, few of which were notable for exemplary political manners even in dealings with whites.[6]

From World War I onward, the coercive regulatory agencies of the cities combined with party and machine organizations to exclude the Negro from an effective political role. Not that the black city-dwellers were ignored by white-controlled city politics; their numbers alone argued against total indifference. (See Table II.) Rather, white city machines, with the notable exception of Chicago,[7] simply dealt halfheartedly with the problem of the political inclusion of black ethnic groups on terms comparable to that of white ethnic groups. Even more, special acts of city machines from World War I onward sought to truncate top Negro political development: "The immigrants and their descendants who controlled the [political] machines were anti-Negro," remarked Herbert Gans, "and gerrymandered ghetto neighborhoods so that they would not have to share their power with Negroes." [8] The coercive power of city machines related to the urban black in ways that demoralized him.

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[3] See Rayford W. Logan, *The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir 1877–1901* (New York, 1954).

[4] W. E. B. DuBois, *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study* (Philadelphia, 1899), pp. 233–34, *passim*. DuBois, one of the first systematic observers of the urban Negro, recognized over 70 years ago that there is a strong correlation between the institutional differentiation available to city-dwelling blacks and their political modernization.

[5] W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven, 1941), p. 217, *passim*. The Lynds discovered a similar situation in their study of a typical American community, the small-sized city of Muncie, Indiana (35,000 population) in the 1920s. So did Frank Quillin, who surveyed Negro status in several cities of Ohio before World War I. See Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middle Town* (New York, 1929); Frank U. Quillin, *The Color Line in Ohio* (Ann Arbor, 1913).

[6] See, e.g., Dayton David McKean, *The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action* (Boston, 1940).

[7] Cf., Harold F. Gosnell, *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago* (Chicago, 1935).

[8] Herbert J. Gans, "The Ghetto Rebellions and Urban Class Conflict," in Robert Connery, ed., *Urban Riots* (New York, 1969), pp. 52–53.

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As Gunnar Myrdal observed some 30 years ago:

> In most Northern communities, Negroes are more likely than whites to be arrested under any suspicious circumstances. They are more likely to be accorded discourteous or brutal treatment at the hands of the police than are whites. The rate of killing of Negroes by the police is high in many Northern cities. . . . The attitudes of the police will sometimes be found among the most important items considered in local Negro politics in the North.[9]

In summary, the rigid and inhuman restrictions placed upon the Negro's access to the modern social system of American cities distorted and truncated his political development in the past 60 years. No other American immigrant group faced comparable barriers to political modernization.[10] It was precisely the white immigrants' reasonably, though not fully, caste-free interaction with the city power structures that enabled them to shape their social institutions.[11]

Ethnicity and the Negro Political Subsystem

SURELY AN INTERPLAY OF POLITICS and social structure similar to that of white ethnic groups was required for effective and modern politicization of Negroes. As it happened, however, much less than this occurred. The violence and militancy typical of contemporary urban Negro politics stem directly from this situation. So do the current endeavors of two kinds of black leadership to utilize black ethnicity as an instrument for political efficacy in the black ghetto. One kind of leadership is highly ideological, articulating militancy and black ethnicity as a matter of willed belief; the other is pragmatic, though not without a world view, articulating militancy and black ethnicity as a matter of political necessity. In the latter, militancy and ethnicity are wedded to established city politics, much in the manner of white ethnic late-19th-century

[9] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), p. 527, *passim*.
[10] Cf., Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston, 1951), chaps. 7–8; also Lawrence H. Fuchs, ed., *American Ethnic Politics* (New York, 1968).
[11] Cf., Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1949).

TABLE II

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF NEGROES IN SELECTED NORTHERN CITIES, 1910–1940

	Number of Negroes				Percent Negroes in Population			
	1910	1920	1930	1940	1910	1920	1930	1940
New York	91,709	152,467	327,706	458,444	1.9	2.7	4.7	6.1
Chicago	44,103	109,458	233,903	277,731	2	4.1	6.9	8.2
Philadelphia	84,459	134,229	219,599	250,880	5.5	7.4	11.3	13
Detroit	5,741	40,838	120,066	149,119	1.2	4.1	7.7	9.2
St. Louis	43,960	69,854	93,580	108,765	6.4	9	11.4	13.3
Cleveland	8,448	34,451	71,899	84,504	1.5	4.3	8	9.6
Pittsburgh	25,623	37,725	54,983	62,216	4.8	6.4	8.2	9.9
Cincinnati	19,639	30,079	47,818	55,593	5.4	7.5	10.6	12.2
Indianapolis	21,816	34,678	43,967	51,142	9.3	11	12.1	13.2
Los Angeles	7,599	15,579	38,894	63,774	2.4	2.7	3.1	4.2
Newark	9,475	16,977	38,880	45,760	2.7	4.1	8.8	10.6
Gary	383	5,299	17,922	20,394	2.3	9.6	17.8	18.3
Dayton	4,842	9,025	17,077	20,273	4.2	5.9	8.5	9.6
Youngstown	1,936	6,662	14,552	14,615	2.4	5	8.6	8.7

Source: *United States Census Reports.*

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and early-20th-century politicians. The goal is to facilitate the Negro community's vertical political structure, and to surmount the horizontal class cleavages. This was never realized through other forms of politics available to urban Negroes in this century—not through the second-class version of machine politics available to urban blacks (which I have characterized elsewhere as neoclientage machine politics [12]) and not through civil rights or protest politics.

The limited relationship between the urban Negro and the white-controlled city machine, from World War I through World War II, deprived the blacks of a primary mode of political development that had been available to white immigrant groups—*the politicization of ethnicity*. This means simply to use ethnic patterns and prejudices as the primary basis for interest-group and political formations, and to build upon these to integrate a given ethnic community into the wider politics of the city and the nation.[13] To the extent that a given ethnic community was successful in so organizing itself, it could claim a share of city-based rewards and, through congressional and presidential politics, of federal government rewards.[14] To fall outside or be only partially integrated into this process, since World War I, was necessarily to be without a basis for sociopolitical power.

The urban Negro thus was either outside or only partially linked to this politicization of ethnicity through city machines, and his political actions have borne the mark of this experience ever since. Thus, the Negro lower or popular strata (that is, the working class, the marginal working class, and the chronically unemployed class) have been, until the past decade, deprived of participatory incentives, an experience that had motivated the white ethnic lower strata's political development.[15] This, in turn, has produced a Negro urban lower strata that by the 1960s ranked low in all salient indices of modern political life: low political skill and knowledge, a high sense of powerlessness and estrangement from institutionalized processes, and low participation. Second, the city machines' relative neglect of the black ghetto in the years 1915–60 deprived the Negro elites (the black middle and upper classes) of the opportunity and incentives to give political leadership. Whereas the city machines' full-fledged inclusion of white ethnic communities provided a powerful stimulus to the Irish, Italian, Jewish, Polish, and other ethnic bourgeoisies to participate in the political organization (and thus control) of their ethnic lower strata,[16] the black bour-

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[12] Martin Kilson, "Political Change in the Negro Ghetto, 1900–1940," in Nathan Huggins, Martin Kilson, Daniel Fox, eds., *Key Issues in the Afro-American Experience* (New York, 1971), pp. 167–92.

[13] See, e.g., Harold Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago, 1937).

[14] For a study of city-based rewards stemming from the politicization of ethnicity, see Theodore Lowi, *At The Pleasure of The Mayor: Patronage and Power In New York City 1898–1958* (London, 1964). Since the 1930s the federal government has become the major source of the politically inspired benefits called patronage for ethnic groups that contribute to congressional and presidential victories.

[15] It is often forgotten how crucial city (and county) party machines were in providing the white ethnic lower strata with viable political organization. Neither interest nor pressure groups such as trade unions or lesser political forms of voluntary associations equalled city machines in this regard. Indeed, interest groups like trade unions and veterans' organizations realized their more effective politicization through city machines. Moreover, the majority of white ethnics in the working class and marginal working class, not to mention those who were lower class, never gained trade union membership anyway, which meant that they could rely only on party machines or paramachine organizations for their politicization. On the central role of city (and county) machines in politicizing white ethnic lower strata, see Gosnell, *Machine Politics*, chaps. 1–4. On role of party machines in politicizing interest groups that serve the lower strata, see Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield, *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest* (Glencoe, 1955). See also J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (New York, 1969).

[16] Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States: A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses* (Durham, 1930).

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geoisie, for the most part, was indeed not induced to use its institutions to politicize the black lower strata in order to bring their votes to the service of party machines. Only in Chicago did this pattern of political relationship between the black bourgeoisie and the black lower strata evolve between the two World Wars. In Chicago, contrary to the pattern of other cities, the white politicians—especially Republicans—accepted the full-fledged inclusion of the black ethnic turf on terms comparable to those applied to the white ethnic turfs.[17] In other cities, however, the Negro elites, denied full-fledged inclusion in machine politics, turned to civil rights or protest politics.

Civil rights politics was largely a middle-class affair: from 1915 to the 1950s the leadership and membership were mainly middle-class, and the large Negro lower strata had little political relationship to civil rights politics. This meant that the politics pursued by Negro elites in most cities never produced a vertical integration of the elites with the Negro lower strata. In short, the civil rights politics, which the neglect of city machines caused Negro elites in most cities to adopt, had a class and status bias that prevented the black ghetto from taking on the attributes of an ethnic political subsystem—that is, an articulate and politically cohesive group within the structure of the city machine.

Only with the rise of a politically cultivated black ethnicity in the past decade has the Negro ghetto acquired the features of a politically institutionalized ethnic community. But this belated politicization of black ethnicity exhibits features that were uncommon in the development of white ethnic communities at an earlier period. One such feature is sharp conflict with the American political system as such, at all levels—city, state, and federal. This conflict takes the form either of popular-based urban riots, commencing in 1964 and initiated largely by lower-strata blacks, or the intensive cultivation of antiwhite perspectives among blacks.

[17] See Gosnell, *Negro Politicians.*

Both of these conflict-laden tendencies are directed toward the wider political mobilization of the ghetto and for the growth of Negro political capability. Of course, none of this can be realized without leadership, and two leadership strata now vie for the main role in the politicization of black ethnicity: one is of lower-strata background and so has a special claim to having spearheaded the militant style now common to much of Negro leadership; the other is middle-class, though a good portion of this second leadership group is first-generation middle-class, and this segment is currently leading the bid of the black bourgeoisie to seize a dominant role in the emerging politics of black ethnicity.

Leadership and Black Ethnicity: Lower-Strata Militants

ALTHOUGH THE RIOTS initiated by lower-strata Negroes in the mid-1960s stimulated the rise of militant political leaders, it was the federal government's War on Poverty that enabled these leaders to institutionalize their politics. In 1965–70 the government allocated nearly $5 billion under the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act to a community action program, which led to the formation of more than 2,000 so-called community action organizations. These organizations were quickly politicized by lower-strata black militants throughout the 1960s and became their primary political structure.

The federal government did not intend, of course, to transform the community action organizations into militant political instruments. The government's purpose was rather to provide the Negro lower strata with an opportunity to develop basic administrative and executive skills, a goal some observers claim was realized, though I doubt it.[18]

[18] See Sar A. Levitan, "The Community Action Program," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* September 1969, p. 67.

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However, federal agencies administering the War on Poverty could not adequately control either what was done at the city level with the resources of community action organizations or the composition of these bodies. In this way the lower-strata militant leaders converted the War on Poverty's action organizations from social service agencies into instruments for politicizing (and radicalizing) such heretofore inarticulate Negro lower-strata groups as welfare mothers, gangs, school dropouts, semiskilled workers, etc.

Yet little of this politicization of the lower strata represented a long-run political gain. It is, after all, one thing to use community action organizations to attract adherents to ideas of black nationalist militancy and incite a demonstration by welfare mothers; it is another matter altogether to use community action agencies to encourage welfare mothers to register to vote, to participate in precinct and ward committee elections and activities, to evaluate candidates and issues, etc. Clearly this latter form of politicization in cities would be of more lasting political value than the rather ad hoc politicization used by lower-strata black militants.

The lower-strata militant leaders pursue a policy of short-run rather than long-run politicization of the ghetto because they are accustomed in general to short-run behavior. The turn of these militant leaders to politics after the riots of the mid-1960s was less a matter of wanting to provide leadership than of utilizing their new status in order to derive benefits on a scale unavailable to them in their previous "hustling" roles such as pimp, narcotics pusher, small holdup man, numbers writer, and others. A previous experience with hustling, which is common to some lower-strata militant leaders, has also influenced their political style. For just as their hustling roles afforded them a certain celebrity status—virtually that of "culture heroes" [19]—their concern with such ad hoc political action as confrontations with officials provides them both publicity and celebration. The Black Panther leaders have taken this style to its extreme; but they have contributed little to the durable politicization of the Negro lower strata, since they prefer short-run tactics linked to violent rhetoric and symbolism, and sometimes to violence itself.[20]

It appears, then, that the lower-strata militant leaders lack the habits, values, and skills required for a durable politicization of the Negro population. Though they have become an important force in the new politics of urban black ethnicity, *they have proved incapable of institutionalizing this politics.* Their main contribution is rather different: they stamp the politics of black ethnicity with a lower-class style, which means that the experiences and problems of the Negro lower strata (marginal working class and lower class) rather than the black bourgeoisie have a determining role in the politics of black ethnicity.

One cannot overstate the significance of this. For one thing, it signifies the profoundly important difference between the earlier civil rights politics and the new politics of black ethnicity. And to the extent that middle-class and upper-strata Negroes participate in the politics of black ethnicity, they must do so at least partly in terms of the lower-class criteria that legitimate this politics. Thus middle-class politicians participating in the politics of black ethnicity now articulate needs, demands, and policies that touch more on problems of lower-strata than of middle- and upper-strata blacks. In making this shift in the style of political articulation, middle-class leaders allow the lower strata a leverage that has existed never before. In short, by stamping the politics of black ethnicity with a lower-class style, the lower-strata militants

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[19] See Malcolm X (with Alex Haley), *Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York, 1966).
[20] See Martin Kilson, "The 'Put-On' of Black Panther Rhetoric: On the Function of Polemical Excess," *Encounter,* April 1971, pp. 57–58.

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have, largely unwittingly, effected a veritable revolution in the structure of Negro politics. For the first time in this century, black politics possesses a style and an ideological structure that facilitate vertical political linkages among the various strata in the black ethnic turf.

Now there is need for a leadership with the skill and political sophistication necessary to institutionalize these vertical political linkages, and thereby to maximize the political power of the Negro ethnic sector on a scale comparable to that realized earlier by other ethnic groups.

Leadership and Black Ethnicity: New Middle-Class Politicians

THE LEADERSHIP NEEDED for this difficult task is in fact available. This leadership draws upon the Negro working class, a stratum in the urban black ghetto that since World War I has made numerous attempts to facilitate a ghetto-wide leadership, but with little success,[21] partly because of the working class's inability to provide enough of its sons with higher education.

In the past 20 years, however, this weakness of the Negro working class has been significantly overcome, and this, along with the marked growth of the Negro middle class, constitutes the most striking sociological change in contemporary Negro society.[22] This new leadership comes out of the post-World War II college-educated generation of the Negro working class. It represents the black working-class segment that rejects lower-class life-styles and cultivates instead upwardly mobile or middle-class aspirations, occasionally marries upward when opportunity allows, purchases a home, has some savings, and above all inspires sons and daughters to pursue higher education.[23]

This new leadership is exemplified at its best by recently successful politicians like Richard Hatcher, son of a steel worker and first Negro mayor of Gary, Indiana; Thomas Atkins, son of a working-class clergyman, and the first Negro city councilman in Boston in over 30 years; Shirley Chisholm, daughter of an artisan and the first Negro woman to be elected to Congress, representing a new district in Bedford-Stuyvesant, New York City. Others in this category include Carl Stokes, first Negro mayor in Cleveland, Louis Stokes, first Negro congressman from Cleveland; Kenneth Gibson, first Negro mayor in Newark. The political resources marshalled by this new group of Negro politicians—the first generation in their families to gain a college education—equip it to begin the task of institutionalizing the politics of black ethnicity. *What are these political resources?*

• First, personal attributes. Primary among these is higher education, which affords the new leaders not only skills (e.g., Gibson is

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[21] See Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, *The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor Movement* (New York, 1931), chaps. 6 and 20, which deal with the role of independent Negro unions, especially among Pullman workers, from World War I to 1930. See also James W. Ford, *The Negro and the Democratic Front* (New York, 1938). This study, written by the leading Negro Communist in the 1930s, covers the efforts of the Communist party to manipulate the Negro working class into a ghetto-wide leadership role.

[22] For example, in 1955 only 9 percent of Negro families had income of $7,000 or more, compared to 31 percent of white families; but in 1967 nearly 39 percent of Negro families fell into this income category, compared to 55 percent of white families. Educationally, 50 percent of Negro males over 25 years of age completed high school by 1967 (compared to 73 percent of white males) while in 1960 only 36 percent of Negro males at 25 years of age had completed high school (compared to 63 percent of white males at 25 years of age). See Bureau of Census, *Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States* (Washington, 1967).

[23] An area of major neglect in the sociology of the urban Negro is the study of the life-style and social structure of the working-class Negro. For example, a classic description of a ghetto like Drake's and Cayton's *Black Metropolis* has virtually nothing to say about the working class, compared to the marginal lower class, and the term "working class" is not even in the book's index. An earlier study does have some data on homeowning tendency among the Negro working class; see Thomas Woofter, ed., *Negro Problems in Cities* (New York, 1928), pp. 106–11, *passim*.

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an engineer; Atkins, Hatcher, and Stokes are lawyers), but a grasp of institutional dynamics in American society—a grasp unavailable to the lower-strata militant leaders.

• Second, their background within the lower strata of the black community. This gives them a certain perception of and empathy with the special material and psychological needs of the black lower strata and thus, perhaps, a capacity to articulate these needs in a manner reasonably satisfactory to wide segments of the lower strata. Though these new politicians may not perform this role as convincingly as the lower-strata militants, they will certainly be more acceptable than the established middle-class Negro leaders. The fact that new middle-class politicians like Richard Hatcher are only recently removed from the Negro lower strata strengthens their position in this regard. Some have fathers, mothers, siblings, and kin still residing in working-class quarters and can readily point to this as evidence of their ties to the black masses.

• Third, the rapid growth in the past decade of Negro population in the inner city, together with the emigration of whites to city fringes, is also to be counted as a resource. (The rates of Negro concentration in the inner city since the 1950s and of white emigration to the city fringe and suburbs are shown in Table III; Table IV shows the percentage growth of Negroes in the 30 largest cities in the 1950s to 1960s.) It is projected that within the next 15 years the population of some 11 major cities will become nearly 50 percent Negro. Included among these cities are Baltimore (1972), Gary (1973), Cleveland (1975), St. Louis (1978), Detroit (1979), Philadelphia (1981), Oakland (1973), and Chicago (1984).

• Fourth and last, the federal government's recognition, since the riots of the 1960s, of the city's problems as a national priority is another and in a way the most crucial political resource available to the emergent middle-class Negro politicians. This recognition, though already acted on by both Democratic and Republican administrations through the War on Poverty, the Model Cities project, and new welfare legislation, still awaits substantial action.

Institutionalizing a Politics of Black Ethnicity

NEGRO POLITICIANS, the main agents of the political institutionalization of black ethnicity, are more numerous today than they were at any period in this century. There are now about 1,500 elected Negro politicians or officials, 62 percent of them outside the South, representing overwhelmingly city constituencies. They are located in 41 of the 50 states, and include, among others, 12 congressmen, 168 state legislators, 48 mayors, 575 other city officials, 362 school board members, and 114 judges and magistrates. It is noteworthy that Negro communities in

TABLE III

POPULATION CHANGE BY LOCATION, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1950–1966 (NUMBERS IN MILLIONS)

	Population					
	Negro			White		
	1950	1960	1966	1950	1960	1966
United States	15.0	18.8	21.5	135.2	158.8	170.8
Metropolitan areas	8.4	12.2	14.8	80.3	99.7	109.0
Central cities	6.5	9.7	12.1	45.5	47.7	46.4
Urban fringe	1.9	2.5	2.7	34.8	52.0	62.5
Small cities, town and rural	6.7	6.7	6.7	54.8	59.2	61.8

Source: *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C., 1968).

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the populous industrial states claim a major share of these congressmen and state legislators, and several of these black mayors head industrial cities. Thus two congressmen (Shirley Chisholm and Charles Rangel) represent Negroes in New York City, two (Charles Diggs and John Conyers) Negroes in Detroit, one (Louis Stokes) Negroes in Cleveland, one (Robert Nix) Negroes in Philadelphia, two (Ralph Metcalfe and George Collins) Negroes in Chicago, and one (Parren Mitchell) Negroes in Baltimore. Illinois, New York, and Ohio have 14, 12, and 13 Negro state legislators respectively, and the proportion of Negro legislators in Ohio is larger than the Negro share of population. Only in Detroit and Gary do Negroes have a majority of city councilmen, and in Pittsburgh the percentage of Negro councilmen is larger than the Negro percentage in Pittsburgh's population.

As Negroes are more concentrated in cities than any other ethnic group, the city is now more than ever the main arena for institutionalizing the politics of black ethnicity. The political infrastructure necessary to realize the long-run goals of this politics begins in cities and evolves outward, either directly through congressmen to the federal government, or indirectly through county, city, and state offices.

Increasingly, mayors and city councilmen spend more time seeking federal revenues. This is particularly true for Negro mayors and city councilmen because their primary constituency, the black population, has more poor, unskilled, and semiskilled persons than

TABLE IV

PERCENTAGE OF NEGROES IN EACH OF THE THIRTY LARGEST CITIES, 1950, 1960, AND ESTIMATED 1965

New York, N.Y.	10	14	18
Chicago, Ill.	14	23	28
Los Angeles, Calif.	9	14	17
Philadelphia, Pa.	18	26	31
Detroit, Michigan	16	29	34
Baltimore, Md.	21	35	38
Houston, Texas	24	23	23
Cleveland, Ohio	16	29	34
Washington, D.C.	35	54	66
St. Louis, Mo.	18	29	36
Milwaukee, Wis.	3	8	11
San Francisco, California	6	10	12
Boston, Mass	5	9	13
Dallas, Texas	13	19	21
New Orleans, La.	32	37	41
Pittsburgh, Pa.	12	17	20
San Antonio, Tex.	7	7	8
San Diego, Calif.	5	6	7
Seattle, Wash.	3	5	7
Buffalo, N.Y.	6	13	17
Cincinnati, Ohio	16	22	24
Memphis, Tenn.	37	37	40
Denver, Colo.	4	6	9
Atlanta, Ga.	37	38	44
Minneapolis, Minn.	1	2	4
Indianapolis, Ind.	15	21	23
Kansas City, Mo.	12	18	22
Columbus, Ohio	12	16	18
Phoenix, Ariz.	5	5	5
Newark, N.J.	17	34	47

Source: *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C., 1968).

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any other community. This means that resources required to alter these people's lives can no longer be found in the cities but must be acquired from the federal government.

In fact, the resources that ultimately enabled the Irish, Italian, Polish, Jewish, and other whites to consolidate their power and improve their conditions also came not from the cities but from the federal government. Without this intervention it is doubtful that the large lower strata of poor, unskilled, and semiskilled persons in the white ethnic groups of 50 years ago would have largely been transformed into skilled workers and homeowners.

Federal government intervention in city politics is required if this politics is to serve Negroes as a means of social change. But before this can happen, the black city population, like its white ethnic counterparts, must make its contribution to the political forces that make possible such federal government intervention. For it was the ability of political leaders of white ethnic groups to mobilize the votes in their communities that enabled the Democratic party to dominate the presidency in the era 1932–60. The same is now required of the new Negro politicians.

The Negro mayors and city councilmen are in the front line of this development. For a variety of reasons, mayors and city councilmen, more so than congressmen, have in the popular mind been symbolic of the political growth and success of ethnic groups. In cities where the chances to elect Negro mayors and councilmen are good, the problems facing the effective mobilization of Negro votes and some white support are for the most part still unsolved.

This was apparent in rather stark fashion in the mayoralty election in the City of East St. Louis in 1967—a city in which some 84,000 Negroes comprise 60 percent of the total population and somewhat over 50 percent of the voters. Although a Negro had stood for the city office of commissioner (four commissioners and a mayor constitute executive government in East St. Louis) and won as a machine candidate, no black had contested the mayoralty before 1967. But a Negro stood as mayor in 1967, and at the head of an all-black ticket contesting all executive posts; he was confronted by an incumbent ticket, all but one, white. Moreover, East St. Louis like other cities experienced some black militancy in the 1960s, including a small riot, and the head of the Negro ticket, Elmo Bush, an educational administrator, conducted the campaign in militant style, which included a visit to the city by Stokely Carmichael whose address at a mass rally included the remark: "Let me tell you, baby, when we got 52 percent of the voters in a city, we own that city —lock, stock, and barrel." [24]

The election results were the opposite of Carmichael's projection. The incumbent mayor polled 71 percent of the votes and none of the four incumbent commissioners less than 60 percent; Elmo Bush, the Negro mayoral candidate, got 29 percent and his running mates 20–26 percent. What is more, the incumbent mayor won 88 percent of the votes in white precincts, compared to 12 percent for the Negro candidate; and in the black precincts, where some 59 percent of all votes were cast, the incumbent white gained 60 percent against the Negro candidate's 40 percent. The incumbent commissioners received no less than 52 percent of the votes in the black precincts, while none of the com-

[24] *Metro-East Journal*, April 3, 1967.

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missioners on the all-black ticket received more than 35 percent. Of special interest was that the incumbent Negro commissioner on the incumbent mayor's ticket, E. Saverson, polled the largest vote of all candidates in the black precincts; and though he received only 46 percent of the votes in white precincts, a return much below his white running mates, no candidate on the all-black ticket received more than 12 percent of the votes in white precincts.

IT IS CLEAR from the foregoing that the all-black ticket in the 1967 East St. Louis mayoralty race was defeated by the weight of the city machine. The racial edge claimed by the all-black ticket was of little moment in face of a well-organized and disciplined party machine. The machine's only Negro candidate, E. Saverson, longtime leader of the city's Negro Democratic organization, brilliantly exhibited the machine's strength. Moreover, the black militant rhetoric of the candidates on the all-black ticket was far from persuasive to the voters in the East St. Louis ghetto. Though they had no illusions about the white city machine, they understood that from it they did or could derive concrete gains in the form of jobs.

The hold of this kind of machine patronage over the Negro vote in East St. Louis, as in many other cities, was aided by the fact that in 1964 some 33 percent of the city's Negro males were unemployed, and 52 percent of those Negroes holding jobs earned less than $3,000. Clearly anything the city machine did to aid employment and income in East St. Louis would have an important political effect on the Negro vote.

Other Negro candidates for city offices, who are unable to see the political limitations of black militant rhetoric, have failed in the past five years and will continue to fail until they learn that the rhetoric of blackness, though of some value in the political mobilization of the ghetto, is no substitute for viable political *organization*. Candidacies which in the past five years have recognized the limitations of this rhetoric, and have based their campaigns upon sound organization, have registered major victories.

This situation characterized the victory of Richard Hatcher in the 1967 mayoralty election in Gary, Indiana. As in East St. Louis, Negroes were by 1967 slightly over 50 percent of the population. Also as in East St. Louis, the Democratic city machine was well-organized in the ghetto. However, unlike the all-black ticket in East St. Louis, Hatcher did not rely simply upon militant rhetoric. Instead, he organized a grass-roots campaign—a united front of Negro organizations—which endeavored to overcome the Democratic machine's foothold in the ghetto. He also recognized the need for allies in the white precincts. But since the corrupt Democratic machine opposed him even after he won the primary, his main instrument turned out to be the local press, which though not supporting Hatcher still did not oppose him, thereby allowing some whites to appraise him on the basis of his merit and the issues of his campaign.[25] As a result, Hatcher won by a narrow margin, and though 91 percent of Hatcher's votes came from black precincts, 17 percent came from white ones. It is clear that the 6,762 white votes Hatcher gained were indispensable to his victory.

Another successful Negro candidacy for mayor of a major city occurred in Cleveland where in 1965 Negroes were 34 percent of the city's 800,000 population. Carl Stokes, typical of the black middle-class politicians, made his first bid for mayor in 1965, unsuccessfully, but stood again in 1967, winning the Democratic primary in a three-sided race with 52 percent of the votes. Like Hatcher in Gary, Stokes recognized the need to confront the Democratic machine, again basically racist in its response to a Negro's candidacy, with a competitive organization in the ghetto. This was achieved by Stokes's

[25] See Edward Greer, "The 'Liberation' of Gary, Indiana," *Trans-action*, January 1971, pp. 30–39.

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campaign, getting 96 percent of the votes in black precincts, with 74 percent of the Negro electorate participating. Equally significant was his showing in white precincts: he polled 17,000 white votes, a figure that represents nearly his margin of victory—18,736. In the November 1967 mayoralty election where Stokes confronted the Republican candidate Seth C. Taft, Stokes's campaign organization repeated its primary victory. Stokes polled 94 percent of the votes in black precincts and one-fifth of the white votes, which amounted to the balance of victory. The key to the white votes was a brilliantly executed alliance with liberal white Protestants and a scattering of white ethnic supporters, reinforced by the endorsement of Cleveland's most powerful newspaper, the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*.

The Future

THE PATTERN of politically cultivating black ethnicity in order to consolidate Negro voting power and to discipline the black vote in favor of one candidate can be expected to persist through the 1970s and into the succeeding decades. Additional electoral victories employing this method were registered in 1970 in the mayoralty campaign of Negro candidate Kenneth Gibson in Newark, New Jersey, where blacks are one-half of the population, and in the congressional campaign of Parren Mitchell in Baltimore. In both cases a disciplined use of the black militant style forged vertical linkages among groups within the Negro ghetto, allowing these campaigns to surmount the divisions of the Negro community. But both candidacies combined, as they must, the politics of black ethnicity by alliances with liberal sectors of the white population, and in both instances the white voters provided the margin of victory. These alliances will persist and gain in sophistication as the politics of black ethnicity matures, though some vigilance will be necessary to combat the simplistic and erroneous notion of black-white coalitions as tantamount to a zero-sum game, which was first enunciated by Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton in their book *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York, 1967).[26]

Gaining white voters was central to Mitchell's campaign, for his congressional district was composed of only 40 percent blacks and 60 percent whites (40 percent Jews and 20 percent WASPS). Mitchell's forces made a black-white alliance that was based on two (largely Protestant) New Politics groups and two Jewish-Negro integrated organizations, backed by liberal labor leaders. These alliances were successful and Parren Mitchell's election as the first Negro congressman from Maryland was assured; so was the election of the first Negro city district attorney, Milton Allen, and the election to the state legislature of 16 Negroes among the 55 legislators representing Baltimore. Furthermore, white liberals gained over 20 of the additional city seats in the state legislature, which enables the Negro and white liberal legislators to be a decisive force if they nurture their alliance.[27]

It would seem, curiously, that a long-run problem for the new middle-class black politicians is less their capacity to forge and maintain alliances with enough whites to ensure victory than the maintenance of discipline within the politics of black ethnicity. Now in its formative period, this politics has yet to encounter major internal conflicts. Two developments will help keep such conflicts at bay: one, the co-optation of lower-class militants by the new black middle-class politicians; two, adequate aid to cities by the federal government.

As for the lower-strata militants' place in the politics of black ethnicity, they will be of little positive value if they persist in a political style emphasizing short-run and merely symbolic political gains. If, however, the

[26] For an excellent antidote to the Carmichael-Hamilton view of coalition politics, see Bayard Rustin, "'Black Power' and Coalition Politics," *Commentary*, September 1966, pp. 35–40.

[27] See Patrick J. McCaffrey, "Black and White in Baltimore," *The Nation*, December 21, 1970, pp. 652–53.

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lower-strata militants grasp the long-run needs of Negro political development, they will redefine their role in a manner conducive to a division of political tasks between themselves and the middle-class politicians. This division of political roles in the leadership of the ghetto will entail the lower-strata militants' acquiring political roles as local (ward, district, precinct) organizers, while the middle-class politicians would hold the executive political roles. The lower-strata militant leaders would apply their skills to the task of linking the middle-class politicians with the Negro lower classes, rather like the ward and precinct organizers in the traditional city machine.[28] Also like the traditional ward, district, and precinct party workers, the lower-strata militants who enter this political relationship with middle-class black politicians will be put on city payrolls as patronage workers, which will guarantee them support during the intervals between elections. And the more talented among these transformed lower-strata militants would surely have opportunity to rise to executive roles. Finally, lower-strata militants such as the Black Panthers could—if they come to reject violence—perform the important task of keeping the middle-class politicians informed of the changing needs and interests among the black lower strata, and could thus be a major factor in ensuring the political accountability of the politicians, something few American ethnic groups ever succeeded in maintaining.

As for possible conflicts over the rewards required by the emergent black ethnic politics, clearly these can be derived in adequate measure only from or through the federal government. No other level of government today has the tax power necessary to secure the revenues required to upgrade the Negro's low skills, health care, home ownership, educational facilities, etc. But this depends upon what kind of regime controls the federal government, whether Republican or Democratic. Unless the latter can regain power in Washington and hold it for another 20 years, it is unlikely that the rewards needed for the politics of black ethnicity will be forthcoming. But if rewards *are* forthcoming from the federal government, there is little doubt that the politics of black ethnicity will mature in coming decades; it will acquire a degree of institutionalization comparable to the development of ethnic-centered politics among white ethnic groups at an earlier period.

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[28] See, e.g., J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics* (New York, 1935).

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Richard Robbins

Perishable Good: Left Turn in the American Religious World

FALLING INTO DECADES—it is a modest version of the archaic practice in European elementary schools of dividing great epochs into convenient categories: the Middle Ages came to an end and then began the Renaissance. In reality, history moves in uneven waves, not by the clock. Yet it is roughly true that the new engagement of American religion with pressing political, economic, and social issues stems from developments that happened to move to a time frame of every-ten-years. To chart the proximate future of our religious social conscience as the seventies unfold, we need to understand that "the will to enter the social arena in force," as Daniel Callahan calls it, the religious impulse to lean more directly on secular institutions in pursuit of social justice and a decent society was in retreat during the fifties and came to full, if chaotic, expression during the sixties. Nor will it be muted in the seventies.

The principal themes remain what they have been—peace, racial justice, the reduction of poverty, the break-out from worn-out bureaucratic structures (churches included). But the new exuberant commitment, the flood of proposals, programs, and sometimes simply cries of anguish, the "bearing witness" on religion and social activism requires sober analysis even at the risk of being considered morally insensitive. For the alternative—an uncritical blessing of the present religious ferment as good because it is godly or right because it is activist—can mean a repetition of many of the frustrations that eventually undermined the achievements of the predecessor movement of the thirties and forties, the Social Gospel of the Protestants, the Social Action coalitions among Catholics, the Jewish liberalism of the synagogues and secular councils. We owe a debt, even now, to those Catholic critics of that time—Monsignor John Ryan, Dorothy Day, Bishop Sheil, John LaFarge, Paul Furfey, the editors of *Commonweal,* whose views ranged from New Deal liberalism to communitarian-pacifist socialism.

There were limits then, there are limits now.[1] Moral integrity, passion for justice, bearing witness, these count enormously. Yet these characteristics are, at maximum, preconditions for turning the *secular* society around. Put more positively, ethical engagement and prophetic judgment have nothing taken away from them when they are worked into complex and flexible strategies to shake loose new public policies. Indeed, moral stance on social issues gains from the association with the "tainted" world; morality is prevented from turning into moralizing righteousness. The Christianity represented by those two remarkable secular-religious socialists, A. J. Muste and Norman Thomas, is eloquent evidence of what I mean.

If the religious commitment is vital to, it can never be a full expression of the political

[1] See Edward A. Marciniak, "Catholic Social Action: Where Do We Go From Here?" *America,* December 12, 1970.

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and social order. Its social end is a powerful strengthening of community, achieved broadly with agnostics and atheists, which *then* may be directed from general-theological to specific-political strategies. To seek to fit human action too tightly to the measure of transcendent values is to court that very moral absolutism against which one protests so vehemently in the secular world. As James Finn remarks, "Those who once were tempted to theologize all life are now, apparently, tempted to politicize all life." True enough. Still, on balance, the reappearance of Social Gospel and Social Action, in new and more radical form, is more than welcome. It *is* new; it is no transient thing; it should flourish in the seventies, insistent but not absolutist.

Insistent but not absolutist because religion is no longer, if it ever was, at war with secular society. It has a central place but not a dominant role in the contemporary world. Early Marxism grossly misunderstood the "opiate of the people" by identifying too closely the religious impulse with the power structure of churches. The same mistake is not likely to be made again. On the other hand, contrary to the dream of the Social Gospel reformers, religiously based social movements are not prime movers. The religious groups speak *to* power; seek to constrain power but do not take power. When the secular institutions falter, religious conscience gets blocked off. Or gets itself coopted by a political leadership ready to invoke the cant of "moral leadership" and "spiritual values" whenever convenient.

All this becomes apparent in a glance at the past twenty years. In the fifties, the American celebration ignored urgent problems pushed aside by World War II, most notably racial discrimination and the failure to extend equality to millions below the poverty line. This slackness in national purpose was echoed in the religious milieu, a muddled religiosity at the top, an ambiguous "revival of religion" out in the growing suburbs. President Eisenhower said it did not matter what faith you had as long as you had one. But this essentially decent man temporized endlessly on racial desegregation of the schools until finally his hand was forced at Little Rock. His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, a force in the Episcopal church, applied a general religiosity to foreign affairs, as if "the crusade against Communism," a chain of military pacts around the world, could shore up the faithful against godless evil overseas.

With a few outstanding exceptions, the churches abdicated on the McCarthy threat to civil liberties; on commitment to the awakening minorities; on moral support for the nuclear disarmament campaigns. The moderately liberal National Council of Churches beat off incessant attacks from the Right; so did the World Council. The religiously oriented pacifist groups, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and the Catholic peace associations, were as voices in the wilderness. Yet, flat as the fifties may now seem, there were also signs and portents—falling into decades will not quite work. The most important sign was Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which forged the strategy of nonviolent direct action against racial oppression in the South. Gandhi, Thoreau, and Christian forbearance were joined to militant tactics of civil disobedience capable of attracting the religious and the secular alike. The civil rights movement, organized by young black ministers and black and white students, brought just that moral "leaning" against the racist legal and political structure which enabled the courts and Congress finally to act. By the end of the sixties the civil rights coalition had come apart; but for a brief time, a new Social Gospel changed us all. Religion was not completely walled off.

Not surprisingly the book for the times was Will Herberg's *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*.[2] As far as he advanced the sociological thesis that "the triple melting pot"—the

[2] Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, rev. ed., 1960).

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achievement of a religious pluralism from the assimilation of the "new" and mainly Catholic and Jewish immigrants—would open the way to social mobility and an erosion of religious bigotry, Herberg was on firm ground. But when he fashioned the doctrine that the American Way of Life represented the faith of all the people, he only succeeded in creating a thin theological cover for the American celebration. "This secularism of a religious people, this religiousness in a secularist framework," could scarcely provide a motive force for the social conscience of the churches. Instead, religious critics were more inclined to preoccupy themselves with problems of the middle class—"identity," "anxiety," "mass culture"—which cast a troubling shadow over the successful American Way of Life. Herberg did not have in mind what Robert Bellah would later term "the civil religion," the broadly ethical character of the American historical experience, with all its virtues and dangers.[3] His intent was to pronounce religion fit and prospering under the canopy of the American Way of Life, whatever reservations one might have about the foolishness of "the power of positive thinking" or the amiable nonsense of Dial-a-Prayer.

IN THE SIXTIES that canopy cracked open. The symbolic point of departure, John Kennedy's election as the first Catholic president, was an appropriate coda to Herberg's theme. Thereafter came the American Disarray of Life, the successive deepening of conflicts in our secular society. It is enough to say that the piling-up of social troubles, especially the war in Vietnam, brought large numbers of clerics into the social arena to denounce, march, organize. And the social crisis, together with the impetus of Vatican II and Pope John, produced a storm of criticism against the church structures themselves. Everything—from theology, liturgy, professional training within the churches, to the secular institutions—would have to be reexamined. This radical change in American religious life constitutes a far more significant event than the "revival of religion" in the fifties. Moreover, the renewal of socially relevant religion was accompanied by a new interest in the relationship of the American religious community to comparable institutions abroad. For Protestants this meant interpretation of radical theology in Europe; for Catholics study of the repercussions of Vatican II; for Jews solidification of the bond with the state of Israel and remembrance of the Holocaust dead.

Whatever the validity of the argument, that upheaval is bound to be followed by quietism. I foresee more of the same intense social involvement of religious groups during the seventies. Yet we must remember to acknowledge that from the fifties down to the present time *a very large segment, perhaps a majority of the regular churchgoers, have been relatively indifferent to and in some cases (mainly Southern Baptists and fundamentalists) actively hostile to "religious liberals."* Once acknowledged, however, this conservative constant should be viewed as a screen against which the smaller, but much more articulate change-groups carry on their work.

If the new activism is indeed durable and fairly deep, there ought to occur a falling-off of interest in religious fads so intriguing to the mass media: the folk-rock mass, the "new breed" of "swinging" young clerics, the priests who leave the Church to marry and "tell their story," the little communes with their patchwork religions—part borrowed Eastern mysticism, part return-to-the-land, part spirit of Woodstock. (On the last point, Margaret Mead is right to argue that the emptiness of the suburban religious revival of the fifties is no reason automatically to

[3] See Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedalus,* Winter 1967. Involved here is not the worship of the American way of life, but "an understanding of the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal reality." I find its expression, e.g., in Gunnar Myrdal's now classic work on the moral ambivalence of white Americans, committed to the values of equality of opportunity and at the same time tenaciously defending a system of devastating racial discrimination. See *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper, 1944).

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delight in the antistructure religious revival of the children of the fifties. She sees the fringe youth groups of the counter culture creating a "mishmash religion." "Young people want to build a new religious movement but they lack the liturgy, poetry, imagery of the historical church.") For the coming decade there would appear to be at least six central issues, likely even to be with us by 1980. These are:

- *the continuation of a heightened interest in "radical theology,"* not so much as abstract argument but as a challenge to theology to speak more directly to the human condition and to enter into philosophical combat with church authority over received theological wisdom;
- *the willingness of some religious groups to resist at least their own secular states on the issue of war and peace,* with strategy ranging from limited institutionalized "leaning" to massive nonviolent resistance, civil disobedience, and a religious nonviolent "underground revolution";
- *a more direct commitment to the struggle against the linked problems of racial injustice and poverty,* though again it is inconceivable that the religious impulse can be decisive in this area, however powerful the role of the Catholic bishops in helping sustain the strike of the grape workers in California;
- *a much firmer consensus on the need for liberalization of laws and practices where "morality" is entwined with family-social relationships;*
- *more insistent reform of church structure itself,* especially in Roman Catholicism;
- *and, finally, a rising "spirituality" (for want of a better word) in the American working class and lower-middle class,* stemming from a sense of loss, of alienation from traditional secular institutions which no longer seem to sustain traditional values.

The Theological Firmament

WHAT WE SEE in all three faiths, especially in Catholicism, is a generalized theological skepticism. The intellectual roots are largely European—the mystical and social thought among the French thinkers as diverse as Teilhard de Chardin, Yves Congar, and François Mauriac; the arresting theological argument of a "German school" of Catholics, perhaps best represented by Hans Kung and Karl Rahner; the new Protestant theology centering on a "secular interpretation" and "demythologizing" of religion, which owes a great deal to Dietrich Bonhoeffer and is in some respects transported to America in the work of Harvey Cox and a number of our "death of God" theologians.[4] Jews have had

[4] There is an extensive literature, variable in depth and in applicability to social action. See, e.g., Sydney E. Ahlstrom's synoptic essay "The Radical Turn in Theology and Ethics," in J. Gustafson, ed., "The Sixties: Radical Change in American Religion," *The Annals,* January 1970. On the French development, there is a useful, if uneven book: Jean-Marie Domenach and Robert de Montvalon, *The Catholic Avant Garde: French Catholicism Since World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967). In the European Protestant context, see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), which has had more direct bearing on social action than the works of Barth Bultman, and others whose theology is radical in the technical sense. See also Karl Rahner, *Theology for Renewal: Bishops, Priests, Laity* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1965); Hans Kung, *The Church* (Sheed & Ward, 1967). Kung's effort to challenge papal infallibility, *Infallible: An Inquiry* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), is a classic instance of the new interplay between theology and the demand for structural change in the Church. For the Catholic situation in America see, e.g., Michael Novak, *The Open Church* (New York: Macmillan, 1962); on the Protestants in American society, see Martin Marty, *The Second Chance for American Protestants* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), and Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (rev. ed., New York: Macmillan, 1966), esp. chaps. 5 and 6.

Cox now concedes that he may have overestimated the commitment of urban-age man to secular-religious social change and may have underestimated the much deeper spiritual longing for a joyous celebration of life. He now argues that the political radicals and the neomystics are equally valuable, but I think he was right the first time out. In any event, *The Secular City* was of great importance to general readers who were not able to

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less reason to be involved, for the "secularizing" of Judaism or redefining the tradition has been going on for a long time.

This "radical turn" in theology matters to our discussion of religious social protest insofar as it comes to bear directly on social structure. There is in fact a correspondence between general theological restlessness and specific social movements. For the theologians find themselves compelled to rework their ideas in order to provide a religious rationale for proposed social changes such as might come about anyway for strictly historical reasons. In Roman Catholicism, to take a clear example, such matters as priestly celibacy, the doctrine of the pope's infallibility, the justification for birth control or abortion, the question of collegiality in the definition of the hierarchical system, the accommodation of Christianity to Marxism—such matters are bound to be resolved as much by social conflict within the Church as by the "correctness" of doctrine. Nevertheless, theological ratification is required, whatever the outcome of the clash between "conservatives" and "liberals" within Church structure. Theology is thereby drawn into the day-to-day process of change initiated by Vatican II. Further, the sense in the congregations that "eternal truths" are being reconsidered reinforces a general conviction that *anything* is subject to drastic change. To be sure, it is possible for an Ivan Illich to be a theological conservative and a proponent of radical social change, but now that matters less than one might suppose, since the Church would be concerned more with his challenge to its authority structure than with his precise religious beliefs.[5]

For the first time, theology is part of a social ferment instead of a remote, unchanging guardian of eternal truth. I am oversimplifying an extremely complex issue, but it seems incontestable that the consequences of the new theology in Roman Catholicism are favorable to a more wide-ranging, liberalized Catholic social action. It is no longer necessary, for example, for Catholics to tug and haul at "just war" doctrine to express their witness against the war in Vietnam: the war is immoral and un-Christian, and broad theological warrant exists for saying it. So, too, with other problems.

War, the Peace Movement, and the Churches

AS NOTHING ELSE, the war in Vietnam has brought together the leadership of the liberal denominations in opposition. Only some conservative subgroups among Catholics and the Protestant fundamentalists support the war explicitly. The powerful Southern Baptists remain officially neutral but their silence is significant, for ordinarily *any* war calls out from this largest Protestant group a patriotic reflex. No one should suppose antiwar declarations in religious national publications are a precise index of sentiment in the congregations. Yet it is clear that moral revulsion against the war has cut deeply into the traditional religious groups' posture of "going along" with the state . . . the things that are Caesar's and the things that are God's. This change, modest as it may be, is unprecedented in our recent history.

Clergy and Laymen Concerned About

see previously how a new theology and the urban crisis could be got together. It spoke directly to the American social conscience. In contrast, "death of God" theology aroused brief, intense debate yet never really left a social imprint. See Thomas J. Altizer and William Hamilton, *Radical Theology and the Death of God* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), the most thorough of a score of books on this subject.

[5] It is not surprising that Latin America should show us the priority of a radical critique of an exploitative society and a rigid church hierarchy over a radical critique of Catholic theology. Ivan Illich in Mexico, Dom Helder Camara in Brazil, are perhaps the two most prominent Catholic critics holding this view. Illich expresses this when he advocates resistance to Church authoritarianism (he has relinquished priestly duties) and advances a program of many-sided social changes (at his CIDOC center in Mexico) but, at the same time, warns against a too-easy invocation of God in man's community: *"N'employez pas son nom."* See Peter Schrag, "Ivan Illich: The Christian as Rebel," *Saturday Review*, July 19, 1969. The same kind of radical humanism informs the work of Bishop Camara of Recife; see José de Broucker, *The Violence of a Peacemaker: Dom Helder Camara* (New York: Orbis, 1970).

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Vietnam (CLCAV), formed in 1965, remains the organizational focus of the liberal antiwar effort, constantly prodding both the government and the more cautious groups within its own constituency. Its documentation of systematic and deliberate atrocities long preceded the My Lai revelations. Its achievement is especially impressive in the light of extensive research showing that local Protestant clergymen involved in protest movements are likely to encounter strong resistance in their own congregations.[6] CLCAV, although a comparatively small organization, has made religious antiwar protest normative and respectable.

The radical and pacifist religious minority finds CLCAV inadequate. An expansion of religious conscientious objection, in the tradition of the Quakers, does not strike it as sufficient either. It calls for civil disobedience, in the name of a "higher law" invoked as a last resort. In this tradition a man *must* break an unjust law, the military draft system, because he can do no other. The invasion of draft offices, the destruction of federal property, the public burning of draft files—all this does not equate with violence; it is "symbolic speech," for napalm is used to light the fire and, then, one calmly awaits arrest and trial. The plea to the judge is that there may be a narrow "guilt" but that these men and women are in the deepest sense innocent; the true crime is committed in Vietnam. In effect, the jury, even in the face of the admitted fact, could find them "not guilty"; if the verdict were guilty, the judge could then set them free, and the President pardon them as they would pardon him. So conceived, religious conscience is expressed, witness is borne, prison accepted. In this I fail to see any moral arrogance or self-righteousness. God's law prevails symbolically while human law is not denied in the specific event.

It is the Catholic radical pacifists in the antiwar movement, clerical and lay men and women, who have most eloquently stood conscience for the rest of us in this way—the Catonsville Nine, the Milwaukee Fourteen, the Chicago Fifteen. The most well-known Catholic leaders in the movement, Fathers Philip and Daniel Berrigan, were sentenced with others to prison in 1970 for their part in the burning of the draft files at Catonsville, Maryland, in 1968. It seems to me inconceivable that they engaged, as charged, in the further step of a "conpiracy" to plot violent destruction.

But taken in its own terms, apart from the outrage of the government's attempt to use charges of "conspiracy" for political repression, there is a point beyond which religious civil disobedience can become self-defeating. The courage and spiritual grace of Father Daniel Berrigan can only command admiration. That does not mean, however, that politically he is right. For unless the society, whatever its grievous faults, is on the threshold of totalitarianism—and it is not—civil disobedience must function on the premise of the legitimacy of the social order, however unjust the draft law or the war. Father Berrigan, Howard Zinn, and others do not agree. They argue that because of the crimes perpetrated by civil government against the Vietnamese abroad and the poor and blacks at home, legitimacy has been forfeited. Why, then, play into the hands of illegitimate authority by quietly inviting arrest and certain conviction? Why not, instead, work to create a nonviolent "revolutionary" underground capable of a real defiance of civil authority gone mad? It is on these grounds that Father Berrigan delayed his inevitable imprisonment by going underground after his conviction . . . and passed a point of no return.

It is painful but necessary to assert, in the face of Father Berrigan's courage, that this

[6] Jeffrey K. Hadden, *The Gathering Storm in the Churches* (New York: Doubleday, 1969). The gap is between conservative laity and liberal clergy. But Hadden notes another gap, between theology and liberal religious social activism; ministers become active in a cause without trying to work out a consistent yet flexible ethical position about society. As a result they may rush, ad hoc, from one social commitment to another.

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form of religious protest does not work, does not advance the antiwar movement, and simply shifts public attention from the principle of civil disobedience to the story of the chase: when would Father Berrigan be caught. His willingness to suffer further pain does not change the fact that individual religious witness can be translated into an effective social movement only if the secular political order is so overwhelmingly repressive that an organized "underground society" must be developed. That time is not now, or rather not yet, in American society, and so religious civil disobedience must remain an act of individual witness, a just act still subject to unjust law.[7]

In any case, the involvement of both liberal clergy and radical, principally Catholic, pacifists in the antiwar movement, points up two somewhat contradictory consequences for the peace movement. Remarkably, the way has been cleared for religious groups to denounce, and even defy, *their own government's* engagement in war, not just the enemy's. But at best the religious conscience can only play an auxiliary role in the organization of a secular antiwar coalition, a role profoundly important but not decisive. To so conclude in no way diminishes either the liberal religious peace movement or the heroism of the Berrigans.

[7] The most eloquent case for the opposite view, that the burning of the children in Vietnam, the *real* crime, makes imperative the creation of an underground community of "spiritual criminals," has been stated by Father Berrigan himself. See Daniel Berrigan, *The Trial of the Catonsville Nine* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970). Most Catholic liberal and radical social activists fully support bearing witness at Catonsville but are troubled by overtones of moralism and a refusal to communicate with the community, an imperfect community of imperfect men. Gordon Zahn, whose important work on the failure of the Catholic church to confront the Nazi evil in Germany provided part of the intellectual capital on which the Berrigans drew directly, has expressed these and other reservations in "The Berrigans: A Catholic Pacifist's View," DISSENT, June 1971 (reprinted from the *Catholic World*). For a generally sympathetic and understanding view, but with some criticism, see the symposium "The Burden of the Berrigans," *Holy Cross Quarterly*, January 1971.

Race, Class, Poverty: The Religious Commitment

THE RIGID SEGREGATIONISM of the Southern Baptists apart, the major faiths had declared themselves forcefully in the fifties against racism as a direct contradiction of the Judeo-Christian ethic. The Catholic Interracial Councils and the Jewish human relations organizations in particular had worked to translate ethic into action.

Yet much remained lip service, not simply because "eleven o'clock on Sunday was still the most segregated hour in America," but because the institutional churches drew back from directly challenging the secular system on such matters as discrimination in housing. Through the late sixties, however, the civil rights crisis compelled a stronger social activism. The familiar lines of strategy unfolded; the liberal religious establishment worked with secular interest groups in political strategy, which produced the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, while the more militant blacks and whites, especially the young, joined the Freedom Rides and voter registration campaigns. With the wisdom of hindsight, it is now commonplace to fault nonviolent direct action as outmoded, a sop to Christian conscience rather than a meaningful strategy against institutional racism. Perhaps so. Yet those clergymen, black and white, who fought the battle in the rural South and the urban North, were not simply establishing their credentials ("I was at Selma"). And in spite of the opportunism and intramural conflict in the religious civil rights movement of the sixties, there was that effort to direct conscience into the social arena which is the test of commitment.

But the seventies will be different. A more militant black community will be less concerned with the idea of civil rights and integration, more with the practice of community power and white commitment to support black organized movements. On the white side, then, support, and where possible coalition; on the black, consolidation of political power, community organization, cul-

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tural expression. In the religious sphere a dual effort will continue; black caucuses seeking more than token representation in the major denominations, and the growth of both traditional Negro denominations and new separatist black religious groups. Even a new "black theology" is taking shape. The black religious community will share with the secular a pride and solidarity in black life, a refusal to acquiesce in paternalistic white direction. Yet—in the area of religious social action, as in its secular counterpart, we have been caught in an excessive preoccupation with the immediate and novel. The new black community movement invites illusions on both sides. The gravity of the racial crisis, the despair about the ghettos, and the conviction that the U.S. government will not listen—these have led some younger blacks to place too much faith in militant splinter groups that claim to speak for the entire black community.

On the white side, young ministers and priests, excluded from an interracial movement by black separatism and burdened with "white guilt," have tended also to lose critical judgment about what is central and what peripheral in secular society. The result is a romanticism about black power among the white religious radicals, a disposition to endorse the Black Panthers, for example, as if they *were* the black community instead of one, somewhat unstable element within it.

A counterpart illusion in the black radical camp is that the mainstream churches can be compelled to pay hundreds of millions of dollars into black community projects as "reparations" for 300 years of repression. James Forman, previously a leader in SNCC, introduced this strategy toward the end of the sixties with the celebrated disruption of a Sunday service at Riverside Church in New York City. In the wake of such other confrontations, a number of national denominations established funds to channel to black communities. Here, I think, is an example of religious conscience misdirected.

The real "lean" of the churches on secular economic institutions lies in the relationship of the organized churches to the big corporations, not in the pressure of the protest groups on the religious congregations. In the former, churches can exert pressure on governing policy, on corporate investment in South Africa, for example, through the use of blocks of shares. But in the latter, the money raised is altogether insufficient to initiate any significant economic change in the black community, and demands for much larger amounts succeed principally in producing bitter conflict between national church headquarters and local denominations. Once the "conscience money" is granted, confusion and uncertainty ensue. Among the Unitarian-Universalists, in fact, two rival groups, one integrated and one all-black, battled to an impasse for control of the appropriated half-million dollars.

It seems likely, as the seventies proceed, that white radical romanticism among the younger religious people will give way to more solidly grounded white-black cooperation within a structure loose enough to assure black solidarity and pride. How the liberal religious groups, left groping after the decline of the civil rights coalition, will be fitted into the new political and economic coalitions necessary to a more insistent attack on racial justice, I do not know. Probably, at the minimum, it will come to whites not intervening in the rising self-assertion of the black community but rather by intervening much more strongly in public conflicts over employment, housing, corporate, and trade union policy.

Because the antipoverty question applies to more whites than blacks (although nonwhite minorities are disproportionately represented), we shall see an intensified participation of religious activists in local and regional programs. Once again, the resources for an actual war on poverty can be located only in secular society, in the federal government. But in this instance the religious auxiliary role can be maintained more forcefully. I have mentioned the intervention of the Catholic bishops in behalf of Chicano grape

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workers; Cesar Chavez's Catholicism is as integral to the primary secular work of trade union organization as was Martin Luther King's Christian doctrine of nonviolent action to his assault on secular racism. A striking number of younger white ministers and priests have chosen to live in central city neighborhoods, only loosely attached to official church bureaucracies and devoting their principal energies to community action groups in the poverty neighborhoods. In the black community a new tough-minded approach of younger clergy, better adapted to the conditions of northern urban life, is taking hold. The new leader is Jesse Jackson.

But in the last analysis, in the absence of a national program of guaranteed employment and income maintenance, the funding of relatively modest projects in urban neighborhoods is about all that religious groups can do in respect to poverty.

Family-Social Relationships and the "New Morality"

CONTROVERSY OVER FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, sexual patterns, the position of women, the life-style of the young, comes directly within the province of the churches as moral guardians. Power is not so central here. Further, the development of a "situational ethics" and a "new morality" by the religious intellectuals, though largely unknown to the regular parishioners, has had a liberating effect on a whole range of social and sexual norms.[8] As this continues in the seventies we may also expect a "moral backlash" from millions of conservative Christians.

The transition is readily measured in the religious accommodation to divorce, family planning, and birth control. (Pope Paul to the contrary, it must simply be a matter of time before Catholic doctrine will find a theologically adequate sanction for artificial contraception. Great numbers of Catholic women defy the ban, and they are supported by younger priests.) Premarital sexuality, sexual deviance, freedom of information in sexual matters, sex education—on these matters the liberal and moderate church groups are saying that it is the relationship which counts ethically, and thus traditional judgments must be set aside.

Abortion is more complex and troubling. While many Protestant clergymen support abortion reform, the religious community is split. "Situational ethics" are not so easy to apply to the question of when the fetus becomes "life." The Catholic church's official position is implacable opposition to "human barbarism." A striking number of the Catholic liberals and radicals who have pressed for change in other areas draw the line at abortion, or at least argue for a more complex approach than "total freedom of the woman to do whatever she wishes with her own body."[9] The conservative Protestant denominations hold fast to a view of abortion as another index of sexual license. In such cases where a religious social consensus is not developing rapidly enough, the issue is likely to be resolved pragmatically in the secular society, through liberalization of restrictive laws in state legislatures.

Abortion reform is but one aspect of the general revolt of women, protesting second-class citizenship. And the parallel between racial and sexual discrimination has a special relevance for the churches and synagogues. Racism in the Mormon church is echoed by the sexism in the Catholic church, as Mary Daly, Sally Cunneen, Sidney Callahan, and other Catholic women writers have made clear.[10] A first step is full ordainment of women clergy; the Lutherans have already done so, the Episcopalians are on the threshold, the first woman rabbi (Reform) will

[8] See Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics: The New Morality* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966).

[9] The most thoughtful Catholic analysis, favorable to liberalization of abortion law but with careful attention to the need for ethical safeguards, is Daniel Callahan's *Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).

[10] Mary Daly, *Church and the Second Sex* (Harper and Row, 1968); Sally S. Cunneen, *Sex: Female, Religion: Catholic* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1968); Sidney Callahan, *Exiled to Eden: The Christian Experience of Sex* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969).

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be ordained in 1972. But that is only the tip of the iceberg. The real conflict has to do with women's objection to an overwhelmingly "masculine" dominance in the theology and structure of the Judeo-Christian system, a dominance in no way contraverted by emphasis on the special place of Mary in Catholic doctrine or the special role of women in the Jewish family. Important work can be done here by the Women's Liberation movement once its worst enemies, its own splinter groups, have been left behind.

Modernization and Reform

TO PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE, to close on the problems of war, race, family life, in spite of the centrality of secular power, the religious denominations in America will have to make striking internal changes. (Not all of them, to be sure. One of the surprises of the sixties was the great gain of people in the more traditional faiths, some of them fundamentalist. This trend is likely to continue quietly, while the call for drastic innovation receives most of the publicity. Perhaps we have to do here with the commonplace about the intensification of the search for security and simplicity, the greater the unsettling problems in the secular world.)

Under the spur of Vatican II and its own restless, often angry younger religious, the Catholic church in America is making a historic transition. The Church of the immigrant era, of the hidebound bureaucracy, of the conservative establishment and narrow diocesan outlook is giving way, often to the shock and dismay of large numbers of working-class and lower-middle-class Catholics.

The great tugging and hauling is summarized in an avalanche of books, in the pages of the *National Catholic Reporter* (which is to *Our Sunday Visitor* as night to day or vice versa). Andrew Greeley is the most prominent among a number of Catholic sociologists who think we may be overemphasizing the upheaval and underestimating the continuity; but the weight of evidence seems on the other side. Many of the changes are largely symbolic—the informal dress, the new liturgy, the effort to bring the laity more closely into parish and diocesan decision-making. More of the changes cut deep. National priests' associations of varying degree of militancy are contesting the dogmatic authority of local bishops who preside over archaic archdioceses. Initial steps have been taken to change the training of seminarians, to make more open the sisters' orders—indeed in Los Angeles an entire order simply broke away from the Cardinal's authoritarian control and reorganized on its own. Economic pressures apart, parochial education from grade school to Jesuit universities has lost a good deal of its "ghetto" character and tries to compete more evenly with the public sector. If optional celibacy remains unlikely for now, it is likely in the future, notwithstanding the opposition of Pope Paul.

Of course, no social structure turns inside out overnight. The bishops must continue to mediate between Rome and the local parish, responding to those in the new movement who are angry over failure to denounce publicly the My Lai atrocity or cope more fully with racism within the Church itself, responding to those in the parish who see in this ferment the very faith undermined. All in all, however, it is not an exaggeration to say that the *aggiornamento,* at home and abroad in the Catholic world, is perhaps the most significant development in Western religious life in the twentieth century.

American Protestantism is so diverse that generalizations about modernization are risky. On the whole, the liberal and mainstream denominations have moved further away from the conservative groups, especially in the field of social activism. They have also inched along toward a series of structural mergers that will make for a more cohesive, if still pluralistic, Protestant system. In any case, the principal lines of conflict and accommodation are more likely to occur *within* denominations, an oncoming generation of clergy and laity against a presiding establishment. In the short run, with politics under

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Nixon and Billy Graham conducting services in the White House, some of the mainstream Protestant groups will slip back into the traditional "neutrality" of acquiescence. But that is probably a temporary stage. We may expect a resurgence of the Social Gospel, directed toward domestic issues once the government is compelled to undertake complete withdrawal from Vietnam. Part of the price will be an excess of anger and a paucity of skill among the younger ministers concerned to overturn policy at once and inclined to substitute zealous moralism for political realism. It is a small price to pay, however, for the renewal of social relevance in American Protestantism.

Jewish life and Judaic religion are the least likely to take a dramatic turn. But not for reasons of political or social conservatism. It is rather that the lines for social action have been established some time. Only traumatic events, in Israel or in the relationship of Jewish to black community, could conceivably shake them. Secular "Jewish liberalism" is on the defensive for the time being in the cities; however, it has in no sense vanished. The revolt of the young against their middle-class parents in the suburbs is, as usual, more intense among Jews than gentiles. A small group of Jewish radicals has permitted itself to be foolishly boxed into a polemical denunciation of "Zionist imperialism," but such New Left ideology has no real entry into American Jewish life. More broadly, Jewish religious life can absorb any "new theology" of the kind proposed by Rabbi Richard Rubenstein and other counterparts of the Protestant God-is-dead school.[11]

I do not mean to present a picture of Jewish complacency and middle-class fatigue, although these elements are there. I would only argue realistically that no other formal religion in America has yielded up, with good reason, so much of its force as an agent of social activism to secular society. Opportunity, mobility, social activism, commitment to arts and letters, all were and are expressions of secular Jewish life. In the main, young believing Jews (the Orthodox excepted) will prefer a separation of elements: synagogue worship on the Sabbath, a strong Jewish-oriented social activism in the secular system, and modernization of traditional synagogal structure hold a relatively low priority.

Of Perishable Good and Tenacious Evil

THERE IS A REVIVAL OF RELIGION in America that is very different from its shallow predecessor in the fifties. The depth of our social crisis, the feeling of loss, of "alienation" if you like, only underlines the need for a new and as yet unspecified spiritual quest. At this point in our history, the organized churches, for all their soul-searching and self-criticism, do not yet appear to be the form through which so inchoate if deeply felt a malaise can find expression. But we know that in some way a kind of spiritual crisis is affecting us and that, at the least, the institutionalized religions *used to be* the appropriate form for its expression. A return to social action, a renewal of the Social Gospel, can be helpful in this dilemma, but only in a limited way. A much broader analysis, beyond my competence, is needed to establish the dimensions of this stage in the transit of American society. Here it need only be noted.

It is not, I hope, presumptuous to stress finally that in the secular society, religious social activism is vulnerable: it lacks coherent power, it is often forced to fall back on moral exhortation, it has great difficulty in coming to grips with a human situation where falling-short and second-best decisions are the norm. Thus it has sometimes been a perishable good. For the seventies, however, the prognosis is rather optimistic. Religious liberalism and radicalism have much "leaning" to do, and it is likely to be done.

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[11] Richard Rubenstein, *After Auschwitz* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). However, in the work of Abraham Heschel, Eugene Borowitz, Emil Fackenheim, and others, there is a much deeper awareness of the need to advance "beyond secularism." And there are signs of a new pride in Jewishness among the urban young.

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Dennis H. Wrong

The Population Problem: An Unorthodox View

THOSE OF US WHO for years have been concerned, as students of population, with the increasing number of people on the earth feel some satisfaction, though not always of an unmixed kind, over the recent rise of interest in the problem. It seems to be one of those rare instances in which the anxieties of specialists suddenly become converted into a public issue. Most surprising is the new concern over continuing population growth in the United States itself, which has created some popular demand for a national antinatalist population policy. The Nixon administration, though hardly noted for its innovative tendencies, is the first to appoint a Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, assigned to explore the consequences of future growth and distribution and the relevance of government policies in a variety of areas.[1]

Social scientists concerned with the underdeveloped countries have long been aware of the need for a slowing-up and even termination of their population growth as a precondition for economic progress. But, except for a few visionaries and conservation or eugenics "cranks," scarcely anyone has bothered about American population growth until very recently. Such sociologist-demographers as Kingsley Davis, Judith Blake, and William Petersen argued that within a few decades government laws and policies aimed at discouraging childbearing would be needed, but before the publication in 1964 of Lincoln and Alice Day's *Too Many Americans* virtually no specialists in demography had advocated such a course to a wide nonprofessional audience.

In 1960 I wrote in DISSENT that the population crisis was "resistant to the old terms of ideological debate between Left and Right." This was an understatement, for the problem of controlling population growth seemed to pose a challenge to basic, though conflicting, assumptions on both sides. Yet today population control has unmistakably become a cause of the Left. Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* is a best-seller on the campus. ZPG—"zero population growth"—clubs have been created on a number of campuses and in some liberal, upper-middle-class communities. Women's Liberation advocates of "equal pay for equal work," day-care nurseries, and liberalized abortion laws, and proponents of the removal of all legal restrictions on homosexuality regularly invoke the need for population control. The connection between population increase and environmental deterioration is stressed by those concerned with the ecology issue. Critics of neocolonialism in the Third World have not only called attention to the population explosion there, but have denounced the greater drain on the resources of underdeveloped countries resulting from continued population growth in America itself. Even enthusiasts for communal living have pointed to the advantages of collective child-rearing

[1] For my references to the President's Population Commission, as well as to several other matters dealing with the future trend in fertility, I am indebted to a seminar talk given at Princeton University by Professor Charles F. Westoff, executive director of the Commission and professor of sociology at Princeton.

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in encouraging lower fertility by enabling childless adults to maintain close contact with infants and children.

Perhaps because there have been so many other startling reversals of attitude on the Left in recent years, the novelty of this new concern with population control has aroused little comment. In the past, Malthusian and neo-Malthusian arguments were usually identified with the Right. As recently as the 1950s a vague antihumanitarian and reactionary aura still clung to advocacy of population control. This goes back, of course, to Malthus himself, who originally put forward his famous theory in 1798 as a refutation of the belief in progress and human perfectability, cherished by such ideologues of the Enlightenment as Godwin and Condorcet. In the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in England, capitalists and their spokesmen made crassly self-interested use of Malthus's arguments in order to oppose higher wages and social legislation, though Malthus himself has often been unjustly blamed for the use made of his ideas by others. Marx was neither the first nor the last to pour invective on Malthus calling him a reactionary apologist for the worst excesses of capitalist exploitation, and his anti-Malthusian polemics in *Capital* have to this day inhibited full recognition of population pressure as a source of poverty in the Communist countries.

The birth-control (or "neo-Malthusian" as it was often called) and the socialist movements developed at about the same time in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A few individuals were pioneers in both movements. Annie Besant, for example, whose famous trial with Charles Bradlaugh in 1876 did so much to popularize knowledge of contraception in England, was also one of the first Fabians and a contributor with Shaw and the Webbs to *Fabian Essays*. But while some of the utopian socialists in the early part of the century had advocated birth control as a solution to the Malthusian dilemma, the parties of the Second International followed Marx's line on Malthus and were generally hostile to birth control propagandists, seeing them as diverting indignation away from capitalism, the real cause of mass poverty. Nor were the Victorian feminists very sympathetic to the birth-control cause. Most of them, as J. A. and Olive Banks have recently shown,[2] objected to birth control as depriving women of a valid excuse for refusing to submit to the brutish lusts of the male. One is startled to find the identical argument turning up in discussions of "the pill" by some of the more militant contemporary supporters of Women's Liberation.

From the closing decades of the 19th century through the 1920s, concern over population growth was often linked to racist and social Darwinist doctrines and to support for imperialist expansion. Some writers worried about the higher birth rates of the lower classes on the grounds that they were outbreeding the "genetically superior" middle and upper classes. In the era of imperialism, this argument was extended to whole peoples, and concern over the "Asiatic hordes" became widespread in the early part of the century. Scott Fitzgerald's Tom Buchanan in *The Great Gatsby,* depicted as a representative irresponsible rich man of the period, asks, "Have you read *The Rise of the Colored Empires* by this man Goddard?" (no doubt Fitzgerald had in mind *The Rising Tide of Color,* by Lothrop Stoddard), and goes on to assert: "The idea is if we don't look out the white race will be—will be utterly submerged. . . . It's up to us, who are the dominant race, to watch out or these other races will have control of things." Indians used to complain as recently as a decade or two ago that the main concern of Westerners seemed to be that there were so many of them, and one finds echoes of this attitude in the fears of "genocide" expressed today by some black militants and in their occasional condemnation of birth control as a white man's plot to eliminate American Negroes. In the

[2] *Feminism and Family Planning in Victorian England* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964).

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debate over the immigration laws 50 years ago, leading American social scientists, even several of liberal persuasion, used racist and eugenic as well as neo-Malthusian arguments to urge the end of unrestricted immigration.

All this contributed to the bad name of population control on the Left. But there were countercurrents: the Swedish socialists in the thirties, influenced by the Myrdals, encouraged the working class to limit the size of families by birth control. The idea of *la grève des ventres,* a "strike of bellies," to deny fresh cannon fodder to the war-makers was advanced by socialists before 1914. And the corollary of racist fears of the expanding colored peoples was to encourage higher fertility at home, which the Nazis and Italian Fascists adopted as official policy in the twenties and thirties, thus aligning birth control and abortion advocates with the left-wing opposition to their regimes.

Even in the period since World War II, when alarm over the population explosion in at least the underdeveloped countries became conventional wisdom among demographers, the traditional hostility of the Left to population control was expressed in several books written for a popular audience,[3] quite independently of official Communist attacks on the "reactionary Malthusianism" of American demographers. A far larger number of popular books was published, however, in the late forties and fifties voicing alarm over world population growth. Yet many of these retained the old eugenic concern over the "quality" of population that has always been unpalatable to the Left; or they attacked the "illusion" that technological progress and social reform could make much difference; or, though not racist in tone, they at least seemed to disparage the cultures of the underdeveloped world, as in conservationist William Vogt's remark that sex was the "Indian national sport."

THE GREAT amount of ignorance of the facts of population, or their distortion and misuse for partisan purposes, is an obvious danger. Even the well-informed often favor population policies that are in line with their own sentiments and reject or ignore the case for more far-reaching and controversial policies. When professional demographers in the past decade finally became active in anti-natalist programs in the underdeveloped countries, they largely confined themselves to encouraging the spread of "family planning" by contraceptive means. It was, of course, the spread of this practice that has successfully lowered fertility in the Western world since the late 19th century. The major effort of family planning programs has, therefore, gone into the mass distribution of such new, simple, and effective contraceptive devices as intrauterine loops and coils on the assumption that, since surveys show family size to exceed the expressed desires of women in the underdeveloped countries, providing them with the means to control fertility will lead to its reduction and therefore to lower overall rates of population growth. Kingsley Davis, however, pointed out in an influential 1967 article in *Science* that the same surveys suggest that even if all women in the underdeveloped areas had no more children than the number they desire, they would still produce families large enough to sustain a fairly high rate of population growth in view of continuing declines in mortality.[4] Zero population growth, he argued, must be the ultimate goal of population policy and it has not yet been attained even in the most developed countries, such as the United States, where family planning has been widely practiced for several generations. The elimination of *unwanted* births made possible by the dissemination of contraceptive knowledge is no more than a first step toward population control. People must be induced to *want*

[3] E.g., Kirtley Mather, *Enough and to Spare* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944); Josué de Castro, *The Geography of Hunger* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1952); Jacob Oser, *Must Men Starve?* (New York: Abelard-Schumann, 1957).

[4] Kingsley Davis, "Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?" *Science,* (158) November 10, 1967, pp. 730–39.

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fewer children, and to achieve this may require the imposition of new and painful social controls interfering with sentiments and personal freedoms long cherished and taken for granted. Demographers concerned with family planning programs have, Davis charged, been politically timid in failing to face up to this necessity.

In the last few years concern over pollution and environmental deterioration resulting from high and rising industrial production has focused attention on the population issue in the United States and the developed countries. Many of the alarmist books on population growth of the past quarter century were written by biological scientists with an ecological point of view, but only recently have their arguments been persuasive to a new and larger audience. The proclaimed quest of young people for a more simple and "natural," a less materialistic way of life, and the allied antitechnological animus of the young and of older ideologues of the New Left, have suddenly created a politics of protest over the "ecology issue" in which old-line conservationists have found new allies, and previously conservative or indifferent citizens have been moved to challenge the conventional goals and routines of our economic life. The very title of Charles Reich's overadvertised book eulogizing the new youth culture is a metaphor based on a conservationist slogan: "the greening of America." Presumably, the much-praised new "tribal consciousness" of the young, combined with their alleged freedom from sexual repression and their repudiation of our "plastic" civilization, does not extend to rejection of contraceptive devices, even those made of plastic, nor does it involve, one supposes, acceptance of the high levels of infant mortality that kept population growth rates low in the tribal societies of the past.

This new climate of opinion has rather suddenly placed an antinatalist population policy on the political agenda of the Left. Population growth obviously increases total demand and thus accelerates the despoliation of the environment. The issue is even adaptable to the ideological identification with the Third World so common nowadays on the Left, for the poverty of the underdeveloped countries can be attributed to the rising levels of demand in the United States, which is allegedly driven to step up its exploitation of their resources as its own population grows. When, at a symposium last year on "The Environment," I argued that population growth caused different and greater problems in the underdeveloped than in the developed countries, I was accused by a fellow panelist, a former editor of *Ramparts,* of "telling the other fellow that his end of the boat is sinking." The population-ecology issue can thus be adapted to the familiar argument that the problems of the Third World are essentially the fault of the West, particularly the United States.

It would be tragic if attention were to be diverted from the enormous task of economic development in the Third World, for which population control is so critical a necessity, by concentration on the lesser problems arising out of population growth in the United States. These problems, however, deserve consideration on their own, quite apart from ideological polemics on global issues. Apocalyptic prophecies that millions of Americans will face imminent death through poisoning by air pollution if people don't stop reproducing tomorrow do a dangerous disservice. I realize that such prophecies are meant to be self-defeating, that they are part of a political strategy designed to jog people out of optimism or indifference. But though the risk of complacency is perennial, there is also a risk of overwhelming the public with doomsday forecasts, and we surely must have approached the saturation level in recent years —even of forecasts that the air and water are close to saturation level with noxious substances. Resignation rather than strengthened determination to eliminate the evil is a possible response, and if the predicted disasters fail to materialize, apathy and complacency find renewed warrant. Moreover, the apocalyptic imagination of the times often leads to espousal of extreme and "radical"

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remedies with the result that less dramatic proposals that promise to be effective are made to appear "wishy-washy."

To give a concrete example: both Kingsley Davis and Paul Ehrlich have suggested that the American government might adopt a policy of eliminating tax deductions for more than two children and limiting free public education to the amount necessary to put no more than two children through high school. Davis has proposed that the government might today consider prohibiting couples from having more than *four* children, presumably by making sterilization compulsory for one or both parents who have already had that many. These are far-reaching proposals in light of the pronatalist bias of our existing policies. Yet the rhetoric of crisis so prevalent on the campus has led students to confront visiting politicians—and only liberal ones have shown their faces there in recent years—with the demand that they publicly support laws proscribing more than *two* children per couple. Any proposal falling short of this is then viewed—and booed—as a "cop-out."

IF ECOLOGICAL DISASTER truly looms before the end of the century, the cessation *now* of population growth will hardly help to avert it. Banning automobiles rather than babies would be a more immediately effective response. The much-cited statistic that one American consumes 50 times as much of the world's resources as a single Indian is roughly true, and the American's contribution to pollution is undoubtedly greater in about the same proportion. But this applies to *adult* Americans—infants and children do not "consume" cars, jet plane trips, six-packs of beer, or even the products of the chemical industry in anything like the same amounts as adults, and most of the people who are going to raise levels of consumption in the seventies are already alive. There is, in any case, disagreement among experts as to whether population growth is in fact the major culprit in the deterioration of the environment; Paul Ehrlich thinks it is, others attach greater importance to rising levels of per capita demand, while still others, like Barry Commoner, blame changes in technology independently of higher levels of consumption. Thus the stress on population control as an immediately effective remedy to an imminent ecological Armageddon is misplaced.

Major shifts in population trends rarely take place within a few years unless they result from natural or man-made catastrophes. The rapid drop in mortality since World War II in the underdeveloped countries is an exception which has, of course, precipitated their subsequent population explosions. But no unambiguous evidence exists that *any* governmental population policies aimed at influencing fertility, whether pro- or antinatalist, have ever succeeded in doing more than hastening a trend already underway. The Nazis made large claims for reversing the decline of the German birth rate in the 1930s, but detailed analysis suggests that the achievement of full employment as a result of rearmament accounted for the upturn of the birth rate some years before the same thing happened for the same cause in other Western countries. More recently, claims have been made for the success of family planning programs in lowering fertility in such countries as Taiwan and South Korea, but Kingsley Davis and William Petersen have convincingly argued that a transition to lower birth rates was already under way in both countries when the new programs were introduced.[5] Admittedly, past efforts by governments to encourage fewer births in both developed and underdeveloped countries have been modest by comparison with many proposals currently under discussion.

If, to invert Keynes, we are unlikely all to be dead in the long run—that is, by the year 2000—and if it is an ideologically motivated exaggeration to blame the problems of the Third World on American population

[5] Davis, *op. cit.;* William Petersen, "Taiwan's Population Problem," in S. Chandrasekhar, ed., *Asia's Population Problem* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), pp. 189–210.

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growth, or even on the American economy in general, it remains highly desirable that population growth in the United States should approach a zero rate and that we begin to plan both how to achieve this and how to cope with the new "stationary state" once it has been achieved.

What are the present prospects for future American population growth according to the evidence of the 1970 census and recent demographic research?

The census shows a population increase of somewhat more than 24 million in the sixties, from a total population of about 180 million in 1960 to 204 million in 1970. This is the second largest intercensal increase in the history of the nation (the largest was in the 1950s), but in percentage terms it is the second *smallest* increase, amounting to about 13.5 percent as compared with an all-time low of 7.2 percent during the depression of the 1930s. Although the 1 percent average annual rate of increase achieved by 1969—less than half the world rate—is still well above zero growth, there has clearly been a considerable decline in the rate of American population growth since the peak of the baby boom in the fifties.

The decline is entirely the result of a reduction in births, just as the post-World War II increases were largely owing to a rise in births. The decline in births in the late sixties so exceeded expectations that in early 1970 the Bureau of the Census revised downward its population projections for the decades ahead. The much-publicized figure of a population of 300 million by the year 2000 now seems too high and the 300 million figure is not expected to be reached until about 2110. Toward the end of the fifties and through the middle sixties, women born during the years of low fertility in the 1930s made up a larger proportion than either before or since of the total numbers of women in the childbearing years. This "ripple effect" contributed to the downturn from the high birth-rate levels of the late forties and early fifties. But since roughly 1965, the ripple effect has favored higher fertility with the first cohorts of the postwar baby-boom years entering the parental ages. This will continue to be the case through the seventies, and has already raised slightly the crude birth rates recorded in the last two years above that of 1968, which at 17.5 (per 1,000) was the lowest ever recorded, even lower than in the depths of the Depression.

However, the fact that the birth rate continued to move downward at a time when the proportion of women in the reproductive ages had become favorable to higher rates, indicates a strong desire among contemporary women to have fewer children. Even though the swollen birth cohorts of the mid-fifties will be becoming parents in the seventies, it is unlikely that their numbers will do more than slightly and temporarily increase the birth rate and the rate of population growth. Undoubtedly, the very rapid dissemination of "the pill" and the widespread publicity attending it greatly increased general awareness of the degree to which family size is subject to personal choice. The greater availability of newer methods of contraception, such as intrauterine devices, and of legal abortions are likely to counteract possible anxieties about the medical effects of the pill which have already somewhat curtailed its use. Yet the American birth rate began its decline some years before the mass marketing of the pill and even more years before intrauterine devices were available. Not the means but the motivation to have fewer children is the crucial consideration.

Some demographers who have long specialized in the study of American fertility go so far as to foresee at least the possibility of widespread concern 20 years from now over the failure of the American population to produce enough children to replace itself. Perhaps the present decline in fertility indicates the resumption of a deeply rooted trend toward small families and low fertility in industrial societies that was interrupted and temporarily reversed in response to the mass traumas of depression, war, and cold

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war in a period of uneasy prosperity permitting one last acting-out of traditional family values. While new demands and problems have emerged in the sixties, much of the discontent expressed by radical youth, by the women's movement, and by the blacks reflects a desire to complete several of the "compromised revolutions" to which Paul Goodman called our attention a decade ago in *Growing Up Absurd* (though, surprisingly, he failed to mention feminism).

Yet in the case of childbearing decisions there is a new element present. The United States has undoubtedly become the most mass-media saturated country in the world. The enormous publicity recently given to environmental damage and to the asserted connection between it and population growth has helped convert childbearing decisions into a moral issue, a matter of conscience, for large numbers of people. Greater exposure to the culture of the campus has undoubtedly had a similar effect. Thus decisions on family size may no longer be determined solely by the desires and adaptations to their particular social and economic situations of individual couples; for perhaps the first time in any large-scale society, they may be becoming responsive to public and official concern over the impact of total population size and growth on the general welfare. The very rapid decline of fertility in the last few years and the sharply reduced family-size preferences expressed in surveys by college-age and slightly older women are consistent with this suggestion.

Official pronouncements on American population growth have not gone beyond the family-planning movement's traditional concern with eliminating unwanted births. If this increasingly noncontroversial goal were to be attained,[6] how far would it take us toward zero population growth? Most authoritative estimates place the proportion of all "unwanted" births in the United States at about one-fifth. The ambiguity inherent in the notion of an unwanted birth strongly suggests that this is an underestimate. Demographers have maintained that the elimination in a decade of all unwanted births would bring the United States two-thirds to three-quarters of the way toward zero population growth. If, however, fertility levels sufficient only for population replacement were reached by the end of the 1970s, the present age composition of the population is such that zero growth could not be actually achieved for another 65–70 years.[7] This is a short time according to the usual timetable of demographic change, but impossibly distant by the standards of the doomsday forecasters.

WHAT PUBLIC POLICIES, in addition to the extension and improvement of effective family planning services, might be adopted to accelerate this trend? Compulsory restrictions on childbearing by means of required abortions or sterilizations, let alone such measures—still technically impossible—as placing steroids in public water supplies, are politically as well as administratively unfeasible, though it is a good thing that they are at least being discussed as ultimate possibilities. Tax reforms removing extra benefits to large families and penalties for single and childless persons are probably the most obvious initial measures that would reverse the built-in, though by no means deliberately planned, pronatalist bias in present tax, welfare, and military exemption policies. It is to be hoped that *all* future government programs will be directly evaluated for their possible effects on fertility, which should rule out such antipoverty measures as the family allowances advocated by Daniel P. Moynihan. Not that present tax or welfare policies have necessarily had a decisive effect on fertility, for, as we have seen, even deliberate

[6] Not all aspects of this are uncontroversial. A high proportion of increased illegitimate birth occurs with teen-agers, suggesting the need for more extensive sex education, including contraceptive information, in the schools.

[7] Larry Bumpass and Charles F. Westoff, "The 'Perfect Contraceptive' Population," *Science*, (169) September 18, 1970, pp. 1177–82.

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population policies in other countries have had little or no measurable impact. But action by the government to remove real or apparent official encouragement of large families may help sustain the present mood of concern, which has independently contributed to the recent decline in fertility. Such new policies might also set limits to a future resurgence of fertility—a second baby boom —even though this seems highly unlikely to occur and, if it did, more stringent measures would certainly be required to control and reverse it.

In addition to the volume of direct publicity on the population-ecology issue, the consequences of rapid urbanization and resulting higher population densities are all too visible. Air and water pollution, traffic jams and transportation problems, housing shortages, the spread of suburbia into the countryside, the overcrowding of recreational facilities, even higher crime rates, are plausibly attributed to population growth and have undoubtedly influenced the downward trend in births and family-size preferences. Yet these problems result primarily from a long-standing trend in the *distribution* of the population: the increasing concentration of people in metropolitan areas, which is only indirectly affected by total population increase. Actually, the United States as a whole is not becoming more crowded: fully half our counties have *lost* population since 1950, most of them in the "heartland" rural belt, extending from the agricultural Midwest southward to Texas and Louisiana, and eastward across the South to Georgia and South Carolina. Nor are American cities themselves characterized by very high densities if compared with European, let alone Asian, cities. The urban explosion of the last 30 years has taken place largely in the suburbs, creating the familiar problems of racial polarization between black central cities and white suburbs, the declining tax base of central cities, congested transportation arteries between residential suburbs and downtown business districts, and increasing residential segregation by class, race, and ethnic group within metropolitan areas.

The Population Commission's charter includes the examination of trends in population distribution as well as overall growth. But the Commission has been far more gingerly in considering policies aiming at population redistribution than those dealing with total growth. In spite of the association of population control with traditional sexual, moral, and religious values held with emotional fervor, policies designed to alter present population distribution and to slow-up or reverse current trends are likely to be even more politically explosive than those aiming at a reduction in fertility. The competition between regions for federal funds and contracts, the acute fiscal needs of the metropolitan areas, the dependence of so many areas on the military-industrial and aerospace establishments, and decisions as to the location of federally financed model cities and new towns—these merely begin to suggest the dimensions of the problem. More than ten years ago, at the peak of the nuclear arms race, Nathan Glazer stated: "Because California needs missile contracts, American civilization may be destroyed." [8] More recently, a similar—if less millennial —disproportion between cause and effect has been indicated in the case of the needs of the Seattle labor market and the noise and pollution effects of the SST.

One may assert with total confidence that there is not a single problem of American society that will be reduced rather than aggravated by the addition of more people to the population. The questions raised by policies of population redistribution, however, are a good deal more complex and politically knotty, and they fall outside the scope of the present discussion.

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[8] Nathan Glazer, "The Peace Movement in America, 1961," *Commentary,* (31) April 1961, p. 295.

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Brendan Sexton and Patricia Cayo Sexton

Labor's Decade—Maybe

Union Prospects for the Seventies

IF WE READ our stars right, the seventies ought to see, not the dawning of the age of Aquarius, but a new era for the working man. Of course, some catastrophe or technological breakthrough may make the seventies nobody's decade. But if history moves on its present course, the worker and his union will once again have a place in the sun. They had it in the thirties, during a period of struggle and unrest, when the unions as we today know them were pretty much shaped.

Labor can be expected to achieve renewed strength in the seventies because many Americans do want change in our society, and labor is driven to use its power to win social change. Most of us are sick of violence and guerrilla war, sick of war abroad and at home. Most Americans want to get out of the trenches. Labor will come to the forefront in the seventies because the economic issues, again urgent, will probably remain with us, especially if conservatives persist in fiddling away our resources when not pouring them into war machines. Jobs, income, opportunity, distribution of wealth and power, standard of living—these are basic, and these are the issues of greatest concern to labor.

What will labor *do* with the seventies? A more difficult question. We expect a turn in a progressive direction. Unions in the seventies, for example, will more nearly resemble the Congress of Industrial Organizations of the thirties than the AFL of the sixties. Changing membership and leadership, as well as a thrust into new unorganized areas, will give the unions a strong new momentum. Many will have a membership that will be much blacker, younger, better educated, and probably more militant, and these members will vote in leaders who more nearly resemble them.

Union membership will pick up in the South, among women, among public employees, among the working poor and paraprofessionals, and perhaps also among white-collar and professional workers. As for technology, the major consequence for labor will be to make the work force and union membership somewhat more skilled. Automation, the nightmare of the fifties, will probably have no more profound an impact on the work force in the seventies than it had in the sixties. It will continue to eliminate some unskilled jobs and increase the need for skilled workers—but not dramatically.

Until very recently it has been fashionable to write off the working class as having, at best, small significance in either the nation's present or future. Blue-collar workers, we were told, had grown fat, dispirited, conservative, maybe "neofascist." Social scientists discovered and rediscovered the working class as authoritarian, anti-civil libertarian, white racist, prowar, or in other ways generally repugnant. The workers' unions, naturally, were even worse, led by fat cats, bureaucrats, crooks, and sellouts. In any event, we were told, blue-collar workers were no longer of much significance because of the "changing nature of the work force"

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and the disappearance of their jobs. Well, this demise of blue-collar has now been impending for at least 20 years, the obituaries have proliferated, and the patient remains pretty healthy.

Neither the work force nor the unions have declined. There are now more blue-collar workers than at any time in history, and more Americans belong to unions than ever before. The 28.2 million blue-collar workers employed at the close of 1969 is the largest number ever so classified.[1] In addition, 9.5 million service workers can probably also be counted as blue-collar—a substantial increase. In all, there were 37.7 million workers in 1969, compared to 29.8 million in 1950. To be sure, white-collar workers have multiplied even faster, but it is the agricultural workers who are disappearing (and being soaked up into a variety of jobs), not the blue-collar workers. Even as a percentage of the work force, the number of blue-collar workers has remained amazingly constant, fluctuating from year to year only within a few percentage points. In the sixties the percentage actually increased somewhat. More specifically, the male blue-collar work force has increased as a percentage of the total male work force while the corresponding percentage of females has decreased (the proportion of female "service workers" is growing). *Almost half of all employed males are employed in blue-collar jobs* (craftsmen, operatives, service workers)—47.3 percent in 1968, to be precise.

DURING THE SIXTIES union membership also grew—from 17 to 19 million and held nearly constant as a proportion of the work force.[2] In 1968 union members were 23 percent of the labor force, including part-time as well as full-time workers. In the mid-fifties the percentage had been slightly higher. The big job of unions, in this respect, is keeping up with the phenomenal growth in the work force over the past several decades, from about 59 million in 1950 to about 82 million in 1968. Moreover, the growth has been most rapid in populations and places unfamiliar to unions: clerical, professional, service, women, the South. As unions learn how to organize these new types—and there is evidence that they *are* learning—they may be able to go beyond the one-quarter mark, which for the last two decades seems to have been, more or less, their assigned share of the labor force.[3]

Most unions are growing steadily. During the period 1964–66, for example, 96 unions gained and 55 lost members. Losses were concentrated in sick or dying industries and where employment generally declined sharply —mining, railroads, textiles, shoe manufacturing, furniture, marine, transportation, etc.

In the fifties and sixties, some long-term assumptions about union growth were drawn from short-term trends. The late fifties were an uncertain and difficult period for unions, especially industrial unions. Losses in some unions were assumed to follow from inroads made by automation and the genetic inability of unions to organize white-collar workers. In fact, many unions were then immobilized

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[1] All statistical citations dealing with the work force are taken from the *Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics,* Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970. In all appropriate cases, we have cited the latest months or years given in that publication.

[2] Materials dealing with numbers of union members are quoted or abstracted from various editions of the *Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States.* The most recent edition of this biennial publication of the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, appeared in late 1970 and reported union membership for 1968.

[3] For reasons not known to us, union membership is almost always reported as a percentage of the "nonagricultural work force," whereas we choose to measure membership against the total labor force. It makes a difference. From 1960 through 1968 union membership as a percentage of the nonagricultural work force sank from 31.4 to 27.9—but measured against the total labor force the percentages were 23.6 against 23.0. The "nonagricultural work force" measurement reflects a shift away from agrarian jobs rather than a decline of unionism and is therefore less useful for these purposes.

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by the Eisenhower policy of combating inflation by raising unemployment, a neat trick Nixon has tried to repeat. Union members were especially vulnerable to this kind of economic manipulation. High interest rates, unemployment, and the periodic recessions of that era reduced the demand for homes, autos, appliances, and all the materials going into them—steel, aluminum, rubber, copper, electrical components.

The Taft-Hartley law, the various state "right-to-work" laws and, a little later, Landrum-Griffin, all created new problems for unions, especially in organizing. The more-or-less liberal interpretation and enforcement of the Labor Relations Act that had marked the Roosevelt and Truman eras began to be reversed as Eisenhower appointees to the NLRB and the federal courts imposed greater restrictions on union organizing efforts.

During the fifties, the McCarthy years, unions again came under assault. The McClellan hearings created general public antagonism to unions. It became fashionable for conservative congressional candidates to "run against" Walter Reuther (who never entered a political race). Noncandidate Reuther was challenged to and participated in national radio and TV debates with both Goldwater and Senator Robert Taft.

Unions were on the defensive, and this made organizing more difficult. At precisely the time when declining membership was reducing dues and income, the new legal complexities drained their finances and energy. Less money was available to pay organizers and the much higher legal expenses incurred in every new organizing campaign. Historically, union organizing efforts tend to be least successful in periods of rising unemployment. During the recession-pocked Eisenhower years, it is a wonder that unions managed to get on as well as they did.

All these factors were often overlooked or minimized by the numerous writers who kept predicting that unionism would wither away. Clichés about the decline of unions were by then so widely accepted that new trends becoming apparent in the middle sixties were almost ignored. President Kennedy opted for high employment levels, and made collective bargaining procedures a matter of accepted policy for government employees. He thereby stimulated the trend already begun at state, city, and county levels—in areas where organized labor's political muscle could be effectively applied —to guarantee public employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.

Moreover, children born during the baby boom of the forties and fifties became adults and consumers of cars, appliances, homes, and other products made by union members. Increased demand began to compensate for the decline in jobs resulting from automation industry and partial prefabrication in construction. The growing need for schools, homes, hospitals, autos, appliances, and services caused the work force to grow to an unprecedented size. At the same time, highly publicized and often successful strikes of professionals—teachers, airline pilots, TV commentators—gave the idea of unionization unprecedented public sanction.

The Steelworkers Union, whose membership declined from 1.2 million in 1957 to 878,000 in 1963, climbed back to 1.1 million in 1968. The Auto Workers' 1957 membership of 1.3 million sank to a low of 1 million just two years later, but bounced back to 1.4 million in 1968. The rubber workers dropped from 178,000 to 158,000 in the two years 1957–59, but climbed up to 203,000 by 1968. (The membership figures are all rounded.) Among the larger unions, the only ones to suffer permanent damage were those in declining industries.

Barring a dragged-out recession, unions will continue to grow during the seventies. They have finally caught on in some of the fastest growing sectors of the society and are likely to catch on in others. In those geographic and economic areas jobs have risen fastest, and so has union membership. In 1957–68, for example, the American Federa-

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tion of Government Employees grew from 64,000 to 294,000; the State, County and Municipal Workers went from 150,000 to 364,000; the Teachers' Federation from 50,000 to 165,000; the Postal Clerks from 97,000 to 166,000; Letter Carriers from 108,000 to 210,000; Retail Clerks from 300,000 to 550,000; Retail-Wholesale from 107,000 to 175,000; Building Service from 230,000 to 389,000; Communication Workers from 259,000 to 357,000; the Teamsters grew from 1.4 million to 1.7 million.

Meanwhile, major changes were occurring in the racial, social, and cultural composition of the working class. These changes are making the working class both blacker and younger.

During the fifties and sixties, the average age of the population declined. At the same time that masses of young people were entering the labor force and unions, the older workers were coming out the other end. Pensions have risen and the age of retirement has declined, permitting older workers to make way for the young. During the seventies, there will be increased pressure—from young and old alike—to reduce the number of years spent at routine jobs and to bring the age of retirement down. In 1972, auto workers with 30 years of service will be eligible for retirement at age 56. By the end of the decade it is likely that many auto workers will be retiring at or before age 50. These standards will surely spread to other industries, too.

II

WHILE THE CENSUS gives little information about ages of workers in specific occupations, we do know from pension information in the auto industry that hordes of young people are employed there. The same seems true for other industries. In Ford, for example, 32 percent of all workers are age 30 or under; in GM, 39 percent; and in Chrysler, 41 percent. In all three, the average is very close to four out of ten workers at or under the magical age of 30.[4] These young workers are beginning to be represented in something close to their numbers in the secondary leadership of the UAW, although nobody on the chief policy-making body—the International Executive Board—is under 45. But this too inevitably will change, and the union will pay far more attention to its young members. (The number of young people in the labor force, of course, far outnumbers those in schools and colleges.)

As with age, information about the racial composition of the work force is sparse. But some reasonable inferences may be made. We know, for example, that black people have been moving North, that the black population of Southern states has declined. Blacks are becoming urban industrial workers —and union members—in the North (and to a lesser extent in the South) at a phenomenal rate. Many whites still come North from the rural South and border states, but they are more likely than blacks to stop off at Memphis, Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, and other southern cities. Furthermore, the black population is younger than the white, less schooled, and therefore more likely to enter the blue-collar work force.

Unions in the North and also, though to a lesser extent, in the South will be a natural center—a new, more realistic and powerful kind—of black power in the seventies. Though their representation is still inadequate, blacks have thus far won more influence in unions than in any other American social institution. A study of black powerlessness, conducted for the Urban League of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, found that unions had a larger percentage (13 percent) of black "policy-makers" than any other private institution.

> In welfare and religious organizations, whose constituents were often largely black, 8 percent of policy making posts were held by blacks. The universities had a negligible one

[4] The percentages were computed from employment reports submitted by Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler to UAW pension committees.

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percent representation. Most of the universities had a few black students, faculty, or administrators. The University of Illinois had one policy maker. Roosevelt University was the sole institution that had a number of blacks at the top. Only *five* out of 380 policy making posts in these universities were held by blacks.

The elected political offices and the elected trade union offices [the study found] account for only 11 percent of all policy making positions in Cook County. Yet, almost half of all the Negro policy makers were found in these areas—137 out of 283.[5]

Industrial unions are very likely the most racially integrated organizations in the country—not necessarily out of inherent virtue, but because the CIO saw from the start that it had to include black workers if it was to organize along industrial rather than craft lines.[6]

In the integrated union especially, the activist learns the politics of coalition, a basic part of the art of negotiation. If a candidate wants to win an election for local office, he must advocate a program broad enough to appeal to a majority of voters, which is likely to include a range of racial minorities.

As time goes by, the "minority" in local unions will increasingly be white. Current political roles will then be reversed, with contending groups of blacks seeking white support, just as contending whites now solicit black votes. Where blacks become a majority, the thrust of black separatism is likely to be blunted, just as open white racism became politically untenable in locals where blacks form a significant minority.

Though union apologists sometimes stoutly deny it, the history of all unions is scarred by racial discrimination. The AFL, after all, was a leading sponsor of the law excluding Oriental immigrants. Until just a few years ago, many of its affiliates still organized and sanctioned jim-crow locals in the South. Some craft unions have flatly excluded blacks. Separate seniority lists, negotiated by unions, sometimes guaranteed that blacks would be laid off first and recalled last in periods of recession. Until recently, blacks were restricted in their efforts to enter most of the industrial skilled trades. To this day, they are underrepresented in such occupations as tool and die maker, machinist, patternmaker, machine repair, steel-mill roller, etc.

Even the best unions have sinned, and the worst have been persistently and callously exclusionist. But unions have been no worse than most other American institutions in this regard, and have been better than many. Their critics—often themselves associated with racially exclusive institutions—have often treated unionists as though they alone were sinners.

What the union apologists might say with justice is, "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone." Instead, they often flatly deny any guilt at all. When we measure discrimination we deal not only with blacks and whites, but with all shades of grey as well, and the apologists are wrong in attempting to whitewash union flaws that might better be exposed to the light.

Overlooked by labor's critics, however, is the *present* state of union affairs, obscured as it is by the constant repetition of old charges that are no longer accurate or valid. So much attention, for example, has been given to conservatism and "racism" in *some* building trades unions that, in the public mind, they have come to symbolize unionism generally.

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[5] Harold M. Baron, with Harriet Stulman, Richard Rothstein, and Renard Davis, "Black Powerlessness in Chicago," *Trans-action,* November, 1968.

[6] According to unofficial estimates, almost half the members of the 550,000-member Laborers' Union and the 50,000-member Longshoremen's Union are black. In all, 45 AFL-CIO unions have black membership that is proportionally larger than the percentage of blacks in the total population (about 11 percent). A number of large unions have more than 20 percent black membership. These include: State, County and Municipal workers (360,000 total members), Meatcutters-Packinghouse Workers (500,000), Letter Carriers (210,000), Postal Clerks (166,000), International Ladies Garment Workers (455,000), Building Service (398,000), Laundry Workers (25,000), the American Federation of Teachers (165,000), and possibly Steel (1.1 million) and Auto Workers (1.4 million).

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Among the 46 unions whose membership exceeds 100,000, only eight, as it happens, are building trades unions. One of these, the Laborers, has a membership that may be more than half black, and blacks are prominent in its top leadership. A few of the others, such as the IBEW (Brotherhood of Electrical Workers), have organized industrial workers as well as building tradesmen and include thousands of black workers in their ranks. Even many of the building trades—especially those in the so-called trowel trades—have never been cited for racial exclusion. A good many have joined in programs such as those sponsored by the A. Philip Randolph Institute, which has successfully prepared large numbers of young black workers for admission to apprenticeships in various trades. Others have sponsored their own training programs for both journeymen and apprentices. At least one, the Operating Engineers, administered a Job Corps center in a successful effort to increase the number of blacks employed in driving earth-moving equipment.

IN THE SOUTH, where industry is growing more rapidly than elsewhere, union growth has been dramatic, if rather obscured by the widely publicized and recurrent failures in past decades to "Organize Dixie."

Successful strikes of southern public and hospital workers have made some local unions the strongest organizations blacks have in southern communities. These locals are eligible to affiliate with state and county labor groups, in which their representatives find a forum to communicate grievances and political demands to the white community. In almost all cases, unionized whites in these communities have given at least tacit support to the strikes of black workers.

In many industries where southern unions are growing, blacks form a significant part of the work force. Their impact in those places will be felt, we believe, just as it has been in northern towns where industrial unions have united workers of all trades and races under one banner. In Alabama, until recently, the only organized opposition to George Wallace came from the State Federation of Labor. In Mississippi, facing terror and intimidation, the state labor organization has nonetheless opposed the Klan and White Citizens' Councils. In Texas even now the organized labor movement is at the heart of the liberal political coalition that wins an occasional statewide victory (Yarborough to the U.S. Senate) and sends a good handful of liberal candidates to Congress and to the state legislature.

Union growth in the South has been a rather well-guarded secret. Since 1964, as illustrated in the following table, unions have, with some fluctuations, grown in almost every southern state in both absolute and relative terms.

In these 12 states, unions added 1 million members between 1960 and 1968 and rose to a total estimated membership of about 2.7 million in 1970. By 1980 it will probably come to 4 million. Such growth will have great social and political significance not only in the South, but in the entire nation. The death of jim-crow locals, for example, will throw blacks and whites together in the same unions, where they will find themselves working toward the same goals. An organized base for the southern populist currents that have never quite died will be created in many communities. Southern unions, playing a healing and ameliorative role in race relations, should begin to push the Democratic party to the Left, and diminish the strength of the northern conservative and southern coalition that has paralyzed liberal reform for so long.

In the South and elsewhere, much union growth occurred in strategic areas of the economy—especially in government employment. The fastest growing unions have been the American Federation of Government Employees, State, County and Municipal Workers, and the American Federation of Teachers. Such successes create new agendas for state, local, and federal governments, and

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a new dynamic in our political life. As they seek support for their goals, the government workers politicize other unions. They create new—and often influential—lobbies for the expansion of public operations. They are generally much more successful than other unions in shaping the policies of the organizations for which they work. Many of them are certain to have a real fling at worker control. The Federation of Teachers, for example, will certainly intervene increasingly in education policy—probably with mixed results.[7]

Rising labor costs resulting from unionization also will create pressure for technological innovation and improvement in public employment. Teaching machines and TV will become commonplace. Data controls and systems analysis will lead to the replacement of many professional and technical workers. The effect will create greater insecurity among publicly employed professionals and accelerate union growth at the upper levels of civil service—which will make unionization of such workers socially even more acceptable than it is now.

The effect of the organization of large numbers of public workers is to increase the pressure on unions to campaign for a redistribution of wealth and income. Local and state governments are being pushed to bankruptcy by the need to expand old and provide new services, and by public workers' demands for a greater share of the nation's wealth.

The continuing inflation will add to the pressures. Efforts to control wages, as a pretext for limiting price increases, are sure to be made. Then the Pandora's box of "reasonable profits" will open and out will pop questions of income and wealth distribution.

The expansion of public employment and unionization will probably also have the effect of making public ownership more acceptable to larger numbers of Americans,

[7] The National Education Association, whose membership is probably five or six times that of the AFT, has a long tradition of participation in policy-making. The NEA is rapidly transforming itself into a real trade union. Many of its state and local affiliates call strikes, and most now bargain collectively for their members. NEA members are not included in our count of union members—though it certainly would not be unreasonable to add their numbers to total union membership. Influential people in both NEA and AFT favor merger of the two organizations. If it occurs the result will be a union about the size of the Teamsters.

UNION MEMBERSHIP IN SOUTHERN STATES *

The gross number of members is expressed in thousands and the percentages of nonagricultural work force is enclosed in parentheses.

State	1964	1966	1968
Alabama	158 (18.7)	178 (19.2)	193 (20.1)
Arkansas	73 (17)	83 (17)	97 (19.1)
Florida	214 (14)	234 (13.6)	279 (14.4)
Georgia	166 (14)	188 (14.2)	239 (16.6)
Kentucky	195 (27)	217 (27.1)	235 (27.5)
Louisiana	160 (18.7)	176 (18.3)	187 (18.0)
Mississippi	62 (13.5)	64 (12.3)	76 (13.8)
North Carolina	100 (7.4)	104 (6.9)	124 (7.5)
South Carolina	48 (7.4)	49 (6.7)	66 (8.6)
Tennessee	201 (19.2)	225 (18.9)	246 (19.4)
Texas	394 (14.1)	423 (13.7)	474 (13.9)
Virginia	184 (15.8)	199 (15.5)	230 (16.6)

* The table shows total membership in each state for the years 1964, 1966, and 1968—the only years for which such material is available. In this case the Department of Labor reports show only percentages of the "nonagricultural work force." If the reports showed percentages of the *total* work force, all the percentages almost certainly would have risen.

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and certainly will increase public interest and participation in the society. To be sure, racism will not disappear in the South simply because workers are unionized. By the logic of their position, however, unionized workers are driven to cooperate, at least for limited goals, across racial lines. Prejudice and discrimination survive—even sometimes flourish—in Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other industrial centers, but unions there nonetheless manage to help elect candidates, including many blacks, who appeal to both black and white workers.

Even the more conservative and lethargic unions transmit information and education for their members about the conduct of public officials. A unionized worker is much more likely than a nonunionized one to be informed about the record of his congressman. He is more likely to register and vote, simply because his union persistently urges him to do so. A majority of Alabama's organized workers, it is true, did support George Wallace, but studies have shown the support they gave was smaller in percentage than among the unorganized.

III

RADICALS HAVE A LONG HISTORY of disappointment with American unions, especially the CIO unions from which they expected far more radicalism than they got. Yet the truth is that the CIO, and those AFL unions that grew along with it, transformed industrial America. Organized workers won some measure of control over their conditions of work and a solid hope that they can win much more. They are protected against arbitrary discipline and discharge. They have access to grievance procedures. They have some insurance against sickness, death, unemployment. They are covered by pension agreements, and enjoy lengthening vacations and holidays with pay. All this may seem trivial to those concerned only with revolutionary abstractions—but it is a great deal to the millions of workers who are directly affected.

Moreover, the solid strength of unions has underwritten a kind of political and social freedom not previously enjoyed by workers. That freedom is reflected in the kinds of candidates elected to public office in places where unions are strong. In the American politicial spectrum, unions have been well over to the Left. If there is a prominent liberal office-holder in the country who got there without union support, we can't think of his name. Even John Lindsay had the support of a significant minority of New York's unions, and Gene McCarthy—idol of the New Democrats—was first elected to the House of Representatives and later to the Senate as a candidate of the Minnesota Democratic Farmer-Labor party.

Forced to play coalition politics in order to maximize their political influence, unions have given some impetus to the drive by blacks for political recognition. In a post-1970 election comment on the number of blacks holding public office in the United States, the *New Republic* said that there were 1,600 prior to the 1970 election and an increased number thereafter. The largest contingent, the report added, is from Michigan, where the "farsighted policies of the United Auto Workers have contributed measurably to black successes." Those "farsighted policies" are in no small measure attributable to the continuing agitation of courageous and aggressive blacks who found in the UAW a forum where they could struggle for their cause. Increasingly, blacks are taking the struggle to other unions.

Will it all make a difference? We think it will—but our hopes and goals (in contrast to our desires) are limited. We hope not for the millennium, but only for a kind of enlightened social and political equilibrium in which democratic discourse about necessary social change can continue, while the worst burdens are lifted from the backs of the socially and politically outcast.

Actually, if we were to reach the kind of

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equilibrium that would be achieved if all the candidates supported by labor in 1970 had been elected to the Congress, we would see significant social change. Such a Congress might:

- Pass tax reform that would bring about some redistribution of wealth—especially through the imposition of higher rates on the top income brackets and the elimination of such tax dodges as the depletion allowance.
- Support full employment.
- Adopt an advanced form of national health insurance.
- Adopt a relatively generous form of guaranteed income, and support programs designating the government as employer of last resort to provide work for the unemployed.
- Adopt advanced standards for water and air pollution.
- Raise the minimum wage to $2 an hour.
- Extend the protection of the National Labor Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act (minimum wages) to agricultural workers and others who now are not covered.
- Reduce the qualifying age and raise the amount of social security payments.
- Increase the amounts of money being spent for education at all levels.
- Increase the number of housing units being constructed.
- Make direct grants to the states and local communities for the support of urban improvements.
- Increase assistance to Appalachia and other areas where poverty is endemic.
- Improve consumer protection and the enforcement powers of government regulatory agencies.

We are not brash enough to include in this list "a more rapid end to the Vietnam war"—but with few exceptions candidates who won for the U.S. Senate with labor support are classified as "doves." More open and flexible than many of his left-leaning critics, George Meany personally gave his support to liberals with whom he disagreed violently on Vietnam. While many liberals and radicals in New York, for example, chose the conservative Goodell only because of his position on the war, George Meany made a strong pitch for Ottinger the dove against Buckley the hawk. Meany and his staff also supported Gore, Hart, Hartke, Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Stevenson, Williams, and other doves, though their opponents' positions on foreign policy often must have been more to the AFL–CIO's liking.

IV

IN SUMMARY, we think the obituaries for workers and their unions, have been premature, based principally on superficial reading of available materials, and distorted inferences drawn from short-term trends.

We cannot, however, wholly discount the influence of simple antilabor and antiworking-class bias. Harvard Professor Daniel Bell speaks for many when he says (as quoted in the *New York Times*):

> The degree of corruption in labor has become incredible. . . . The pomposity of labor leaders unbearable. . . . A lot of union leaders are corrupted by power. . . . The labor movement has stagnated. . . . Membership has reached the saturation point except in some white-collar unions. Union leadership has grown old. Labor is no longer pushing up the kind of extraordinary leaders that it did in the thirties and who are emerging from the blacks today.

We think, by contrast, that scholars and others increasingly are rejecting Professor Bell's notions. Albert Camus never bought them, and his thinking about workers seems now to have some chance for acceptance.

> The confusion of European intellectuals [Camus said] springs from the double hoax, bourgeois and pseudo-revolutionary, and separating them from their sole source of authenticity, the work and suffering of all, cutting them off from their sole natural allies, the workers. I know that if they are separated (workers and intellectuals) they

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will allow themselves to be overwhelmed gradually by the forces of tyranny and barbarousness, but that united, on the other hand, they will govern the world.[8]

Irving Louis Horowitz, a more moderate critic than Professor Bell, says he

> does not believe a resurgence of the militant-moralistic unionism of the left is likely in the foreseeable future. . . . American labor, at least after 1880, was not *in the main* of the left in any classically socialist sense of the term. A left orientation has always been modest, if not peripheral, and thus has not suffered such a dramatic decline as is often made out.[9]

We too see no leftward movement in any "classical socialist sense," but we do see a labor movement supplied with fresh momentum by the newly organized, the blacks, the young, the public workers, and Southerners.

Some years ago, Frank Tannenbaum came close to expressing our assessment of unions, when he wrote in *A Philosophy of Labor:*

> This profound challenge to our time has gone largely unnoticed because the trade-union's preoccupation with the detailed frictions that flow from the worker's relation to his job seemed to involve no broad program. In tinkering with the little things—hours, wages, shop conditions, and security in the job—the trade-union is, however, rebuilding our industrial society upon a different basis from that envisioned by the philosophers, economists, and social revolutionaries of the 18th and 19th centuries.
>
> A sparsity of general ideas and a lack of any "ideology" kept the trade-union movement from being obtrusively vocal and permitted mesmeric political groups to look upon it as something of no great importance. But its very lack of ideas make it strong and enable it to concentrate upon immediate ends without wasting its energies in a futile pursuit of Utopia.
>
> In terms of the individual, the union returns to the worker his "society." It gives him a fellowship, a part in the drama that he can understand, and life takes on meaning once again because he shares a value system common to others.
>
> That is why the trade-union is a repudiation of the individualism of the French Revolution and of the liberalism of English utilitarian philosophers. It rests upon the group, upon the organized "society" forged by the mine, mill and factory. Trade-unionism is . . . a social and ethical system, not merely an economic one. It is concerned with the whole man. Its ends are the "good life."[10]

[8] Albert Camus, *Resistance, Rebellion and Death* (New York: Knopf, 1961).

[9] Irving L. Horowitz, "Condition of the Working Class in the U.S. (1970)," *New Politics,* Summer 1970.

[10] Frank Tannenbaum, *A Philosophy of Labor* (New York: Knopf, 1951).

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Emanuel Geltman and Stanley Plastrik

Coalition Politics Revisited

THOUGH THE EVENTS of recent years have bruised its image, the idea of political coalitionism is still very much with us. Among some of the young and disaffected, coalition politics may not be this season's vegetable but it remains this season's political strategy—provided we recognize that its virtue rests not in repetition but in changing political relationships and styles.

The argument is not all that abstract. It is a plain and demonstrable fact that politics by coalition is a commonplace of political life everywhere, at least in democratic societies. Could Golda Meir rule Israel without a coalition? Or could Indira Gandhi steer India along progressive lines without a coalition? Would any alternative but chaos and confrontation exist for Chile's President Allende without a coalition?

Writing on the politics of coalition in what now seems a distant past when progressive forces in the labor, civil rights, and liberal-radical movements were working together as never before, we said:

> "A new style of politics" is certainly the order of the day. But the content of that new style can be given a wide range of meaning, from isolated, if brave, sorties, to turbulent intervention in American political life *as it is lived*. Surely the happiest and easiest solution for the radical condition is to think we can agitate the disaffected into our welcoming organizational arms—if only they would come! It is not quite that easy to rub against the realities of American politics, to educate people, convince them, move them. Easy or not, it is possible to accomplish these ends if we use the resources that are available to us in coalition with others of more or less similar purpose and mind. [Emphasis in original.] [1]

Admittedly, the politics of coalition has not fared well since these words were written. Yet there were significant advances. In its own way, the present turmoil in our cities reflects the taste for "more," as stimulated by the achievements of coalition activity during the early and mid-sixties. But it was a politics that could barely withstand the successive shocks of the Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy assassinations, the sour smell of the 1968 Democratic party convention, the appearance of new movements, the aggravation of old issues.

Yet, we feel we are right in asking: what political course *has* met with success, what brave new political worlds have revealed themselves to us over, say, the past ten years? It is our contention that, had a more vigorous coalitionist policy been pursued and preserved, a policy designed to unite people behind desirable goals, the tone and level of political life in the United States would not be in its present dismal condition.

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[1] "The Politics of Coalition," *The Radical Papers*, Irving Howe, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965).

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Changes in the Making

A RECENT LABOR DEPARTMENT STUDY contains projections of great relevance to our subject.[2] Estimated to reach 100 million workers by 1980, the labor force will show a major increase in the number of young adult workers, particularly in the number of young black workers. In addition to a doubling of the number of women workers as compared with 1950, *there will be, for the first time, as many professional and technical workers by 1980 as blue-collar workers.*

This represents a growth in the country's labor force of 15 million workers within the next decade, of whom 50 percent will be 25–34 years old, a carry-over of the famous post-World War II "baby boom"; in other words, that section of today's youth population which does not succeed in getting into the ranks of the professional classes. More significantly, it is estimated that the number of young black workers entering the work force will outnumber—perhaps as much as five-fold—the entering young white workers. These changes are bound to generate social and economic problems that will require the broadest kind of political coalition to supply the mass basis for new and humane solutions.

Or, consider the role of women. By 1980 there will be an estimated 37 million working women, as compared to 30 million in 1969 and 18 million in 1950—very near a doubling of the female labor force within two decades. This fact alone will initiate major changes in our society. Among other things, job training for mothers who reenter the labor force and day-care facilities for the children of working mothers are less likely to be dismissed as luxuries, for they will have become social necessities.

All in all, fundamental shifts in the composition, activity, and personnel of the world's most gigantic labor force are bound to have major political consequences and to act as a stimulus to forming alliances between this mass of human labor and other sectors of our society—alliances that may well assume fresh and unforeseeable forms.

Even the coalitionism of a few years ago differed sharply from the classic coalitionism familiar in the United States since the days of the New Deal. By the 1960s it had acquired a new context: the context of the civil rights movement, of the struggle to right the wrongs of the Vietnam war and to prevent similar national catastrophes. Now, in the 1970s the task of a progressive coalitionism is still more demanding:

- First, there is the burning need for a redistribution of the nation's wealth, at present concentrated in the hands of those whom Gus Tyler calls the "superrich," so as to make possible funding of the tens of billions of dollars required to solve the problems of school building, housing, health care, alleviation of poverty and hunger, etc.
- Second, there is the whole ecological problem, which includes such matters as a voluntary population redistribution in order to decongest urban density, the collossal issue of pollution, and the more conventional questions of resource conservation. It is calculated that ecological rebirth in the United States will involve sums running into the trillions of dollars. A vast number of policies must be worked out: population control, land usage, recycling of wastes, readjustment of resource allocations, reestablishment of control over the use of air, water, fuels, etc.
- Third, there remain the familiar but urgent social issues that condition the daily responses of almost all Americans: crime, drugs, racism, campus life, etc. And, in the early seventies, the traditional union preoccupation with the problem of whether a man has a job or not (full employment) has assumed new importance.

The very magnitude of the issues precludes any other solution than that of coalitionism: i.e., *the mobilization of the broadest number of people coming from all sorts of "interest groups" in an effort to find common answers.* Given the American political structure, the diversity of this country, and the deep tradi-

[2] *United States Manpower in the Nineteen-Seventies,* U.S. Labor Department pamphlet, 1971.

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tion of political and social pluralism, it seems unlikely (to put it mildly) that any single political constituency or social group, no matter how large or powerful, can expect to gain sufficient support or power in order to cope effectively with the issues we face.

The November 1970 elections back up these conclusions, if sometimes only negatively. Because the liberal and radical forces in New York were unable to work together, Conservative James Buckley was elected a senator. Though Buckley ran on an independent ticket (with veiled support from large sections of the Republican party), he benefited from a conservative version of coalition strategy. By welding together the sizable minority of conservative forces, mainly through working with and through the Republican party, they could exercise an effective, and often decisive, voice in national politics.

Independents of the Left and radical-progressive candidates, recognizing that the mass of people still speak through the traditional parties, have similarly had little choice but to use the Democratic party if they wanted to get anywhere. Had they run as independent or so-called peace candidates, people like Julian Bond, Shirley Chisholm, and Allard Lowenstein, as well as the growing number of black mayors across the country, would probably have suffered utter defeat. The skepticism that coexists in the electoral mood together with traditional voting habits is not very receptive to "freakish" or "wasted" political effort. Whether or not one likes this isn't nearly as important as recognizing that for the present, and very likely for the immediate future, it is a fact.

Third- or fourth-party activity was so feeble and distant from any reality in the 1970 elections that it barely surfaced, with the one partial exception of the right-wing Buckley campaign which, as we have noted, was as much coalitionist as independent. For all their "revolutionary" rhetoric, even the Panthers accept the practical necessity for a coalition with whites—in their own version, of course—but nonetheless a coalition such as had previously been ruled out by Rap Brown, who has vanished, and Stokely Carmichael, who has been reduced to calls from Guinea for a return to "Mother Africa."

A Coalition in New Dress?

OUR GOAL IS A BROAD-BASED majority coalition for major social change in America, capable of winning elections and built around a concentration on domestic issues, though not to the exclusion of foreign problems.

Such a coalition can probably not be constructed simply along the lines of the classic New-Deal-FDR pattern of the thirties (Democratic party, labor unions, and urban poor), anymore than it can simply rehash the slogans of that period—though the issues raised in that period are by no means completely resolved. And the welfare-state solutions proposed in that period still remain urgently to the point. But now the problems are much more complex, and even a coalition trying to limit itself to thirties-style issues would have to acknowledge the presence of new forces, such as the organized blacks and the peace movement. Further, the new American middle class (technicians, experts, the vastly expanded academic community, white-collar specialists in electronics, social engineers) will simply not accept coalitions in which they do not have a prominent role. Some of the academic spokesmen for this new class reveal ambitions in excess of their probable power, and a snobbism toward the plebeian classes in excess of their democratic convictions; but even after such spokesmen are deflated, the power of the new class of technicians and specialists will be considerable. At best, they will share the leadership of the coalition movement with other forces in the Democratic party, most of all the labor movement which, in addition to supplying experience, political drive, and organizing capacity, influence large numbers of voters.

If liberalism was the ideology of classic American coalitionism, what may replace it in the coalition of tomorrow? While American liberalism may not be nearly as ex-

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hausted a force as some maintain, its strength both as an ideologic tendency and a practical force is at a low point. Scorned by many of the young New Leftists, whose attitudes toward conventional American liberalism often parallel those of traditional conservatism, the liberal forces are at the moment in disarray. But we do not think that an outlook as deeply ingrained in the American experience as liberalism is likely to go under—though, for revival, it may have to rethink its premises and take on a sharper radical edge. It seems likely that, in the seventies, because of the troubles of liberalism there will flourish a sophisticated conservative ideology stressing self-centered individualism (plight and flight of the individual when faced with the Machine) and state and local "decentralization."

Is there any reason to suppose that such a rightist mixture of nostalgia and cynicism is likely to help the country? For our part, we think that the outlook of a new liberal-left coalition must be that of social cooperation; that its philosophy must be based on the conviction that man can make the Machine do his work; that only on a national scale can our social problems be solved; that the society is the arena in which we act as brothers.

While the terrain for political realignment remains the Democratic party, too much can be made of the question of whether all progressive coalitionist roads lead to the Democratic party, whether one should work "outside" or "inside" the party, etc. If recent investigations have indicated that a growing number of voters classify themselves (and act) as independents (probably the emerging younger voters, and hopefully a substantial percentage of those in the new 18–21-year-old electors' category, newly married couples, and the new middle class referred to above), there is all the more reason to be flexible about labels and organizations. There will be much shifting of political chairs in the next decade. People are coming together politically around issues and personalities to a greater extent than before, particularly if the personality involved strongly symbolizes a position on a critical issue—traditional party labels could melt away before the growing number of "swing" or mixed-ticket voters. Nevertheless, and of much more immediate import, a strong tradition remains according to which the Democratic party is the more liberal, responsive, looser, and freer of the two parties. All this is only comparative, which is to say, far from ideal. No one would claim the Democratic party is a beacon of enlightenment; still, it is in comparisons that we have to deal if we want to participate in American politics at all. Just about all parties in American political life have been coalitions of one or another sort, brought into existence by leaders of fairly well-defined "interest groups" heading constituencies that make up the coalition. Even without having formally declared themselves, these coalitions were as a rule easily recognizable and definable.

Now, however, this has changed somewhat. It has become more difficult to grasp the interests and aspirations of the multitude of groups making up an infinitely complex society. Hence, forming coalitions is a process at once looser, less clearly definable, and harder to arrive at. No one, not even the heads of powerful organizations that number in the millions can simply declare by fiat the fixed shape of tomorrow's coalition—and expect sufficient acquiescence for political success. These days people are too uneasy for that, too itchy, too independent. Or, to put it another way, coalitions already formed fall apart much easier than ever before. Groups tend to coalesce around *issues* (or personalities associated with issues), but new issues constantly arise that strain and break apart yesterday's coalition. We ought to expect a phase in our history during which coalitions will seem rapidly to come and go, though in practice what may happen will be the shifting of tactical realignments (like European cabinets) of pretty much the same forces. Those, however, who stress one issue above all else—the "peace" candidates

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—aren't likely to thrive. Americans believe that the war is a major issue but one in a series of related problems. It is not so much Vietnam that divides us any longer; it is what to do about the United States.

Reforming the Democratic Party

THE MOST POWERFUL and best-established coalition in America worked traditionally in the Democratic party—a coalition of workers (trade unions), liberal city middle class, and minority groups. It used to command such cities as New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia, as well as such old factory towns as Scranton, Duluth, and dozens of others. In addition, it commanded national power for most of the period from the early thirties onward. This may no longer hold true.

Where this old coalition once ruled we now find decline, loss of influence, or outright disintegration. We think this decline may well continue if only because the 1970 census figures indicate a steady population loss in these towns and cities. The "population explosion" is centered in what may be described as the neoconservative places—Tulsa, Shreveport, Orlando, Albuquerque—relatively new towns, with a population quite different in ethnic and social composition from the old industrial and commercial centers of the country.

Who are these "conservatives"? Some lower-middle-class workers and service employees (mainly white, of course); prosperous citizens, at least until the Nixon-recession, either owning or running some service industry (insurance, auto sales, supermarket); homeowners and taxpayers whose central political concern tends to be the white man's fear of the black man's presence. Any proposal for restructuring the Democratic party in the seventies must take this influential group into account.

Concretely, this means that a liberal coalitionist politics in the seventies—even as it places heavy stress on domestic economic issues, along the lines of greater federal expenditure in behalf of jobs, housing, education, antipollution, and smaller expenditures on the military—must take great pains to speak in a language that would connect with the feelings and troubles of mainstream segments of the population. It must recognize that the popular concern with "law and order" isn't simply or always a code name for racism, though sometimes it is that. Often enough, this concern is an authentic one, the response of people who feel harried and threatened, and who have a perfect right to want to live under conditions of reasonable personal security.

Meanwhile, the question of Democratic-party reorganization is high on the agenda. Minor local and statewide reforms have been begun. Is a major reorganization possible? In the defeatist mood after the 1968 election, the McGovern Commission was appointed. It met and discussed the enormous task of the internal reform of a party heavily larded with bureaucracy and outworn rules designed to frustrate insurgent forces.

Now the Commission's proposals, many of them sensible and concrete, face opposition from the revived "regular" wing of the party, a group anxious to maintain control over the party, and trying to do so through a clever appeal to "unity." A key issue, as of this writing, will be the matter of qualifying delegates for the 1972 convention, a convention that some would like to see as "safe and sane" as the 1968 convention was stormy and dangerous.

While no single proposed new rule is drastic, the McGovern package as a whole is striking. Party "regulars" have so far responded with hostility or studied indifference. These reforms deal with access to power rather than with distribution of power within the party. The "mandatory" proposals include a welcome to the new 18-year-old national voter, urging his full participation at every level of party activity regardless of state law; an end to corrupt proxy voting practices; a banning of secret caucuses; an end to closed, slate-making sessions. There

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are recommendations for proportional representation of minority groups on all delegations, so as to include young people and women; reiteration of the Chicago decision barring use of the unit rule (state voting as one unit); and a rule that delegate selection should start in the calendar year of the convention.

The McGovern proposals, indicating that the first round of the struggle for major reform of the Democratic party is underway, are now in the hands of the party state machines for compliance and implementation. This, together with the presidential nominating drives already in progress, places the Democratic party at the center of the struggle for political change.

Whatever may happen in the eighties, the Democratic party is the party of the politics of the seventies. And if the party succeeds in appealing to the new breed of independent "swing" voters coming largely from the ranks of youth and the new middle class of professional and white-collar workers, it will quickly regain strength. If a moderately toned middle-of-the-road but leaning-rightward politics works for the Republicans, then a moderately toned, but progressive left-of-center policy is indicated for the Democrats. Single-issue candidates and reformers will find themselves hopelessly outflanked. If there are now more secretaries and garage and gas station attendants in this country than college students, we ought to drop the notion that radical students can lead or change society or, in its smaller aspects, reform the Democratic party. Social and demographic facts are against such propositions, and showdown challenges usually encourage rightist victories at the polls. Which is not to say that the radicalized students cannot play a ginger role, as they did in the McCarthy campaign. Their commitment, idealism, energy, and even their freedom to move about make them indispensable allies in a restructured democratic politics.

Professional and technical workers who constitute the new middle class are undergoing their first serious shock in the loss of jobs, underemployment, and a darkening of what had yesterday seemed the endless vista of prosperity. This middle class has experienced the most rapid growth rate of any sector of the American population in the last decade, and even if this rate falls in the future, its absolute numbers will continue to grow. Parts of the traditional lower middle class, however much against its will, may now be shoved into working-class ranks, a kind of belated quasi-confirmation of the

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old Marxist view that the lower-middle class will be reduced to proletarians. At this point, sections of the white middle class and white working class form the source of Wallace support, even though in 1968 the trade unions did an effective, last-minute job of keeping blue-collar workers out of the Wallace ranks. Still, he received 10 million votes, 50 percent of them in the South and the other 5 million in the North. (In such states as Kansas, Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana they came to 10–12 percent.) An overly drastic transformation of the Democratic party, or an enlarged influence of confrontationist elements, or efforts to initiate a radical new party—such developments would probably speed up "Wallace-ization," no matter how heroic the efforts of the unions to oppose it.

Goals

OUR GOAL IS a broad-based majority coalition of progressive forces for major social change, fulfilling and expanding the welfare state. As for foreign issues: an end to any remaining illusions about the "American century," or a *Pax Americana,* and the subordination of military (Pentagon) objectives to domestic priorities. We are, of course, not proposing an isolationist absurdity this late in the 20th century. If only on the simplest level of helping the developing nations to survive, the United States cannot avoid a leading role in the world. And a radicalized domestic program could influence foreign policies by encouraging a more tolerant view of radical alternatives in other countries.

We see the politics of coalition taking three possible roads during the seventies:

- First, a *traditional coalitionism,* modeling itself after the New Deal coalition of the thirties. This would be built around the professional machine wing of the Democratic party dominated by men in their fifties and sixties, together with the cautious trade union leadership of the AFL–CIO executive council. Such a coalition can claim credit for real achievements in the past, but is not likely to turn on the important new segments of the population we have mentioned, including the young workers. Its outlook on foreign policy is essentially attached to the administration in power (Johnson, Nixon), and inflexible in its world view.
- Second, at the opposite pole, a *radical coalitionism* modeling itself on the tradition in American history that consists of sharp breaks with past politics (the Abolitionists' Liberty party, Teddy Roosevelt's Bull Moose party, Henry Wallace's Progressive party); built upon such issues as Vietnam, Imperialism, "quality of life," particularly emphatic in proposing radical justice for minorities and disturbingly confrontationist to the bulk of the citizenry. Such a coalition has barely the slightest chance for political success in the next decade, though if it acted independently at election time it could virtually assure the success of the Nixon and still more conservative Republicans. Apart from the enormous difficulties that follow whenever former McCarthy supporters, New Politics people, and New Leftists come together in the same room, such a gathering on the Left might well find itself unrelated to the very people—racial minorities as well as others—it proposes to serve.
- Finally, there is the alternative of a *progressive coalitionism,* which believes that it is still possible to rally a large majority of the United States electorate for change. We view this as an empirical approach to progress because it preserves, but intensifies, a strong relation to long-standing ideals and the traditional way in which we have lived our political life. Though we have emphasized domestic issues, we take it as given that the quickest end to the senseless engagement in Vietnam is a *sine qua non* for innovative reforms and the huge expenditures they will require. If progressive coalitionism works—that is, if numbers and ideas can be brought together—it could propel the country along progressive lines which will lead us into the eighties with cleaner horizons and greater cheer.

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Arnold S. Kaufman

A Strategy for Radical Liberals

One of Jules Feiffer's cartoons captures the mood of political hopelessness that pervades the American Left. A long-haired militant asks a short-cropped liberal whether he voted in the last election. "Yes." "Did your man win?" "Yes." "How will you feel about him a year from now?" asks the militant. "Betrayed," the liberal answers. "Then why did you vote?" "To be effective." The liberal then asks the militant whether he voted. "No." "What did you do?" "Blew up a university," answers the militant. "Why did you blow up a university?" "To be effective." "How will you feel about it a year from now?" "Ineffective." To which the liberal responds, "I can get the same results a lot easier."

My aim is to dispel this sense of profound discouragement. I offer a political strategy that is, I think, better than betrayal or ineffectiveness—at least for those who are radical and liberal.

I am liberal in believing that "a good society is one in which each person possesses the resources of materials, mind, and spirit, as well as the opportunities, to carve out a career in conformity to that person's own nature and reasoned choice." [1] This simple expression of basic social faith will have to serve for present purposes.

I am radical because the United States is so far from being a good society that institutional arrangements must be thoroughly transformed before it can become one. The sense of *radical* I intend is a matter of what political programs one embraces, not of the political tactics favored. So radical liberals favor radical policies for eliminating poverty and racism, guaranteeing full employment, providing decent housing and medical care to everyone, drastically paring military appropriations, purifying and beautifying our common environment, reconstructing our prisons and mental institutions, implementing a universal right to higher education—to mention only a few minimal points. Radicals know that to achieve these goals vast corporate powers must be subordinated to wise and democratic governance: bureaucracies must be humanized, pursuit of private profit ethically subordinated.

Radical liberals are not and for the foreseeable future will not be a majority of the population or the voting public; but there are many of us. Our numerically significant but distinctly minority status is the foundation on which any sensible political strategy must be built.

Radical liberals must regard electoral politics as an essential part of the strategy for political change. But since we comprise a distinct minority both of the voting public and of the Democratic party—the major party with which we must identify—our strategic aims must be to build a radical majority in the long run and to deploy our minority strength effectively in the short run. What are the prospects?

There are two bases for a new majority coalition: self-interest and moral concern.

[1] Arnold S. Kaufman, *The Radical Liberal* (New York: Atherton, 1968; Clarion Books, 1970), p. 6.

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Many think that only self-interest provides a reliable basis for building a coalition. Such a view goes too far in the basically healthy effort to debunk the moralism that has plagued American politics. People *are* capable of acting persistently and energetically out of primarily moral motives. Richard L. Stout provides evidence for this claim in a book that describes the significance of the effort thousands of morally concerned people made during the McCarthy campaign.[2]

If we are to build a radical majority, there is no realistic alternative to relying on what has been called a constituency of conscience. For consider the alternatives:

• First, we might rely on a broadly based movement that has workers, especially trade unionists, the racially oppressed, and the very poor as its primary base. Such a coalition would not have to wait for some distant future to effect radical change. For it is, or is close to being, a voting majority of the population. But this in itself is not a valid alternative, for such a coalition would not be radical. Those who favor this approach cling to a neo-Marxist faith in the radical potentialities of organized workers,[3] even though a plausible basis for their optimism has disappeared. It is a fact of American political life that whatever radicalism is found among workers, and trade unionists in particular, tends to diminish as their precarious hold on a marginally comfortable life grows firmer. Relatively little education, growing security and comfort, constant concern with satisfying desires that press against income, the still frightening realities of an uncertain labor market—in combination these cause the near-poor and the affluent poor to draw back from genuinely radical commitment, *even while remaining a generally progressive force for change.*[4]

This is a crucial point. A distinction must be drawn between progressive and radical majorities. Radical liberals should view organization of progressive voting majorities as a vital part of their strategy for change. Without doing so, it is unlikely that repression can be contained or the basis for a radical future laid. But the ameliorative, reformist programs such majorities are disposed to support are far from radical enough.

I am not saying that the working class is authoritarian, or the trade union movement conservative. Many within the trade union movement are deeply committed radical liberals. They form an indispensable part of the new coalition. And the possibilities for progressive coalition between racial minorities and white workers, especially in the South, now is great and growing. Yet, a coalition whose core consists of organized workers, though generally progressive, will not be radical.

• A second alternative is to rely mainly on those who are most abused racially and economically—a constituency of the oppressed. This group must be an important part of any new radical coalition. As they become more aware of the causes of their misery the poor increasingly seek radical perspectives. The Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Welfare Rights Organization represent a new kind of radical assertiveness among the very poor. Still, they comprise a small proportion of the total population, and even their absolute strength is likely to diminish over time. For there is a good conservative sense in trying to buy social stability by using a portion of America's prodigious wealth to provide them with modest increments in income. No doubt, this is the main political thought behind Nixon's conversion to a minimum income program.

As people who have been long deprived begin to consume more, their expectations

[2] Richard Stout, *People* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

[3] I have in mind especially writings by Bayard Rustin and Gus Tyler. Their position is widely held within liberal and democratic socialist circles—e.g., in the ADA, the League for Industrial Democracy, and the Young Peoples Socialist League.

[4] That Rustin regards his approach as conflicting with a new coalition strategy indicates that he does not make the distinction between a radical and a progressive coalition. Cf., "From Protest to Politics," in *The Radical Papers,* Howe, ed. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965).

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rise and they tend to become more overtly frustrated and angry. Their ire tends to focus on whatever frustrates their effort to consume, not on the forces that hold them down. Not for them the counter culture. Barring economic catastrophe, in 20–30 years some of those who yesterday joined the Poor People's Campaign may be among the most consumption-oriented segments of our population. Groups afflicted by scarcity cannot generally be made to skip this cultural stage —as the Communist states of Eastern Europe have discovered and China will discover. This is not said critically, but in an effort to assess the prospects for radical liberalism.

• A third alternative for building a new radical coalition is to appeal to the more affluent on the basis of their narrow interest. War, ecology, the debasement of our culture affect them, too, vitally. While this must be done, it is delusive to suppose that the affluent can be radicalized on the basis of self-interest alone. For them life usually is too comfortable, and the cost of activism too great. Whatever effort they can make on behalf of radical programs will depend on the depth of their moral commitment.

Each of these alternatives is an important part of any effort to forge a new radical majority, but separately they are doomed to failure. Our ability to create a radical future depends on our ability to fuse a radical constituency of the oppressed with a radical constituency of conscience. And the prospect of organizing a conscience constituency that will in time be sufficiently numerous rests in turn on what is happening to our young people, primarily the more affluent young on the nation's campuses.

WHILE HIGHER EDUCATION is neither essential nor enough to produce liberals, every study reveals a significant correlation between the two. Examining the available evidence, Kenneth Keniston and Michael Lerner declare that

> The most decisive refutation of the leftist charge that the universities are centers for reactionary indoctrination is the growing liberalism of college students. Radicals who claim universities castrate their students intellectually find it impossible to explain why American students are taking an increasingly active role in attempting to redress the injustices of American society.[5]

Young people, especially the more affluent ones, are less afflicted by economic fear and careerism than any generation of advantaged youth before them.[6] They feel, with some reason, that they will *make it* economically and professionally. And they know that anxieties of budget-cutting conservatives bear no plausible relationship to what this society can do to end human misery.

So today's young people are uniquely predisposed to use education not only as a stepping stone to personal security but as a means of examining their lives and their society. They bring to these tasks commitment to the ideals of American culture—belief in liberty and justice, in the efficacy of reason, etc. And they take these ideals seriously. The basic mission of our universities is to provide what has traditionally been called, not without reason, a liberal education. When this task is competently fulfilled, the ideas and knowledge it opens to students affect them profoundly. Now they quickly, sometimes intolerantly, demand that material be presented in a manner that breathes life into study. They demand relevance, though they are often too impatient and therefore self-defeating.

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[5] *New York Times Magazine*, November 9, 1970, p. 66.

[6] A survey by the American Council on Education shows that the percentage of entering college freshmen who consider themselves far Left or "liberal" has risen to more than 36 percent while the percentage who consider themselves "far Right" or "conservative" has declined to 18.1 percent. (Data from the *New York Times*, December 20, 1970.) If my analysis is correct, education will intensify these trends.

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As the conventional American ideals are taken seriously and as students are confirmed in their suspicions that the rhetoric is remote from the reality, education comes to promote both the liberal ideal and a commitment to making it real. The potential ranks of the conscience constituency will swell as long as increasing numbers of the young receive an honest liberal education. Barring economic catastrophe, there is only one way in which the trend can be impeded or reversed—through politicization of the university.

The serious danger of politicization emanates not from the bulk of the students or faculty but from those who accurately perceive the long-range political threat implicit in the very idea of a liberal education—a danger they try to counter in three ways: (1) by forcing curricular changes that divert educational resources from liberal education; (2) by repression, crude and subtle; (3) by cutting college budgets enough to insure that standards of educational competence will erode.

To cope with this assault, the universities' internal political resources are inadequate. Those who want to protect the integrity of liberal education need political allies, and there are no more reliable allies than those who have a natural political interest in preventing interference with the campuses doing well what they are supposed to do. None have a more natural interest in protecting the universities than those forces that are trying to build a new radical coalition.

The views just sketched contrast sharply with the rage for counter culture. I find that the currently fashionable works of countercultural theorists are naive and politically muddled.[7] It is dangerous to suppose, as Charles Reich does,[8] that successful cultural revolution is inevitable. Unless we maintain continuous effective political awareness and action on every front, minds will ultimately be destroyed not liberated. Ideologues of the counter culture do not appreciate the extent to which the young are moved, not by new ideals, but by the traditional values of American culture. At its best and most politically relevant, the changing styles of American consciousness are efforts to redeem the pledge of liberty and justice for all. Although much that the chroniclers of the counter culture write is useful background to the serious business of building a decent society, it is dangerous to regard their prescriptions as an alternative to hard, sustained political effort.

Building the New Coalition

To CRITICIZE A NEW COALITION STRATEGY on grounds that it would not build winning majorities in the immediate future would miss my central point. The basic aim is *radical* change. But, as present majorities are not radical, the most urgent aim is to transform the center of American political life from moderation to radicalism, To do that we must build a radical coalition now, deploying its substantial but minority strength effectively on behalf of programs that are radical when possible, and at least progressive. As the radical coalition consists primarily of two groups—constituencies of the oppressed and of conscience—it is paramount to increase and fuse their respective strengths.

I have already indicated what is important in shaping a growing constituency of conscience: protect and adequately fund a system of higher education committed to liberal education for everyone who wants to go to college. Beyond this, the conscience constituency must be organized wherever the potential exists—in unions, churches, businesses, towns, city neighborhoods, suburbs, and so on. For not only the young seek to reedem the promise of their own lives and the prom-

[7] See Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969); Philip Slater, *In Pursuit of Loneliness* (Boston: Beacon, 1970); Charles Reich, *The Greening of America* (New York: Random House, 1970). I am not passing a general judgment on these works —only on those parts that have political relevance. In other respects these authors have important things to say.

[8] In Reich's *New Yorker* abridgment, September 26, 1970, p. 111.

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ise of American society. There is something in the air that stirs millions of Americans.

The Black Power movement was first and foremost an effort to transform the consciousness of black Americans; to destroy attitudes of slavishness and deference; to engender self-respect and autonomy. The same urgings are plain in the movement for women's liberation, among radical clergy, within segments of the industrial community. Affluent people in growing numbers are trying to feel free, to live with dignity, without lying. And their needs fuel political interests in ways that erode constraints of self-interest. Criticism that dwells primarily on political defect and rhetorical excess misses the most hopeful thing about these liberation movements. If these urgings are an outgrowth of middle-class attitudes, then all power to that aspect of bourgeois culture. In response to these currents the politics of the new coalition should, in part, be redemptive. But its primary aim must be to radicalize and politicize what is too often merely redemptive.

There is no blueprint for what needs to be done. Each segment of the emerging conscience constituency must be convinced that its special interests are important; that people within the coalition care. Yet each must be brought into the coalition not merely on the basis of interest, but on the basis of moral concern. Political activity must become a means of endowing with significance lives despoiled in other respects.

The central difficulty in building the constituency of the oppressed is their sense of powerlessness resulting from political isolation. And the main barrier to joining it to a constituency of conscience is this sense of powerlessness often expressed in mistrust of those who are moved primarily by moral concern. This is neither surprising nor unjustified. For what is a moral matter to the conscientious may, for the oppressed, be a condition of survival. And it is inevitable that, faced with less catastrophic options, the affluent will not usually be willing to absorb comparable personal costs for the sake of social justice. Those black activists of the South who in the early days of the civil rights movement doubted that their affluent white helpmates could stay the course once the going got rough or, more likely, tiresome, showed good sense. Tension and disharmony can never be completely eliminated from a coalition that is primarily a fusion of these two constituencies.

However, there are many ways in which mistrust can be reasonably allayed. Four general issues are crucial. Each involves dissolution of traditionally liberal hang-ups about mere forms of equality and lawfulness. Each has symbolic importance that sometimes transcends its importance to peoples' lives.

- First, relatively affluent whites should respond affirmatively to claims for reparation. The moral case for doing so is strong; the strategic case, decisive. Suppose an easily identifiable group has, by and large, suffered the effects of original injustices from which another easily identifiable group has generally benefited. The disabilities and advantages have been transmitted to the respective groups by social inheritance, much by deliberate design of unjust social institutions. This is the situation of most black people in relation to most whites in our society. There is a compelling case for a transfer of resources from whites to blacks. It is not a matter of visiting the sins of the fathers on the sons, but of transferring undeserved benefits to those who suffer undeserved disabilities.[9] This perspective is, moreover, compatible with acknowledging that distinct groups—e.g., the poor—have equal or greater claims than black people as such.

- Second, the issue of minority representation is crucial. Whether X, who is white, will make a better congressman than Y, who is black, is often less important than the fact

[9] I have discussed the moral and political case for reparations more fully elsewhere. Cf. Chapter 6 of *The Radical Liberal*, and "Black Reparations: Two Views" (an exchange with Michael Harrington), DISSENT, July-August 1969, pp. 317–20.

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that the election of a black representative has political significance for black constituents everywhere. In California, Democratic legislators have gerrymandered Chicano candidates out of contention so often that many key Mexican-American leaders are no longer willing to play the Democratic electoral game. They demand representation. To intone that merit alone should be decisive is morally evasive. Minorities must be accorded representation at every level of American power. As a group, minority representatives will tend to make greater personal sacrifices for the sake of important policy goals than comparable alternatives.

• Third, economic boycott is an important weapon for poor minorities. Whether organized on behalf of the grape or lettuce workers of California, or the black residents of Cairo, Illinois, or the white miners of Appalachia, successful boycott is effective power. Members of the new coalition should bring economic muscle to bear in communities that otherwise cannot be influenced by minority economic pressure. The conscience constituency should become the lens through which the power of poor and racial minorities is effectively magnified in communities where the oppressed are politically insignificant.

• Fourth, one aspect of the law-and-order issue is preeminently important to all oppressed groups, especially ghetto dwellers: the injustice of *official* lawlessness. They view lawless action, not only by police but by every segment of the legal system, as a plague that specially afflicts them. Last year the *New York Times* (November 31, 1970) carried stories about the determination of black policemen in Hartford, Connecticut, to protect members of minority communities who are physically interfered with by "white bigoted police officers"; about a grand jury report that indicated "there was probably cause to believe that state policemen committed a criminal offense in a case in which they shot and killed two unarmed brothers in a stake-out and then planted a gun to cover themselves"; about a New York detective who was tried for conducting illegal checks of police records on behalf of a private business firm. And beneath the surface of reported events is greater abuse of official power that is never publicly aired. The new coalition should fight for that favorite ideal of conservatives, genuine rule of law. Doing so would produce a dramatically favorable response among those who primarily suffer the harm of official lawlessness.[10]

These four issues have great symbolic and policy significance. But, taken together, they are only one aspect of the general political effort to empower the oppressed. A program of progressive change that will achieve meaningful *reform* is a precondition for successful *radicalism*. To complete the work of the welfare state is the surest route to a radical future. The sooner everyone has access to a decent share of affluence, the sooner will a subsequent generation know in their gut that achievement of material well-being is only a way-station to a truly satisfying existence. Fear that welfarism is co-optative is morally arrogant, and politically senseless from the point of view of genuine radicalism.

The Tokenism of American Democracy

A MAJOR OBSTACLE to significantly ameliorative social programs lies in a political system whose hallmark is tokenism—in the maintainance of social stability by means of payoffs to the victims of injustice—payoffs so small as to be mere tokens. The system has worked primarily because those who have least have traditionally accepted least in return for their compliance with established forms of law and order. From the Re-

[10] This observation is, unhappily, partly based on personal experience. I testified in the case of a UCLA professor who was assaulted by policemen, then charged with felonious assault. In this instance the state's case was so flimsy, the number of eyewitnesses so great, that the judge terminated the proceedings before the defense had finished giving all its evidence, summarily declaring the defendant innocent without even retiring to his chambers.

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public's beginnings, this system of token payoffs has worked remarkably well. Radical strategy cannot rid us of tokenism until radical majorities can act within a genuinely majoritarian system. But we cannot even navigate the intervening waters unless there is at least mitigation of the evil.

Tokenism has three main causes.[11] (1) The entire social system is institutionally skewed in favor of the tiny minority at the top of the social hierarchy that has most power, wealth, and status. (2) As majorities are not presently radical, even the majoritarian aspects of the system tend to promote tokenism, especially in relation to poverty and racism. (3) Manipulation and co-optation are so common that most Americans, especially those at the bottom, are too often inculcated with political attitudes that frustrate basic interests.

(*1*) Social stability is important to anyone who has something he wants to protect against society's boat-rockers. In a just society, just men would seek social stability to protect those institutions that promote what they cherish most. In an unjust society, powerful men do the same.

American democracy's historic genius, throughout the era of industrial expansion, has enabled groups highest in the social hierarchy to protect what they have with minimum reliance on repressive force. By contrast to other political systems, primary reliance on a token carrot instead of a big stick has enabled American democracy to promote social peace efficiently and with a minimum of jeopardy to structures of injustice. The institutional devices by which the interests of the mighty have almost always been protected at the expense of the weak are many, varied, and mutable. At one time, the Supreme Court was a main bulwark; today it is a less reliable tool of the powerful. At one time, limitations on the franchise were effective; with gradual extension of the suffrage, devices like the congressional seniority system and the poll tax were introduced to take up the slack. Our federal system was designed to frustrate the will of urban majorities, something it has done remarkably well as the present madness of our system of agricultural subsidies attests. In fact every aspect of American political life—party organization, electoral practices, municipal governance, legislative redistricting, governance of the mass media—betrays an institutional skew that favors the upper classes.

Today the practices by which majorities are frustrated is vulnerable to political attack. For the American electorate increasingly supports efforts to translate theoretical majoritarianism into institutional practice—a development reinforced by the Supreme Court's one-man one-vote decision. The new coalition should ally itself with every effort to erode the unequal political power of the socially mighty; but it should do so with care. For majorities are not more inclined to govern justly than ruling elites. Paradoxically, in some cases the vestiges of class rule have become important defenses for oppressed minorities.

(*2*) Our short-term coalition aim should not be majoritarian democracy, rather, what we should seek is a democratic order that most effectively promotes social justice. For example, direct primaries often harm the interests of urban minorities who, through strategic concentrations, have acquired a political leverage within nominating conventions that more majoritarian practices might dilute. Radical liberals who are carried away by majoritarian bias will ignore such practicalities at peril of frustrating their primary goal—to build the coalition.[12] Because majorities usually act against the victims of ex-

[11] I have analyzed *tokenism* more fully in "Democracy and the Paradox of Want-Satisfaction," *The Personalist*, Spring 1970 issue.

[12] For example, a proposal for a direct presidential primary went down to defeat in a special 1969 convention of the Michigan Democratic party partly because so many black Democrats thought a convention system gave them more political leverage.

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treme poverty and racial discrimination, the new coalition should deliberately try to modify adherence to the principle of majority rule. I can do no more here than suggest the range of possibilities.

The following specific measures may prove useful: community control that increases the power of oppressed minorities over municipal decisions affecting their lives; a cabinet post that deals exclusively with minority interests; systematic and sustained effort by the Democratic party organization to bring minorities into positions of influence and power out of proportion to their numbers; gerrymandering electoral districts to guarantee minority representation; a National Party Committee structure that magnifies the representation of minorities; even the use of weighted votes when feasible.

(3) The fact is that a free marketplace of ideas as John Stuart Mill proposed it does not exist. Despite the current fashions of counter culture, in political thought and feeling the great mass of the American people are too often manipulated "right down to their very instincts." Autonomy is a word more honored ceremonially than in practical political ways. Even those who are genuinely autonomous can rarely make themselves heard. That is partly why so many of them are inclined to "speak" disruptively. But these problems are so basic and so deep that any remedies proposed in this brief space would be too superficial to be helpful. Besides more emphasis on liberal education, there is a need for more political education, more participation in decisions that affect one's life, more democratic control over the media of communication, more sympathy for liberation movements despite occasional rhetorical excess.

Electoral Politics: Keystone in the Arch

THE VOTE IS THE KEYSTONE of a strategic arch that includes many other forms of political action. Nonelectoral tactics will fail unless there is effective use of the ballot. For example, the vast concentrations of corporate power cannot be democratically and wisely mastered without vigorous use of voting power. The task is not more likely to be accomplished by bloody revolution, or the Great Refusal, or "socialism in the ghetto," or the politics of the shaman—to mention only a few of the more frivolous alternatives that have been suggested.[13]

Yet the keystone is useless without the other stones in the arch. When Hubert Humphrey proclaimed that "liberalism and violence are deadly enemies," [14] he betrayed devastating historical ignorance about how almost every radical program of liberal change has been achieved in this society. Foreign domination was lifted, slavery ended, the franchise extended to women, the trade unions were organized and the conditions of racial minorities generally improved by a complex set of events and political activities that included much essential disruption, disorder, and violence. But American revolutionaries also used their votes to control colonial legislatures. Abraham Lincoln had to be elected before he emancipated the slaves. Women were enfranchised only when enough elected public officials were willing to endorse a constitutional amendment. New Deal legislation promoted and consolidated trade union organization. And right now legislative willingness is essential if the lives of racial minorities are to be steadily improved. It is morally wrong and politically opportunistic to urge radicals to pledge unconditional nonviolence. But it is more absurd to urge them to forgo electoral activity. Only a complex strategy that promotes flexibility about tactics can do the job.

Lest I be misinterpreted in a climate of public opinion that is only a little less hysterical about violence than it was about Communism during the McCarthy period, I do not think violence is particularly useful at this time. All forms of disorder tend to be

[13] By Tom Hayden, Herbert Marcuse, Christopher Lasch, and Theodore Roszak, respectively.
[14] *New York Times Magazine,* October 11, 1969.

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counterproductive. By and large, the sporadic violence that has occurred has been manipulated by the Nixons, Agnews, and Reagans for political advantage. There is even evidence that they have, on occasion, not been loath to encourage violence.[15]

My point is not to defend violence, but to liberate the tactical imagination. Principally, I had in mind neither violence nor any other form of social disorder when I used the metaphor of the arch. Political education that goes on outside the electoral process as such is far more important and persuasive.

The role of secondary political groups that focus on a narrow range of issues needs to be stressed in this connection. Peace, civil liberties, and ecological groups play an indispensable role whose effectiveness tends to be blunted by their engagement in electoral politics. This is something Ralph Nader, to his credit, understands very well. There must be division of labor within the radical movement. Appropriate linkage of such groups with a radical coalition that is directly involved in electoral activities provides the best assurance that an obsessive desire to win elections will not undermine a politics of issues. As to electoral strategy itself, the main problem is how to deploy most effectively a minority of substantial strength. As they have only the support of a minority, candidates who run as radicals and liberals cannot normally hope to win. By the same token, those who place exclusive emphasis on winning erode prospects for radical change. When winning is the measure, the disheartening impact of losing is magnified. And demoralized former activists swell the ranks of the apathetic—not because they don't care, but because they can't hope.

Apathy is not, however, the worst consequence of a mania for victory. Practitioners of the old politics who are disposed to pay any price to win demote even the gravest moral issues. By 1967 Hubert Humphrey was already convinced that the war in Southeast Asia was wrong and had to be ended. Asked why he did not say so at the 1968 Democratic National Convention he explained that President Johnson "was absolutely paranoid about the war," and that, after all, "there I was, supposed to be running for President of the United States. All I had for a party to start with were the Johnson remnants." [16]

Radical liberals who cannot normally win elections are yet sufficiently numerous to veto the election of candidates who desperately want simply to win—especially the ones who have tended to take for granted our willingness to march lock-step in the cadres of the lesser evil. And while we should always support a lesser evil when evils are our only alternatives, the mistake is to suppose that support of marginally better candidates is always, in balance, the lesser evil.

The opposite is often true. By exercising an electoral veto we can, in those instances where the opposite *is* true, exert maximum pressure on the entire political process—educating the center when we defend our use of the veto; educating candidates or at least forcing them to reassess their inclination to move to the soft side of every tough policy question; giving heart to those who despair by enabling them to count some losses as victories; moving the whole center of gravity of American politics, eventually, toward an authentic liberalism.

Two broadly conflicting approaches to the problem of applying the veto vie for the favor of radical liberals: formation of a new political party on the one hand, retaining a loose affiliation with the Democratic party on the other. Under the present conditions, the latter is more rational.

A new party that really tries to win elections would not be sufficiently better than the Democratic party to justify the enormous

[15] I have in mind such statements as Ronald Reagan's when he welcomed a bloodbath on the campuses, as well as hard evidence that President Nixon went out of his way to encourage rock throwing at San Jose, California, for the sake of its effect on the 1970 elections.

[16] *New York Times Magazine*, October 11, 1969, p. 26.

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effort that would have to be expended in the building. At best, such a new party effort would be slightly more progressive and less corrupt than internal Democratic party politics. Those who think otherwise fantasize. It is the process of seeking power, not the Democratic party, that co-opts. Immunity results not from new organizational forms, but from rationality and morally authentic commitment—another reason why a new political coalition based solely on self-interest would merely initiate new political horrors. Granting that a new party would make political education easier, the critical test is whether such a shift would make application of a veto strategy more effective. The answer to that question is plainly negative, for a new party would organize a minority of an already distinct minority. In the process it would fragment our strength in those other ways that anyone who has ever been involved in internecine political conflict knows too well. Not only would deployment of the veto be less effective, but a new party effort would make us look far weaker than we are.

Many who might be attracted by a new coalition strategy that broadly gears itself to Democractic party activity will not be drawn to a new party. The bulk of the racial minorities, the more radical trade unionists, all in the conscience constituency who have acquired significant leverage within the Democratic party are not about to abandon the organization they continue to view as their main vehicle for electoral effort. The election victories of genuine radicals like Bella Abzug in New York, Ronald Dellums in California, the successful gubernatorial race of Pat Lucey in Wisconsin, Joseph Duffey's near-miss in Connecticut are among the gains I have in mind. Those who have in the face of growing repression made this limited progress are not about to yield it for the sake of party purity. And those who look to liberal Republicans for radical leadership, who try to induce men like John Lindsay and John Gardner to join a new genuinely radical party, pursue a will'o the wisp. Common Cause, for example, is a hopeful development, but hardly radical.

Moreover, any new party would be the fourth, not the third. It is true, as Senator McCarthy has emphasized,[17] that habits of major-party loyalty have been eroding. But, though generally healthy, the main benefits of this development have gone to those who are conservative or reactionary, not to radical liberals. Buckley's success in New York, Byrd's in Virginia, and the general threat George Wallace poses, all indicate that a new party would likely be the weakest of the four. And because a party is a less flexible instrument than the alternative I will propose, a new party effort is likely to play right into the hands of conservative and reactionary forces. For by splitting the vote that would normally go to progressive candidates, conservatives and reactionaries hope to gain by pluralities what majorities normally deny them.

To some extent people find a new party attractive because they despair of reforming the Democratic party in even its procedural aspects. Reform of the Democratic party, state by state and at the national level, indeed is urgently needed. And the little that has been done—reports by the McGovern and O'Hara commissions, proposals by a few reform commissions in such states as Michigan—is mostly a matter of blueprints awaiting implementing action. Progress is being made, but the omens are, at best, problematic. Yet well-justified scepticism about party-reform efforts is a sandy foundation on which to build fourth-party effort and a very weak basis for a new coalition strategy.

The time for a new party has not yet arrived. The alternative is loose affiliations with the Democratic party, primarily by successfully deploying our power to veto.

In order to do so most effectively, we must understand what makes very good politicians

[17] In his general defense of a new party effort in "A Third Party May Be a Real Force in 1972," *New York Times Magazine,* June 7, 1970.

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tick. Senator Edmund Muskie, for example, is a man who possesses integrity, intelligence, moral sensibility, and enough *amour propre* to project great dignity. He reminds many of Lincoln. Moreover, like Lincoln, he is very ambitious—a man who seeks and enjoys the exercise of power. Most important within the frame of broadly decent but quite flexible moral commitments, his decision-making mechanisms function so that he comes to perceive the world and to make judgments in ways that accommodate his political ambitions. When he forms judgments that conflict with views held by people who can advance or impair his career, he displays a fine humility. Publicly, he becomes silent or vague about important issues. He is, and perceives himself as, a bridge across troubled waters.[18]

In brief, Muskie's instinctual tendencies move him toward the center of any system of political pressures that is relevant to his electoral success. Clearly such a man will be affected by credible pressure from radical liberals. An intelligently conceived, vigorously applied veto strategy can contribute to the moral education of men like Muskie. But this must be done in a rational, credible fashion. The purpose is to limit the range of acceptable candidates; and to make sure that those who qualify and run conduct their campaigns in ways that most advance radical liberalism's long-term aims.

To see how this approach might work, consider a concrete case. Liberals want the Democrats to nominate a presidential candidate in 1972 who can win without betraying certain critically important, minimal commitments and values. That is to say, we would support a man who, if he wins, will at least be pledged to defend us against repressive force, will generally encourage the demographic trends on which we found our hope for future majorities, will energetically try to advance the welfare state, will enable us to be heard by keeping channels of governmental and party power open, will treat with reasonable sympathy programs we favor, the moral aspirations we voice. He cannot be radical and win. He can be progressive, reasonable, and tolerant. With these thoughts in mind, we should formulate a set of minimal but definite criteria of acceptability. Presenting these to all plausible candidates, we should warn each that unless he subscribes to these reasonable standards, we will work to defeat him in the general election should he be nominated. By gently reminding him of what many of us did in 1968, we can make it plain that this is not an empty threat.

Of course, circumstances could arise in which all threats are void. Suppose an Agnew is nominated. Or suppose the danger of another Vietnam, or of a great depression, is imminent. We might have to swallow our convictions and our threats, support a nominee who does not satisfy even our minimal criteria. But barring such unfortunate contingencies, we should make the veto threat, and carry it out if it becomes necessary.

The same process, with appropriate variations, should be adopted whenever we are in a minority so definite that candidates of our own cannot win. The veto is applicable at every level of the electoral process. In each case we should assess our strength, assess the alternative to the lesser-evil Democrat and, where the alternatives are tolerable, apply the veto. The processes by which criteria are hammered out, limits of tolerability fixed, are crucial. No component of the potential coalition of radical forces should be excluded.

It is argued that we cannot organize a veto effectively enough to be credible. But it has been done, notably in 1968, and should be done much more explicitly. We have no alternative to going the veto route—except acquiescing in the kind of pseudo-realism

[18] "The American people don't like extremists or extreme positions. If I'm pushed to try to please the Left, I lose some Democratic votes and the independent and Republican votes I've always needed and gotten in Maine. I'm one of the few politicians who can still talk to the hard-hats and the blacks." *New York Times Magazine,* November 22, 1970, p. 130.

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that permits fundamental evils of our society to fester while candidates continue merrily to appeal to majority prejudices at the center. To permit this to happen will result in more than burning ghettos; our hopes for a liberal future will also go up in flames.

To accept the veto as basic to our electoral strategy does not preclude our running candidates who are genuinely committed radicals. In those rare instances where assessment yields a rational prospect of winning, the fight should certainly be made. Nor do radical liberals have to restrict themselves to candidacies that have prospects for victory. At times it is important to make the race for mainly educational reasons—though, unless this is done without illusion, the resulting loss will be demoralizing.

The basic approach should be clear. Electoral effort, precisely because it is so important, should be conducted with all the intelligence and determination needed to exert a maximum influence on the entire political process. The tension between short-term gains and long-term prospects should always be in the forefront. Skill at using our minority strength most effectively in building toward future majorities is the keystone of the arch which has the veto at the center.

A New Political Persona

THE NEW POLITICS sketched in what has gone before needs a new political persona, able to handle baffling tensions without losing either moral elan or political effectiveness.

The tensions are many. For at the heart of this new politics is the effort to build a radical coalition that is cohesive without being monolithic, progressive in ways that do not weaken more basic commitment to radicalism, tactically bold yet mindful of political consequence. The new coalition seeks to exert a steady pressure on the Democratic party. Above all, the coalition neither overestimates its present strength, nor underestimates its future potential.

Possessive individualism—the need to appropriate and control all things, people, organizations as one would a toothbrush—is the scourge of our culture. It is, and not surprisingly, a special vice of our politics. The radical Left has not been spared. Through the period of Vietnam protest, insurgents frequently suffered leaders who treated the many movements and groups they helped to build like personal fiefdoms. Some wheeled and dealed, manipulated and lied, betrayed trusts. Others displayed more integrity, but not less possessiveness. Unless this atavistic need to control is curbed, unless we become more capable of substituting the satisfactions of common effort for the satisfactions of ego-fulfillment, the new politics will in time become indistinguishable from the old.

The new political man will view all political leaders, especially candidates and officials, as neither devils nor saints, but as fallible creatures too often caught in a web of conflicting pressures to which they respond out of a variety of motives. But such understanding compassion should not prevent us from adding to the official's predicament. For our basic task is to generate pressures that by influencing judgment and action serve our ultimate aims. We will not succeed if we role-play, if we act *as if* we were at the center of the system of pressures rather than as part of its source. The tendency to role-playing comes to the fore when successful candidates or officials emerge from our own ranks. It is then that the dangers of harmful identification, of false loyalty and misplaced gratitude are greatest. Part of the price of success is that old intimacies must give way to the imperatives of a politics of impersonal, radical pressure.

My remarks no more than scratch the surface of the topic. Unless the qualities that constitute this new political persona become typical rather than exceptional, our radical minority cannot hope to be effective. But if radicals learn to find their gratifications through communal accomplishment within a strategic frame set by long-range moral perspectives, then the present mood of cynicism and despair may lift.

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Steven Kelman

Culture, Life Style, and Politics

THERE HAS BEEN much discussion of the youth "counter culture" insofar as it affects prospects of social change in America. The counter culture's adulators have gone so far as to suggest that the appearance of this new "consciousness" renders a major social transformation a mere matter of time, independent of political organization or struggle. Others, from members of the Progressive Labor party to certain people on the democratic Left, claim to find nothing of value in the youth culture and often show a puritan hatred of the new youth life-styles which matches that of the average American.

The truth, I think, is somewhere in between; but here I would like to focus on what appears an internal contradiction within the youth culture, between its life-style and its social critique. I find much of the youth culture's life-style to be positive, but feel that carrying into practice its social critique would undermine what is positive in this life-style.

By life-style I don't mean so much the surface manifestations of clothes, music, or even marijuana—I refer to traits of gentleness and tolerance in interpersonal behavior, and a political activism significantly based on idealism, which mark the moral code and influence the conduct of members of the youth culture.

Now I don't want to overestimate how much gentleness, tolerance, and idealism do in fact characterize the behavior of youth. Youth often shows little tolerance for the "silent majority." Idealism in political behavior does not exclude tactical and moral errors within the student movement. The point remains, however, that members of the youth culture show at least marginally more gentleness and tolerance in their everyday behavior than much of the rest of the population, and that middle-class idealism is an important, if not sufficient, part of any movement for social progress.

The question is, what enables young people to base their personal and political behavior on values that transcend simple self-interest? The answer, I would say, is almost axiomatic: in most cases, people will be more gentle and idealistic when they can afford to be so. There are exceptions, naturally, but idealism is generally a luxury item. Some on the Left romanticize the poor as less selfish and more willing to cooperate than those "corrupted" by affluence. In fact, exactly the opposite seems true. Edward Banfield's study of a Sicilian village, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, concludes that pathological inability to trust and cooperate prevented the villagers from jointly improving their lot. And a *New York Times* reporter sent to Pakistan after the flood catastrophe last year reported that,

> The burdens of life that have made the peasants of the delta fatalistic have also made them socially introverted—even selfish, by the standards of more affluent cultures. Life centers on the family and people rarely think of asking for help from others or of offering any. Sharing is an alien concept, except within the family—and even there, brothers do not necessarily share their food.

THE GENTLE AND TOLERANT IDEALS of the youth culture are very similar to the traditional ideals of *aristocracies* around the world. Aristocrats sometimes gave away large sums to the poor, patronized culture, and were kind and civil in their interpersonal relations.

Aristocratic gentility presupposed high ma-

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terial standards which made possible the luxury of a kindness resting on a material base of the exploitation of peasants and serfs. What is new about modern industrial society is that it has allowed the emergence of a large-scale affluence which is not, to nearly the same extent, based on exploitation, and thus the spread of aristocratic life-styles in non-aristocratic segments of the population. It is no accident that the new life-style spread widely among young people during the first generation of mass affluence. The flower child was the daughter of the computer age.

However, as a social critique, and not just a life-style, the counter culture has centered on an attack on technology and industrial society as dehumanizing, repressive, impersonal, and destructive. To many youths, technology represents a "death trip."

To be sure, some people can find anything repressive. I remember discussions at Harvard where it was claimed that urban traffic lights and clothing represented intolerable examples of psychological repression. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to deny that modern industrial society, among other things, routinizes and stifles certain types of individual self-expression. Technology has often been misused, sometimes avoidably.

Freud presented the dilemma of industrial society in *Civilization and its Discontents* with a good deal more sophistication than the modern counter culture theorists. For Freud, the paradox of civilization was that it required instinct repressions and postponements of immediate gratification which made many unhappy. At the same time, without these fetters imposed by civilization, raising living standards beyond subsistence would be impossible.

What appears as paradox in Freud emerges as polemic in the ideology of the youth culture. Civilization and its technology are seen *only* for the ways in which they stifle individual self-expression and impose rules, not for the ways in which they liberate from drudgery and make possible the elimination of poverty. The use of computers in universities is seen only as a method of reducing the student to a number. Ignored are the necessities imposed by mass education, or, put another way, the expansion of higher education which computers help make possible.

While keeping in mind Freud's paradox, it is important to realize that, after weighing positive against negative results of industrial society, *no* society in human history, when given the choice, has failed to opt for modernization. At the same time as some affluent American youths imagine that they would be freer and happier if they left large cities for the pastoral community of the countryside, tens of millions of peasants in the Third World are flocking away from the countryside and into the "impersonalized," "dehumanized" cities. And it is almost hypocritical to say at the same time that one sympathizes with the starving peoples of the Third World and that one opposes the technology which offers the only practical way out of that starvation.

And here is the contradiction within the counter culture. If "depersonalizing" technology were dismantled, as the ideologists of the counter culture would have it, standards of living would drop catastrophically. And with them would disappear the material base for the life-style of love and tolerance. A few philosopher-saints might continue to live nobly in the de-technologized poverty. But for most people such widespread poverty would imply a quick return to dog-eat-dog.

Just as you don't end pollution by chanting Hare Krishna at a dirty stream, so you don't create nicer people merely by circulating the love poems of John Lennon and Yoko Ono. Technology, notwithstanding the dehumanization for which it may in part be responsible, is the key to the humanization of the lives of the masses of people. The high standards of living

What's This?

We received in the mail an advertisement for the National Taxpayer's Union, a conservative organization dedicated to "individual liberty and financial security for the American taxpayer." It boasts among its Board of Advisors such familiar conservative worthies as Ludwig von Mises, Henry Jazlitt, and Felix Morley.

Fair enough. But then, on the same Board we find listed—Noam Chomsky and Marc Raskin. So, what's this?

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brought about by industrialism have made possible a "love *generation*" where otherwise there might have been only a few scattered love individuals. If the youth culture dismantled the industrial world, it would at the same time succeed in putting an end to its own existence. Socialists can welcome certain aspects of the youth culture, while continuing to make our task the redistribution of the benefits of technology—so that more people can be influenced by the type of idealism and gentleness which marks a part of this generation.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

Evening with a "T" Group

THE FIRST SPARKS had already been struck when I arrived five minutes late for the initial session of a T group,* composed of faculty and staff at a university in Boston. Each member was telling something about himself. As I entered, a good-looking, husky, blond man in his late twenties was talking. "I finished my Ph.D. in psychology last year," George said, "so this is my first year of teaching. Some days are good, but some are bad. Today I was very incoherent in my lecture. When I talk about familiar ideas I come across better, but today I was trying to discuss something new to me, and lost my grip. I tried to explain in class the Jensen articles about the inherited IQ levels of blacks, but I got lost." One of the main reasons why he came to the T group, George said, was to improve his ability in communicating especially with undergraduates.

After George and several others identified themselves as teachers, one fellow in a black turtle-neck sweater announced he was a priest. This provoked a girl sitting next to George to say that she was against introducing oneself with the use of labels. "I am an individual," she said, "a thinking person different from all others, and that is more important than whatever job or profession I have."

George, however, strongly disagreed. "I think you overdo it," he said. "We may not be much more than whatever role we play. You exaggerate the differences between us."

After some further exchange, George turned to the priest. "I see that there is going to be some trouble between us. I don't know what it will be or what will cause it. But I feel that there is something that will cause conflict between us."

Others commented on how the priest seemed to go to special lengths to break out of whatever stereotype people might use to cast clerics. His efforts, one lady suggested, didn't do much good, since she had a stereotype of the avant-garde priest who might well turn out to be a hypocrite beneath his veneer of being a good guy.

With this the priest turned to a woman in her early twenties, who was sitting in the corner. "You have a similar problem," he asserted, "because you're black. This racial thing is a hangup for everyone, and we might as well admit it from the beginning."

The black girl, however, said that most of her associations were with whites. True, she was now wearing an Afro hair style, because she wanted to affirm her negritude. But she did not want to let this get in the way of her relations with other people. (She, like several other educators in the group, had not heard of the Jensen thesis. Told of its overall thrust, she replied that she couldn't personalize it, because she had always gone to good universities, and just didn't believe that she was intellectually inferior.)

To this, George responded with some passion: "I've just come from Cornell University where I have seen how blacks have accomplished a great deal working together. I just don't see how you have the right to spend your time in here trying to get along with a bunch of whites."

Several of the group protested that George had no right to make judgment on how Shirley, the black girl, should spend her time, or what her values should be. He replied that he doubted whether—at a time like this—anyone should be sitting around in what amounted to group therapy, worrying about private anxieties, when so much needed to be done on the outside.

* "T" is for "training"; sensitivity training in human relations.

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"That may be all right for you," one middle-aged redhead declared, "but you can't judge for us."

NOW THE TALK VEERED OFF in several directions, which the discussion leader started to sift, so as to indicate some possible options for continuing the meeting.

George, however, cut him short. "Are you trying to be one of the group?" he demanded to know. "I don't want you to be a member. I didn't pay very much for these sessions, but I want to get my own money's worth, figuratively speaking." George, apparently, feared that if the discussion leader came too close, he would not be so effective as a trainer. On the other hand, a breath or two later, George declared that he was opposed to all kinds of father figures (a sentiment shared by many in the group), and did not want the trainer to offer "directions" but—at most—"analysis."

Again, the group turned against George. His attempted exclusion of the trainer, a kind, white-haired man, struck many as brutal—not to say contradictory, since he also wanted him to be neither a father figure nor a member of the group.

A new voice came in. "I don't believe what you are saying," a man told George. "I think you are rationalizing something else."

"Perhaps," George replied.

"Did that comment hurt you," the trainer asked George, "or the other angry remarks of the last few minutes?"

"No," George replied. Indeed, it looked as though these rejoinders left him unruffled. The most callous of the group and the most offhand in his comments about others, he also seemed to be able to take it in return. For George, persons (even he himself) were not as important as causes and movements.

"Shall we meet again next week?" the trainer asked.

"No, we can't," another member replied. "Next week is the protest strike."

"I'll be marching," George said. But when the priest said that he would also be marching, George declared: "Religion and priests are irrelevant to our society."

"But I'm not irrelevant to this society," the priest practically shouted back at him. "Not to Boston. Or to this university. Or to this group."

"I wonder whether it's worth my time to be here," George mused. "It seems picayune to be discussing our little problems when the big world out there needs us."

The trainer at this moment raised a question: "Do you remember, George, when you really came across and were coherent for us? It was early in our meeting, when you said that you were sitting here with your elbows and hands high, supporting your head, even though inside you were nervous, and wanted to keep your arms folded and tucked into your stomach? That was being intellectual, but it also concerned what was going on inside this room, and inside yourself."

"I'm still going to march," George said.

1970, I was reminded, was the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin, a man who accomplished a great deal to change the objects around him, but at terrific costs to the subjects. George, like Lenin, might agree with the proposition: one has to break eggs to make an omelet. For his omelet he found it possible and desirable to exclude almost half the persons in our room in the course of less than two hours: a priest who was potentially too dogmatic or otherworldly; a black girl who believed in small-group dynamics as well as mass demonstrations; another girl who didn't like defining persons with labels; and a humane discussion leader whom George could pillory either way—for being too much a peer or too much a leader. With time, I suppose, George could have found reason to exclude others from his faction of true believers.

Many politically active persons are driven by some compelling inner force, a sense of mission or inadequacy; by idealism or egocentrism; or some complex mixture of these and other apparent opposites. While many persons in the

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forefront of radical movements may be quite different from George, one may wonder how many might share his implicit prescription: the movement above the individual, the end above the means. If we knew more about the internal workings of such people, we would be better able to understand how their struggle for noble ideals often comes to be undermined and even transformed, with the tactics of the Left gravitating toward those of the extreme Right.

Horia Bratu

End of Literary Criticism

VERY SOON AFTER the mass production of literature-writing machines began and started working with high efficiency, it was noticed that with every passing day critics were disappearing. The phenomenon had an immediate and easily perceptible cause: the trade of the literary critic had become practically impossible. No one was capable of reading even a small number of all the books that were being brought out. According to certain approximate estimates (the history of this moment was traced back later and its concrete details have remained obscure, for they are still based on indirect sources), a machine managed to compose a piece of poetry in less than two minutes. A novel of less than 300 pages took 18 minutes, while the time required for the writing of a play amounted, quite unaccountably, to almost one hour. The machines worked uninterruptedly for about 90 days, after which they required a stop for a check up. In this way Lima alone brought out 1,012 volumes a year, while the profits of the publishing concerns went up rapidly. The first to give up their mission were the literary historians. If they couldn't examine the great majority of the books issued, the object of their activity became nonsensical. No matter how hard they worked, they could not manage to read even 0.0001 percent of the works turned out. Presently the newspaper critics gave up too. Even if they had deliberately given up the ambition of making a selection according to the importance of the books issued (there was absolutely no way of knowing if among the numberless unread volumes they had not overlooked essential works), another major difficulty had seemed to them unconquerable. As they turned out only the type of work for which they had been devised, the machines ruled out any critical remark. The commentator was asked to examine, first and foremost, to what extent the artistic intention had been carried through. Now, the machines did not stray from their program a single whit, and in fact created masterpieces, so that an estimate of their value was, *ab initio,* superfluous. Even the most extravagant tastes had been provided for, in the initial statistical calculations, so they could not fail to react the way they were expected to.

As the discouragement of the critics menaced to rob literary life of its essential pigment, someone had the idea of scheduling a few cheap books, otherwise there would be nothing against which to match the merits of masterpieces. When the plan was put into application it was found that the vicious circle could not be broken. In their turn, the machines designed to write unsuccessful books fulfilled their task faultlessly. The texts they turned out were of perfect mediocrity and stupidity, thus acquiring mechanically an unvaluable aesthetic value. Then one of the most reputed philosophers of the time set forth the proposition that criticism was indeed doomed to disappear, since machines could create only perfect things, considering the aim they had in view. The demonstration was rather intricate and got lost in metaphysical mist, but the conclusion asserted itself intuitively with great force and very soon gained almost unanimous approval. The last critic died of brain fever in his own library one May morning, actually buried under a heap of books (he had been reading uninterruptedly for 26 hours).

A LITERATURE LACKING CRITICAL COMMENTARY, however, was unimaginable. This was the moment when it was considered necessary to build machines for assessing books. From the very first, the builders encountered a great difficulty. What program should they assign them? Naturally, first came the problem of ele-

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mentary information. The machine critics would have to run through all the works produced by the machine writers and classify them according to genre, species, themes, subject, artistic formula, publishing for the moment brief bulletins for the readers' guidance. The electronic brains that were to effect the operation were quickly achieved and put into operation. Plugged in at the literature writing machines, they succeeded in a very short time in systematically studying the production of fiction. However, the results proved to be ridiculous, because the bulletins obtained in this way were unserviceable. Their volume became so great that no one could make head or tail of them. There should have been other machines that would read all the lists and make a new selection. But according to what criteria? So, after lengthy debates there was a return to explanatory criticism. The machine builders had to rack their brains in order to draw up the programs for these types of machines. The critical systems practiced in the age of literary handicraft (that was how they called the period when books were written by people) led, in turn, to unforeseen results. Existentialist criticism, under electronic form clashed with the paradox of the literature produced by machines. Was it the document of a life experience? The answer to that is yes and no, as the works it started discussing actually expressed a life experience (their program included so many possibilities that the results became actually unpredictable and echoed exactly the ineffable throb of life), but the machines remained only enormous heaps of filaments, levers, and networks that when a button was pressed became completely inert. Psychoanalytical criticism as usual gave rise to rows, especially as it prolonged its deductions into the subconscious of the designers; nay, even of the managers of the various industrial enterprises that supplied electronic brains designed to produce various literary works. The press of the time carried even the accounts of a few resounding cases: the head of a great financial group found himself charged with incestuous inclinations, present in the 12604th *Antigone* conceived by a machine built by a firm dependent on his bank. The claimant declared he did not even know the original piece, but the argument met with serious theoretical objections.

For a time the machines scheduled on a theological basis enjoyed a certain amount of success. They were assimilated with the former human creatures whom the God-creator inspired with the gift of creation. But the church objected, so the analogy was considered diabolical. The only system that proved more productive returned to the old idea of the critical act, meant as a shortened remaking of the creation in its essential elements, indicating the virtualities left unexplored by the author. Thus for the exegete, the literary work was to remain a spiritual stimulant that should stir him to infinite poetical hypotheses. Accordingly, the criticizing machines began to effect the extrapolation of artistic intentions. From one novel they made thousands. From one poem, whole cycles. From one play, millions of better variants. Literary production experienced an unprecedented flourishing. Everyone seemed content, but in a few years it was noticed that the machine-writers were showing signs of irritation. Discordant effects made their appearance at the end of the works, on purpose, as it were. A disease appeared, "self-annulment" or as some historians call it "aesthetic suicide." There came a time when the novel, the play, or the poem developed symmetrically in opposite directions, with equal perfection, so that the result was a complete annihilation of the initial artistic effects.

It was also found that, practically, works of criticism had altogether ceased to appear, for the machines designed to produce them were also turning out novels, poems, and plays, while the advertising agencies, unable to introduce in the papers at least a book review, were threatened with bankruptcy. Then somebody had a revolutionary idea, which solved the problem for good. The two types of machine were plugged in a close circuit. The electronic brains of writers and critics were thus compelled to consume their production mutually; the former started frantically passing judgment on the works produced by the latter. The result was an astounding reversal. If the machine-critics discovered they had a secret vocation for becoming writers, the machine-writers betrayed their undeclared passion for writing criticism. As everything developed with consuming violence, in a closed circle as suggested above, the rest of the people were able to go about their business peacefully and quietly.

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Maurice Goldbloom

The Mysteries of Greek Politics

POLITICS IN MODERN GREECE, by Keith Legg. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 367 pp. $10.

GREEK POLITICS is *terra incognita* to most non-Greeks, including all too many of those responsible for American policy toward Greece. The Greeks themselves usually know a little more about their country's history, but much of what they know isn't so. For both Greeks and non-Greeks, the factual vacuum tends to be filled by stereotypes and myths.

One stereotype dear to political scientists is that pre-1967 Greek politics was based on patron-client relationships rather than ideological differences, and was therefore essentially meaningless. This charge has been taken up by both the Left and the ruling junta for their own reasons; if Greek democracy was simply a facade for a corrupt shell game, then it can be argued that its destruction was at worst a venial sin. Indeed, the junta can and does claim that the 1967 coup was a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of a "true democracy" in which the nation's interest would triumph over traditional influence networks. The same arguments have been used by the Communists, as well as even by democratic reformers; denunciation of the "old political world" sometimes seems to be an essential weapon in the arsenal of *any* Greek politician.

The indictment is, of course, based on fact. Greek politicians do have personal followings, and Greek political parties are often formed as alliances of such followings. (In recent years, however, no party based *only* on such relationships has succeeded in getting to first base in Greece. Strong local connections certainly helped a politician to get elected, but long-established local grandees have repeatedly found themselves ignominiously defeated when they ran without the support of the major party within their ideological tendency.) Greek deputies did usually spend much more effort on smoothing the way of their constituents with government agencies than on their legislative duties; but the same is true of most American legislators.

Nor are the habits of French deputies and British MPs so different; one suspects that legislators elected from local constituencies rather than at large will always tend to function in this way. Yet this does not mean that American political conflicts are meaningless, though their meaning is often obscured by their nonideological aspects and by the absence of any necessary relationship between belief and party affiliation. In much the same way, Greek politics before the coup was also meaningful, though differences in policy might depend as much on the current leadership of the parties as on which of them held power.

So far as I know, no comprehensive study of modern Greek politics exists in any language; certainly not in English. There are a number of books dealing with various periods and aspects of the question: a few very good, several moderately good, others useful either as original documents or because they make such documents available. But most are wretched. It was therefore with anticipation that I approached the current volume; perhaps here was the book to present an integrated account of the evolution of modern Greek politics.

That book, unfortunately, remains to be written. Mr. Legg makes many perceptive comments

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on Greek political and social life, though they sometimes come as asides, unsupported by evidence. He is certainly correct, for instance, when he points out that foreign intervention in Greek affairs, massive though it has been, has been less than the Greeks believed it to be. "It has been difficult for Greeks to appreciate that major powers have interests elsewhere that might dictate policy toward Greece, or that outside powers do not have to control every internal action." And again, "Greek politicians can make extravagant promises; but ultimately, all blame for any errors can be shifted to the foreign embassies."

For many years it was standard operating practice for Greek governments, when they wanted to do something that they feared would arouse popular protest, to let it be known that they were acting at the insistence of the Americans—even though the latter were often in fact strenuously objecting to the policy in question. The late Sophocles Venizelos was particularly adept at this; one suspects that the Embassy let him get away with it because his Center to Right-Center Liberal party had a strategic position in the making and unmaking of majorities and was often ready to use that position in the interest of the Embassy.

Mr. Legg stresses "political stability" as one of the aims of American intervention in Greek politics. But the actual goal was more often political *instability;* the U.S. Embassy usually preferred a parliament in which the Right and Center were fairly closely balanced, with a small group of deputies particularly responsive to the Embassy's wishes holding the balance of power. In that way, the Embassy could expect to get what it wanted on important questions by subtle rather than obvious pressures. In the 1952 elections, for example, the Greek Rally of Marshal Alexander Papagos united most of the factions of the Right with certain politicians formerly belonging to the Center, but with close ties to big business and the Americans. This party, initiated in the U.S. Embassy and put together with the aid of all sorts of American pressures and inducements directed at individual politicians, won four-fifths of the seats in parliament with 49 percent of the vote against a divided opposition. This was the result of the imposition of the plurality system in place of the "reinforced proportional representation" system previously in effect. The change was rammed down the throat of an unwilling parliament by public ultimatums from Ambassador John Peurifoy. (One of the easily foreseeable results of this situation—though it took the Embassy by surprise—was a popular front between the Center and the Communist-influenced Left in the next election.)

After the election I had a long discussion with one of Peurifoy's chief accomplices, who defended the Embassy's course of conduct but admitted that he was not happy about the *extent* of the Papagos victory; the Embassy had not wanted even its hand-crafted party to be too securely in power. After the election, it set about remedying the situation by encouraging the factional rivalries of the various leaders whom it had dragooned into unity; by the time Marshal Papagos died in 1955, the Embassy had obtained *within* the Greek Rally the sort of decisive role it had lost in Parliament because of the Rally's overwhelming majority in that body. It was thus able to impose Papagos's Minister of Public Works Constantine Karamanlis as Papagos's successor over the heads of senior leaders with greater prestige and political claims. And with Embassy backing, Karamanlis was able to maintain his leadership of the bulk of the Right, which he reorganized as the National Radical Union (ERE) for eight years. None of this is to be learned from Mr. Legg's book; he treats the events in question without regard to either the American role or —in the case of the establishment of the Greek Rally—the way in which traditionally "liberal" sectors of big business turned against the Center and went over to the Rally because of their resentment of the economic measures carried through by George Kartalis, the Socialist Minister of Coordination in the Plastiras-Venizelos Center government of 1951–52. (Among other things, Kartalis had forced leading business interests to pay back taxes which had accumulated for years, and had called in government loans given to industrialists at low interest for plant expansion but used by them to speculate against the Drachma.)

Mr. Legg follows the usual custom of downgrading the significance of Greek political parties. At one point he says, "These organizations are termed parties here only for the sake of convenience. Despite some appearances to the contrary, they are primarily the following of

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individual leaders." Certainly, no major Greek parties except those influenced by the Communists have ever been parties in the same sense as the Socialist, Communist, and Christian Democratic parties of Europe. Mr. Legg notes, and it is widely recognized, that in Greece they have involved a complex system of clientage. Leaders have shifted from one party to another; sometimes they have carried large numbers of followers with them—but more often in recent years they have not, a fact Mr. Legg fails to mention. (Thus in 1952 the two politicians who had respectively headed the Right and Center in Corinth for years, Constantine Tsaldaris and Constantine Rendis, both ran on the slate of the Center, but the former Tsaldaris voters remained true to their traditional politics rather than their traditional leader, and went over *en bloc* to the rightist Greek Rally, which carried the district. Again, in 1958 when the three most important national leaders of the traditional Right—Tsaldaris, Kanellopoulos, and Stephanopoulos—broke with the National Radical Union [ERE] of Karamanlis and formed the Union of Populist Parties, their slate polled less than 3 percent of the vote.)

Perhaps the best way for an American to picture the nature of Greek political life before 1967 is to imagine a situation in which the Republican mayor of New York backed the Democratic candidate for governor, while the defeated Democratic candidate for mayor supported the Republican—a Rockefeller—for reelection to the office he had originally taken from a Harriman and successfully defended against a Morgenthau; in which Harry Byrd, Jr., bolted his party but kept his hereditary Senate seat, running as an independent; in which a Tydings was defeated in Maryland by a Beall for the seat he had originally won from the latter's father but which his own father had also once held; in which other successful candidates included a Kennedy in Massachusetts, a Taft in Ohio, a Stevenson in Illinois, and a DuPont in Delaware, and in which the American party candidate for President again became the Democratic governor of Alabama.

To some extent Mr. Legg is misled by the continual birth and death of parties in Greece; what he does not observe is that what was happening, as far as the voters were concerned, was a realignment *within permanent groupings.* If one places the Center line properly, and takes proper account of the organized abstentions in some elections (notably that of 1946), the maximum number of voters who cross it in the course of all the elections from 1930 to 1961 is about 5 percent. (Mr. Legg comments on the 1946 election without mentioning that the entire Left and Left-Center boycotted it. The increased percentage of voters in 1950 is approximately equal to the vote cast for the left-wing and Left-Center parties, the Democratic Front and EPEK, in that election.)

There have been much greater shifts in the allegiances of individual politicians; thus both George Kartalis, the British Labor party protegé who was responsible for most of the rather considerable achievements of the Center governments of 1950–52, and Michael Kyrkos, one of the leaders of the Communist-sponsored United Democratic Left (EDA), started out as ministers in a prewar right-wing government headed by Panagis Tsaldaris. On the other hand, almost all those connected with the present regime whose names meant anything before 1967 are former Communists or fellow-travelers. But then Bobby Kennedy started out as assistant counsel to Joe McCarthy's committee, while Joe himself originally beat Bob LaFollette with the help of Communist votes and money. Not to mention that both Ronald Reagan and Sam Yorty are former fellow-travelers, while Charles Goodell was not always a "radical-liberal." These things happen everywhere; even in the relatively stable atmosphere of German politics, the Social Democratic President of the *Bundesrepublik* is a former Christian Democratic Interior Minister. (Mr. Legg suggests that deputies tend to shift from opposition parties to the one in power; in Greece, the contrary is more often the case.)

Because of his overemphasis on the singularity of Greek politics, Mr. Legg misses the significance of what happened in 1963–64, when for the first time the Left-of-Center vote went over 60 percent of the total. This represented the first real breakthrough in the pattern of almost even division, which had stood in the way of radical reform. He also minimizes the reforms of the Center Union government headed by the late George Papandreou, and in doing so he is guilty of some serious inaccuracies. Thus he states that under Papandreou

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"only a few political prisoners were released."

In fact, of some hundreds in prison in 1963 for political offenses—including common-law crimes committed during the civil war—only about a dozen remained in July 1965, when Papandreou was dismissed by the King; most of these had been convicted of such crimes as multiple murders. (Perhaps one should also consider the right-wing thugs convicted of the murder of the EDA deputy Gregory Lambrakis, described in "Z," as political prisoners.) Nor did the Papandreou government ever make use of administrative deportation, as Mr. Legg says it did. The fact is that under George Papandreou the people of Greece were freer than they ever had been before. That, indeed, was one of the things some highly placed Americans as well as large sections of the Greek officer corps didn't like about the Papandreou government, and hence one of the major causes of its downfall in 1965 as well as of the 1967 coup.

The detailed description of the United Democratic Left (EDA), which Mr. Legg properly recognizes as a political party organized by the principle of "democratic centralism," is a more accurate picture than the one Mr. Legg gives of the Center Union and ERE. Even here, however, there are some inaccuracies. An important one is Mr. Legg's statement that "a substantial amount of EDA revenue comes . . . from certain trade unions." This probably comes from a misreading of a passage in Jean Meynaud's *Les Forces Politique en Grece* (the best survey of postwar Greek politics, rather sympathetic to the Communists, but scholarly and objective) in which Meynaud explains that under conditions as they existed in Greece EDA could *not* get significant financial trade-union support.

As most writers on Greece, Mr. Legg pays little attention to the trade union movement and is wrong in much of what he does say. The unions did not first become involved in politics in the 1920s; there were strikes in Northern Greece against Venizelos's involvement of Greece in World War I on the side of the Allies, and a number of union leaders were imprisoned as a result. Nor is it correct to say that "large-scale labor organization has had little success in Greece." In pre-Metaxas days, there were very effective unions among the railroad workers and certain other groups. Even in the unfavorable postwar climate, some unions—e.g., longshoremen, printers, and Athens transit workers—served their members well. Similarly, Legg neglects the role of the Greek Communist movement in the pre-Metaxas period, although as early as 1920 it polled 120,000 votes—about a third of the total cast in the major cities. This was *before* the influx of the Asia Minor refugees, who were later to become the backbone of Left and Center parties.

More important, he says that "during the resistance [the Communist party] became an outright agent of the Soviet Union." In fact, it was precisely during the resistance and the immediate postwar period that the CP was *not* simply an agent of the Soviet Union. Communications between Greece and Moscow during the war were practically nonexistent, so the Greek Communists *had* to act on their own. And the December 1944 rising was, as Winston Churchill was at pains to point out, undertaken without Moscow's aid, advice, or consent. (In contrast, the 1946 uprising was a Cominform operation from start to finish—and the finish was a result of the expulsion of Yugoslavia, the principal guerrilla base, from the Cominform.)

An even more serious weakness is an excessively gentle treatment of the armed forces in general and of the present military regime in particular. It is *not* true that the postwar Greek army "appeared to be united and above politics"; the split in the army between the British-backed faction represented by such generals as Ventiris and the secret American-supported IDEA organization, whose figurehead was Marshal Papagos, is notorious. (*Both* factions were rightist, but their rivalry was so intense that it served as an effective obstacle to a military dictatorship until Papagos's installation as Premier brought the final triumph of IDEA over its rivals.) This split was a major factor in the failure of the attempted IDEA coup of May 1951, and played an important role in the alliance of the palace—which had ties to Ventiris—with the traditionally republican groups against Papagos and the Greek Rally. Mr. Legg substantially underestimates the role of the palace in the politics of postwar Greece; this influence, even exerted in the awarding of contracts, was probably the most distinctive feature of Greek political life.

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Mr. Legg is in error in believing that within months after the coup of April 21, 1967, "only the hard core who refused to renounce their political ties and to abstain from future political activity remained in custody." The statement required was in most cases much more humiliating than that, and signing it did not guarantee release. Those freed in recent amnesties, and many of those still in concentration camps where they have remained without charges for almost four years, are to a large extent old and sick. To describe them as "hard core" is certainly a peculiar use of language.

Nor is it true that "the more influential business figures were arrested at the beginning of the coup; others sought asylum outside the country." *One* leading capitalist, Professor Stratis Andreadis, was arrested for having given money to EDA. (He had given it to all parties.) The arrest was never announced, and he was released in a few days for value received; immediately after his release, he visited London on behalf of the junta and then promptly returned to Greece to resume business at the old stand. Indeed, the one group to which the junta was from the very beginning not merely considerate but obsequious was big business; its attentions were reciprocated. Most of the junta's decrees on economic matters have embodied new favors for big business, and the military government has been at least as accessible to its blandishments as any civilian government ever was. Mr. Legg also says that "there has always been sufficient power in Greek press legislation to muzzle journalists offensive to the regime, military or not." While it is certainly true that prejunta press legislation was no libertarian model, the fact is that it did not—even during the civil war—effectively muzzle the opposition press. The junta does.

In spite of all its weaknesses and errors, this is not a bad book. Mr. Legg has done some useful research on such matters as the attitudes of deputies toward their role and brought together interesting statistics on their occupational backgrounds, family connections, etc. His analyses often serve to illuminate particular aspects of Greek life, and his book is useful if handled with care. But it is not an accurate picture of Greek politics, either before 1967 or since; the necessary information simply isn't there. And that is a pity.

Edward T. Chase

Economist's Progress

BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMICS, by Robert Heilbroner. New York: Random House. 294 pp. $7.95; Vintage edition, $1.95.

THERE IS TENSION, even suspense, in Robert Heilbroner's new collection of articles. The tension comes from Heilbroner's agonizing over the classic issue, the social injustices perpetrated by capitalism on the one hand and by the totalitarianism historically associated with "socialism" on the other. One cares about Heilbroner because he is an academician who cannot be dismissed for affecting a modish New Left authoritarian bias. His inner debate is agonizing, indeed, because of the earnestness with which he strives to give full marks to each side even as his predilection is so deeply socialist.

Heilbroner quotes this stunning passage from Ambrose, the fourth-century Bishop of Milan, and it can serve as the theme for his book: "Think you that you commit no injustice by keeping to yourself alone what would be the means of life to many? It is the bread of the hungry you cling to; it is the clothing of the naked you lock up; the money you bury is the redemption of the poor."

How strongly this injunction has moved Heilbroner is reflected in the high percentage of his writings about the undeveloped world. Throughout, he expresses anguish over the dismal prospects of the world's southern peoples. He is utterly skeptical of those like C. P. Snow and Sakharov who see a solution in a massive payments transfer from the rich to the poor, or through the wonders of new technology. The political, social, and psychological barriers are such, he emphasizes, that change can only come through revolution and the iron disciplines, "the ruthless energy" of regimes capable of coercing the revolutionary generation to sacrifice itself for future generations. Indeed, Heilbroner sees Maoist China in a favorable light and asks the reader rhetorically, wouldn't you rather take your chances of life today in China over India?

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The reader may assume that Heilbroner would choose Communist China, yet a while back in this magazine (November–December 1967) he gave the qualified response that "To be sure, if I could choose to be an intellectual in both nations I would opt for the other [the Indian] side." It is important in understanding Heilbroner to distinguish between his fluctuating roles of advocacy and prediction. And one may find some ambiguity here. What it comes down to is that while he deplores the costs of revolutionary authoritarianism—and prays wistfully for a regime with the total dedication of the revolutionary combined with the "decency of the gradualist"—he feels compelled to predict that only the totalitarian will effect the basic changes, above all else overcome not simply the resistance of old regimes but the torpor of the masses "who must be wrenched from their established ways . . . and then systematically denied an increase in well-being so that capital can be amassed for future growth."

It is fair to say that the problem of the legitimacy of the ruling elite in such situations does not seem to trouble Heilbroner as much as it might. He is overwhelmed by his fiercer concern for the plight of capitalism's victims. Thus, while he acknowledges the evils of revolutionists, Communists or otherwise, he writes:

> We tend to count carefully each corpse attributable to the terrorists, guerrillas, or avowed soldiers of revolutionary action, but to ignore the bodies of those who perish because of the actions of our own side, military or not. To whom, for example, should be charged the permanent and irreversible mental and physical stunting of Latin America's children that follows from an inability to alter the established social order? To whom shall we debit the grisly corpses, living and dead, in the streets of Bombay?

He concludes that however cruel revolutionaries (Chinese, Cuban) may be, they have demonstrated an ability to lead men "out of their misery for at least the first critical stage of the journey," whereas at this juncture in history "it is the shameful fact that we have nothing as good and, worse than that, have ranged ourselves against nearly every movement that might have led men toward a better life, on the grounds of our opposition to Communism."

Heilbroner sees in the domination of the scientific mentality a powerful new impetus in the shift toward authoritarianism and away from the market. He feels the chief new directive force in 20th-century history is technology, and that its impact is toward "the conscious direction over and control of the environment, including the social environment," "a deliberate application of intelligence to social problems." The ascendant elites are the scientists and the technologists, with mentalities antagonistic to individual entrepreneurship with its anarchic social consequences; hence "the swing toward the state."

THE HEART OF HEILBRONER'S BOOK is his wrestling with the moral as well as practical problems of socialism and his analysis of the price-market mechanism: "I think a valid case *can* be made for the usefulness of the money-making system as an instrument for social accumulation, at least in certain stages of history and in certain social settings." He even concedes that there is an oversimplified but partly valid "equation of economic freedom and political freedom." Nonetheless, Heilbroner remains resolute in his general belief that authoritarianism, collectivism, and revolution are essentials for progress.

But while he is impatient with democratic dissent—one might say too impatient—his favorite target is the market system, which "solves its tasks efficiently just because it applies to the varied and tangled needs of a human community one and only one criterion, the criterion of wealth." Socialism, on the other hand, "intends progress to lead to the creation of a wholly new kind of society, free of invidious striving and built on motives of cooperation and confraternity."

It is in his discussion of socialism's future that he describes its recourse to the market mechanism as necessary to prevent lumbering bureaucratic inefficiency. Socialism's basic problem, he suggests, is motivation, since if "a hierarchy of remunerations" is used, socialism abandons its ideal of virtual income equality. Yet, without differentials in income rewards for labor, men may not be attracted to where they are needed and hence increasingly "coercive planning" is used, "with all the difficulties of efficiency and morale that such measures must bring."

Heilbroner is profoundly skeptical of Marcuse's faith that in a setting of socialist abun-

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dance, man's invidious selfish nature would give way to Eros and the Nirvana Principle. He himself cannot define what will replace market incentives and end the cash nexus, so he concludes only with a reassertion of *faith* that somehow socialism will transcend its internal contradictions. "Socialism is, at its root, the effort to find a remedy in social terms for the affront to reason and morality in the status quo," he writes. "Socialism is the expression of a collective hope for mankind, the idealization of what it conceives itself to be capable of. When the fires of socialism no longer burn, it will mean that mankind has extinguished that hope and abandoned that ideal."

In his concluding essay on "Ecological Armageddon," Heilbroner reviews the horrors of overpopulation and resource exploitation. He ends on the ambivalent note that whereas things look hopeless, just possibly the issue of environmental deterioration may prove a rallying ground for the race to achieve genuine reformation in its presently suicidal systems of high consumption. The prospect of ecological disaster may well drive home the grand lesson of the social costs of endless, unaccounted-for private-profit seeking.

Reflecting on Heilbroner's book, it seemed to me that what appears to drive him most strongly is not some ideological fervor but his sense of repeated outrage over the fact that since our society's guiding dynamic, the price-market system, does not register social values truly, then all judgments, all allocations are awry, in fact perverse, corrupt. Prices, all kinds of prices, are treacherous, mindless signs because they fail to register external diseconomies or economies. They only register effective (i.e., cash-backed) demand, oblivious to malign or benign side effects, much less social need. (Isn't this really the unstated, since barely discerned, underlying cause of the alienation of America's young and the despair of its old?)

Heilbroner does not pretend to have a pat answer—indeed he devotes much discussion to the technical problem of socialist pricing, to von Mises's and Hayek's critiques, and Oscar Lange's rebuttals. But though he concedes here the great difficulties, nonetheless he can foresee no hope that capitalism can ever overcome the truly *gross* inequities of society, while socialism, though it may well have to use the market as a functional tool, in fact remains the only hope for social justice. The fact that this position is reached rather tortuously by a middle-aged, liberal academician of extreme sophistication, with a background of Harvard, Wall Street, free-lance writing, teaching, and intimate association with the "New York intellectuals" traumatized by the spectacle of Stalinism and by the disintegration of the American socialist movement—this fact endows it with a special significance.

Edwin Schur

The Blood of Society

THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY, by Richard M. Titmuss. New York: Pantheon Books. 339 pp. $6.95.

FROM EACH ACCORDING TO HIS NEEDS, to each according to his abilities! As Richard Titmuss makes clear, in this superb book, such is the operative principle that governs blood donorship in the United States and much of the world today. Titmuss, a major architect of the United Kingdom's National Health Service and the leading student of its health care and welfare policies, provides in this book a comprehensive view of blood distribution policies and practices and a devastating critique of the growing tendency to treat blood as a market commodity. On the basis of his careful study of the private market in blood in the United States (as compared to the completely voluntary British system), he reaches the following conclusions:

> . . . that the commercialization of blood and donor relationships represses the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community, lowers scientific standards, limits both personal and professional freedoms, sanctions the making of profits in hospitals and clinical laboratories, legalizes hostility between doctor and patient, subjects critical areas of medicine to the laws of the marketplace, places immense social costs on those least able to bear them—the poor, the sick and the inept—increases the danger of unethical behavior in various sectors of medical science and practice, and results in situations in which proportionately more and more blood is supplied by the poor, the unskilled, the unem-

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ployed, Negroes and other low income groups and categories of exploited human populations of high blood yielders. Redistribution in terms of blood and blood products from the poor to the rich appears to be one of the dominant effects of the American blood banking systems.

To have undertaken at all a systematic study of what might be called the social circulation of blood was an act of sociological imagination. This is so because many of us are strongly inclined to take blood for granted. Yet, as Titmuss documents, there is in fact a very serious world blood crisis with respect both to adequacy of supplies and medically sound criteria of quality; if present trends continue, there is every indication that the crisis will get much worse. By reviewing a wide array of official and medical surveys and analyses, supplemented by original research of his own (for example, on the expressed motives of voluntary donors in Britain for giving blood). Titmuss brings together an enormous amount of hitherto uncoordinated data. He clearly shows and beautifully articulates the broad social and moral significance of blood distribution.

In Western countries, the demand for blood is increasing rapidly—given the development of new medical techniques (a single open-heart operation, for example, may require as many as 60 donations), the increased resort to surgery of all sorts, the growing immunological use of blood products, and rising accident tolls. "In the foreseeable future, there appears to be no predictable limit to demand in countries like the United States and Britain, more especially if account is taken of unmet needs . . . and the great potentialities of demand in many areas of preventive medicine." Such factors as the perishability of blood, the desirable medical exemption of various categories of persons as donors, and medical limits on the frequency with which an eligible donor should give blood, inevitably restrict supply. In the United States, the difficulties are compounded because of the lack of any central planning; crucial shortages may arise in some communities while supplies are wasted in others. (Studies suggest that between 15 and 30 percent of the blood collected in the United States is wasted; comparable figures for Britain are between 1 and 2 percent.)

Titmuss concludes that the growth of commercial blood banks, rather than increasing overall supply, has simply meant a reduction in the proportion of voluntary donations. Recently, about one-half of all blood and plasma donations in the United States have been contributed by paid donors; a large proportion of the remaining voluntary donors give blood under one of several arrangements providing for an eventual "return" if needed. As Titmuss demonstrates, commercialization has a pronounced negative effect on the quality of available drug supplies. In the United States, the poor (who are, of course, often sick as well) now comprise the majority of blood donors. A not insignificant proportion of donors consists of Skid Row derelicts and drug addicts who donate as frequently as possible, and who consider "donorship" a major source of income. (Under a new technique for collecting plasma, in which red cells are immediately returned to the donor, very frequent donations may be accepted—from donors who usually are unable to maintain the medically desirable diet between donations.) Quite apart from deleterious effects on the health of donors, there is a substantial probability of dangerous impurities in the collected blood. Since it is not fully ascertainable in advance whether a donor carries certain diseases in his blood, the purity of blood supplies depends crucially on donor truthfulness (full disclosure of medical history, etc.); yet, as Titmus rightly emphasizes, a system under which blood is bought and sold hardly encourages such honesty. (The current risk of serum hepatitis following transfusion is about three or four times greater in the United States than it is in Britain; the rates in Japan and West Germany, both heavily reliant on purchased supplies, greatly exceed the American ones.)

Viewing blood distribution practices as an index of the quality of social life, Titmuss insists that we should distinguish between mere economic policy and more general social policy. After demonstrating that by strictly economic criteria the commercialization of blood is bad policy, he goes on to assert that there are other important aspects of the problem that can never be satisfactorily dealt with through economic calculation alone. Social policy "must inevitably be concerned with the unquantifiable and unmethodological aspects of man as well as with those aspects which can be identified and counted." For example, he comments, "no money values can be attached to the presence

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or absence of a spirit of altruism in a society." It is the preservation of such humane values, as well as the physical health of human beings, that is imperiled when we treat blood as a market commodity (for if we can treat blood in this way, Titmuss asks, what is there in human life that cannot be so treated).

Apparently neither centralized planning nor a formal attachment to socialism ensures a satisfactory policy in this area. It is depressing to learn that there is complete reliance on paid donors in Sweden, and even more so to discover that the Soviet Union makes substantial payments to a large proportion of donors. Titmuss tells us relatively little about why it is that Britain has succeeded so well in maintaining its voluntary system (which produces adequate supplies and draws on a generally representative pool of donors), though he does comment on the broadly altruistic spirit that he feels is reinforced by the policies and practices of the National Health Service there. Certainly it seems likely that the major characteristics of a society's general system of health care are likely to be found as well in such subsidiary systems as that involving the distribution of blood. From this standpoint, the commercialization of blood in the United States reflects the continuing treatment of medical care in market terms. Some readers may feel Titmuss is rather optimistic in concluding that the British experience illustrates "how social policy can help to actualize the social and moral potentialities of all citizens." The book is a marvelous demonstration of the ways in which systematic social research—even in its use of statistical survey results—can at the same time be both "relevant" and theoretically provocative.

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE YPSL *(continued from page 323)*

YPSLs have been active on many issues. They have provided the leadership for the Youth Committee to Support the GE workers, and thus have taken an active part in the grape and lettuce boycotts initiated by the United Farm Workers' Organizing Committee. They are now preparing to mobilize student support for national health insurance. They have fought for peace in Vietnam and for a change in U.S. policy through both Negotiation Now! and the Vietnam Moratorium, and they have demonstrated against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the persecution of Soviet Jewry.

YPSLs have concentrated most of their energies in two national programs they helped establish. The first is Frontlash, a voter registration program that had projects in 10 states in the last election. Approximately 10,000 student volunteers worked with Frontlash and succeeded in registering 200,000 poor and minority group voters. Half of these voters were registered in key assembly districts in California in an effort that helped liberals take control of the state legislature.

The second program is the Youth Committee for Peace and Democracy in the Middle East, a nonsectarian coalition that is trying to rally student support of a lasting Mideast peace settlement that will secure the existence of every state in the area. In concrete terms, this has meant standing up for Israel's right to exist against the violent opposition of New and Old Left groups, and trying to convey to students an appreciation for Israel's social democratic institutions. The Youth Committee organizes teach-ins and debates, publishes a monthly bulletin called *Crossroads* that has a circulation of 20,000, and is now initiating a national petition campaign calling upon the U.S. government to guarantee Israel's security.

The YPSL faces a number of problems in the coming years, among which will be the growing student apathy that is accompanying the disintegration of the New Left, the tendency on the part of many students to escape into a counter culture, and the rise of a strong New Right on campus. But having lived through the rise and fall of the New Left, the YPSL should continue to make gains on campus and to strengthen its ties with liberal adult movements, particularly the trade union movement. It should also benefit from the growth that its parent organization, the Socialist party, is now experiencing. If the YPSL can maintain its cohesion and avoid the mistakes of past youth movements, it could provide the basis for a sustained and effective student radicalism, and this, in turn, could lead to the revival of the Socialist movement in the United States.

—C. G. □

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

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

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

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